On 20 January 1968, a Marine patrol made contact with NVA troops to the northeast of the base. In his engagement, an NVA officer surrendered to an outpost of marines and told his interrogators that the NVA would attack the Marine outposts on Hills 881N and 861, and the Khe Sanh base that night.
The NVA struck Khe Sanh and its outposts with rocket, artillery, mortar, and small arms fire at 0530 on 21 January. The ammunition depot and the fuel supplies were blown up and heavy fighting occurred on hill 861, but the Marines held their posts. Operation Niagara was quickly activated by General Westmoreland. This operation, in the planning stage since early January, called for Khe Sanh to be defended not only by the Marine garrison, but by awesome firepower supplied by B-52?s, tactical air, artillery, and mortars.
The hills surrounding the base were of great importance to the defense of Khe Sanh. Fearing the similar result as Dien Bien Phu, the Marines refused to allow the NVA control of the hills, which would give their artillery a good vantage point. Another reason the hills were so important was to keep anti-aircraft guns from shredding American planes in the area. Had the NVA been able to knock he Marines off those summits, they would have been able to fire down the throats of the base defenders and make their position vulnerable, as well as make air resupply virtually impossible.
The air support given to the Marines at Khe Sanh was phenomenal. The Air Force dropped over 100,000 tons of bombs into the area. They, along with Army and Marine aircraft, kept the necessary supplies flowing to the base. The runway was damaged heavily when the ammunition dumps were destroyed, so the situation called for innovation, and the Air Force supplied it. They came up with a new delivery system called the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System(LAPES) and the Ground Proximity Extraction System(GPES). LAPES was a self-contained system that used a reefed cargo parachute to extract a roller mounted cargo pallet from the rear of the aircraft from approximately five feet off the deck. GPES extracted cargo by means of snagging an arresting cable, similar to those used on aircraft carriers, with a hook extended from the boom at the rear of the aircraft.
The last sizeable NVA attack on Khe Sanh occurred on the night of February 29th-March 1st. This was a suicide attack made by General Giap, mostly out of frustration. Throughout the battle, his forces were distracted from attacking Khe Sanh heavily because of the hill battles and American air power. The only significant effect the NVA had on the base itself was the artillery barrage and he menacing sporadic attacks by small groups of NVA.
The siege ended on March 6th, when NVA forces began to withdrawal, although fighting didn?t cease until March 30th. Operation PEGASUS, a combined relief force of Marines and Soldiers of the 1st U.S. Air Cavalry Division reached Khe Sanh on April 8th. The 77-day siege was over, and the relief effort had begun. This effort proved to be very costly for the Americans. Thus, General Westmoreland decided to abandon the base. So from the end of Operation PEGASUS to the end of the evacuation of Khe Sanh, the losses suffered by the US forces were disastrous: 7,000 American troops put out of action, 122 planes shot down, 69 military vehicles, and many munitions depots destroyed.
Analysis
As was stated previously, the primary factors of both the sieges, at Dien Bien Phu and at Khe Sanh, were the use of artillery, infantry, and airpower as the primary components of the siege. When comparing these three items with regard to the battles, we can find out what went wrong, and what went right.
The French artillery at Dien Bien Phu was rendered useless by the Viet Minh because the French did not know where to fire. The Viet Minh kept positions well concealed from air observation as well and defended from ground observation. Another reason why the artillery was rendered useless was, as they would fire their artillery, the Viet Minh would target them and destroy the French guns. This had no real impact on French because for most of the siege, they didn?t have artillery shells to fire.
The Americans a Khe Sanh employed their artillery effectively by using ground and air reconnaissance to locate targets. The ammunition supplied to the artillery batteries provided them the means to fire whenever needed. The NVA employed effective artillery fire as well; by destroying the runway and ammunition dump, the NVA proved their artillery was formidable. But US ground reconnaissance located the artillery and provided grid coordinates to the B-52?s who would carpet-bomb the area. In this case, the infantry helped the artillery as well as the air power.
The US Marines, who defended the base, were a cohesive unit, dedicated to survival and teamwork. They kept the NVA forces at bay until the battle was over, and didn?t allow penetration of the base. There are no publicized reports of Marine desertion. The NVA troops were not a fortunate. They were plagued with desertion and lack of motivation. General Giap had hastily prepared these men, women, and boys, so they were ill trained. Many of the troops, who deserted, did so after the US began the B-52 bombing of the area. General Giap was helpless to stop his deserters, and was helpless to send to send his fellow countrymen to get slaughtered in the wire around Khe Sanh.
That was not the case for General Giap 14 years earlier. At Dien Bien Phu, Giap?s troops were highly motivated. With the arrival of the artillery batteries and anti-aircraft weapons, he Viet Minh seemed control the battle. The French troops, on the other hand, were made up of French Army, Legionnaires, and a wide variety of other nationalities. This mixture of troops did not work in favor of the French. Many of the Legionnaires were not French, nor did they speak French, so communication was a problem. But an even bigger problem, was the moral of the troops. Many deserted, while others stole and hoarded supplies in their trenches. Overall, the forces lacked unity.
The greatest difference between the two battles was air power. For both Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh, the Viet Minh and NVA respectively, had no air power. So with the lack of airpower, French and American forces controlled the skies. The French could not take advantage of this. Although they did not face an enemy air force, they did not have enough aircraft to suppress enemy anti-aircraft fire. This resulted in heavy losses of transport aircraft. Navarre understood that he could not expect the delivery of additional air assent, but he continued with the operation, and as a result, the French no longer live in Vietnam.
The Americans were quite different from the French in regards to air power. At Khe Sanh, aircraft were readily available for a multitude of missions. Ground attack aircraft were utilized to suppress enemy anti-aircraft guns, covering the transports while in the area. Fixed wing aircraft delivered supplies, ammunition, and even troops to help relieve the garrison. With complete control of the skies, the US forces dominated the siege at Khe Sanh.
Siege warfare has been around since the early medieval times. Since then, there have been many advancements in weapons and technology, but the siege tactics remain the same. There is an opponent in a fortified position, and an opponent trying to overtake that position.
In the battles of Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh, the siege was the method of attack by the Vietnamese forces. The French at Dien Bien Phu were disorganized and lacked unit cohesiveness. That coupled with their lack of supplies and no air power, they were thoroughly defeated by the Viet Minh.
At Khe Sanh, the Marines worked together as a unit to prevent the NVA for taking the base. In a combined arms operation, the Air Force, Army and Navy all helped the Marines keep the NVA at bay by supplying air superiority. The US forces completely dominated the air, ground and artillery and that was the means of their success.
The battles at Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh proved that siege warfare in the modern theater is very costly in terms of money, lives and strategic considerations. If a siege is unsuccessfully prepared, and defeat is imminent, then you have won nothing by attempting the siege in the first place.
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