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North Korea Essay Research Paper The United (стр. 1 из 3)

North Korea Essay, Research Paper

The United States has been presented a dilemma towards its foreign policy with

the Democratic People?s Republic of Korea (North Korea). North Korea?s

alleged launch of a new Taepo-Dong I missile on August 31, 1998 has heightened

American worries and escalated an already tense situation with North Korea. The

United States response towards this new missile, which could possibly be able to

reach the edges of both Alaska and Hawaii , will be a factor in its decision on

whether or not to continue to finance support towards North Korea. New sanctions

could mean the collapse of a weak North Korean economy. Already on the brink of

economic and political collapse, the loss of U.S. and KEDO aid could push them

over the edge and into political ruin. One major factor involved in the foreign

policy decision is the collapse of North Korea. It could mean one of three

things: Implosion (collapse of the state), explosion (war with South Korea) or

absorption (reform and reunification). In May 1997, acting Director of Central

Intelligence, George Tenet, stated, ?One of the things that worries us most is

an implosion internally.? The result of an implosion, the collapse of the

state, would be hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing to China and South

Korea. China has already begun stepping up troops at the North Korean border to

halt the flow of refugees should this happen. South Korea would possibly use

force to deter refugees to the south. Another factor here is the humanitarian

influences. Massive floods, droughts and typhoons since 1995 have forced North

Korea to accept international food aid. Widespread famine has reportedly killed

hundreds of thousands of people. This acceptance is contrary to the North Korean

government?s policy of ?juche? or self-reliance . It is feared that the

government of North Korea is diverting scarce food sources from the civilian

sector to its military, even at a time of humanitarian crisis . A third factor

is the general flow of our foreign policy towards North Korea. Since 1994, we

have been implementing constructive engagement with North Korea. The Agreed

Framework was a barter system where the United States would provide economic and

food aid to North Korea. North Korea would cease production of nuclear weapons

and they would make other concessions as well. Congress has recently called for

the end to this. In a plenary session on September 18, the US Congress adopted a

resolution, H.J. RES. 83, to call on President Clinton to stop implementing the

U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework reached in Geneva, 1994 . On September 17,

Congress also passed a resolution to cut funding to KEDO. The State Department

feels that constructive engagement is still the answer. Secretary of State press

briefer James P. Rubin said, ?We believe that if we can?t fulfill our part

of the agreement, it will be much, much harder to convince the North Koreans to

fulfill their pat of the agreement. ? This highlights differences within the

U.S. government that may effect the outcome. Another factor is the North Korea

military presence in northeast Asia. With increases technology in SCUD missiles

and new longer range missiles being developed, North Korea is a source of

instability in its region. It is one of the last Marxist regimes. Unlike the

other communist countries? peaceful exit from the international scene, North

Korea could strike out in desperation as they try to hold on to power as they

slip out. North Korean military implications are important in two ways 1) the

exporting and sales of missiles and technology abroad; and 2) the domestic

stockpiling of troops and weapons along the De-Militarized zone. These two

factors will effect the United States foreign policy to North Korea. Historical

Context The United States has held virtually no relations with North Korea since

the end of the Korean War. In response to the Korean War, the United States

Government established severe economic sanctions towards N. Korea under the

Trading with the Enemy Act in 1950. These sanctions and additional sanctions

from the West caused North Korea to fall behind technologically to its neighbor,

South Korea over time. Kim Il ?sung dominated most political and governmental

affairs since the Korean War. Both as premier and president, Kim continued to

press for the reunification of Korea (under the Korean Workers? Party rule of

course). Domestically, he transformed Korea into one of the most repressive and

strictly regimented societies in the world. The Korean Workers? Party

dominated all aspects of life; police forces were also used to suppress the

slightest dissent or opposition . In doing this Kim terrorized his own people

and thus failed to produce adequate quantities of food and consumer goods for

them. Nearly one quarter or one third of the North Korean budget has been based

on the military. Much trade involved the export of military goods such as

missiles. North Korea began producing advanced missile systems in 1984. They

have also been producing chemical and biological weapons since the 1960?s.

This coupled with their exporting of missile systems to Iran, Syria and Egypt

provided sufficient grounds for the United States to ignore relations with them.

The United States also feared another Korean War. If we began to bolster the

military there and to begin to take more action in the east Pacific, North Korea

could become unsecured and launch an attack on South Korea. North Korea became a

party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty in 1985. Although a party to it,

they did not finalize a safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy

Agency until 1992, thereby becoming a full member. During the late eighties the

N. Korea government worked to advance and distribute its missile systems. The

United States was worried by this but continued their quarantine of them. The

IAEA continued to inspect the nuclear program and take stock. The year 1994

started a tension point between the U.S. and N. Korea. North Korea had been

under constant watch by the United Nations and the United States due to their

experimentation with nuclear energy. The International Atomic Energy Agency, who

had been the main group responsible for observing and keeping track of North

Korean nuclear progress, reported that it had become impossible to determine

whether nuclear fuel had been diverted from nuclear reactors near the city of

Yongbyon. Any ?misplaced? atomic fuel could possibly be used to produce

plutonium, the basis for nuclear weapons. The volatile and hostile nature of the

North Korean government could use nuclear weapons to a maximum advantage for

terror. This gave grounds for the United Nation to impose sanctions towards

North Korea. President Clinton and the United States pressed for the sanctions.

The North Korean government responded by threatening to declare war. In response

to the situation, Former-President Jimmy Carter met with Kim Il-Sung in mid-June

and helped to ease the growing tension. His negotiations were cut short by the

death of the Korean leader in early July. But the talks resumed and on October

21, 1994, after much talking, the United States and North Korea agreed to sign

the ?Agreed Framework.? In this, North Korea pledged to: 1. Freeze

operations at, or cease construction of, all of these reactors and cease

operating the Yongbyon reprocessing plant, with the freeze to be verified by the

IAEA; 2. Not separate plutonium from the spent fuel removed from the 5-Mwe

reactor in May 1994 (the status of the fuel to be monitored by the IAEA. 3. Ship

the spent fuel out of North Korea; and 4. Thereafter dismantle all facilities of

nuclear proliferation concern. In exchange, North Korea will be provided with

two less proliferation-prone light-water reactors (LWRs) and a number of other

energy-related inducements as well as security assurances. (See appendix A for

full text) This gave way for better relations between the United States and

North Korea. President Clinton took positive steps by signing an executive order

in January 1995 to reduce some sanctions towards North Korea by allowing private

US firms to sell foodstuffs to them at market prices. The international

community sought to further be involved in North Korea?s new developments. On

March 5, 1995, the United States, Japan, and South Korea formed a multinational

consortium, called the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO),

to supply North Korea with the two promised light water reactors from the Agreed

Framework. This group would become the liaison between Washington and North

Korea. It is the principle agent in implementing the Agreed Framework of 1994.

One of KEDO?s first breakthroughs came on December 15, 1995 when they and

North Korea signed a Supply Agreement for the actual financing and supply of the

reactors. 1996 started a year of ups and downs in the US-North Korean

relationship. In April, the two countries held a two-day talk discussing the

North Korean ballistic missile program. The United States wanted North Korea to

stop development of long range missiles and missile exports. In exchange, the US

would lift additional sanctions that were imposed on DPRK. May saw these talks

go sour as North Korea failed to comply and the US imposed additional sanctions.

Things turned even worse for North Korea when on September 18, 1996, a North

Korean reconnaissance submarine was discovered grounded off of South Korea?s

coast. Its crew had reportedly gone to shore and killed South Koreans while

conducting a limited form of guerrilla warfare South Korea called for a limited

halt on KEDO implementation of the Agreed Framework until the North issued an

apology. Japan and The United States agreed, putting significant pressure on the

North Korean government until December 29 of that year when a formal apology was

administered. Clinton issued a statement saying, ? I am pleased that Pyongyang

has pledged to prevent the recurrence of such an incident and has expressed its

willingness to work with others for durable peace and stability on the

peninsula.? The situation was resolved. The next day the US rewarded them by

approving a license sought by Cargill, Inc., a US firm, to negotiate a

commercial deal to sell N. Korea up to 500,000 tons of grain. 1997 was no

exception to the struggle between North Korea and the members of KEDO. When the

Taiwan Power Co. announced it would ship 200,000 barrels of low-level nuclear

waste to Pyongsan, the United States and Japan fiercely protested fearing that

the waste would be used as a source from which the N. Koreans could extract

plutonium. The North Koreans were still wary of the United States. Washington

pressured the Taiwan Power Co. and the North Korean government until they agreed

to postpone shipments until further times. KEDO went along as planned.

Domestically, North Koreas economy was collapsing; massive floods and typhoons

from 1995 destroyed many areas of food production and cause widespread famine

and disease. Production ground down to a minimum. This put large amounts of

pressure on a government that still stressed self-sufficiency. The launching of

Pakistan?s first nuclear weapon in April 1998 caused many in the US chagrin.

The source of the missiles and technology transfer that they applied to the

weapon was also a source irritation: North Korea. The United States condemned

this. Sanctions were again applied as the US became aware of transfers made from

the North Korean Mining Development Corporation. Since the North Korean economy

is state run the sanctions applied to the government and forbade any arms or

arms technology sales to them. This leads us up to August 31, 1998 when the

Democratic People?s Republic of North Korea launched what appeared to be a

missile test of their newest missile, the Taepo-Dong I. Immediate Aftermath In

the next few days after the August 31 launch, the world, especially the members

of KEDO were in shock. They raced to find out just what it was that the N.

Koreans had launched with their new missile. The fact they had developed the new

missile was of concern as well. Its new long-range capabilities would be sought

after on the international arms market. Older ties with Iran, Egypt, Pakistan,

and Syria could bud new agreements that would spread the use of these missiles

outward into Asia and the Middle East. The US denounced N. Korea?s government

for the lack of them to notify Washington of the launch. Our surprise turned

into a month of ups and downs with the State Department and the Defense

Department, and Congress. Congress wanted US involvement in North Korea to halt

(anything above the liaison office level) due to the failed cooperation with

nuclear inspection on part of the North Korean government. The North Korean

nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, near Pyongyang, has long been a target of the

International Atomic Energy Agency, which has complained about Pyongyang?s

?uncooperative attitudes? towards nuclear inspection. The House stresses

that nuclear inspections should be thorough and complete and the IAEA inspectors

should have the freedom to conduct any and all inspections that it deems

necessary to fully account for the stocks of plutonium and other nuclear

materials in North Korea. The House also attempted to pass a resolution on

September 17, 1998 that would kill KEDO funding in 1999. The State Department

replied to Congress stating that KEDO was vital to US interests on the Korean

Peninsula as a foundation for stability. Without US funding in whole, the United

States? portion of the Agreed Framework would not be able to be carried out

completely. Charles Kartman, the Special Envoy for the Korean Peace Process and

the U.S. Representative to KEDO (from the State Department) testified before the

House International Relations Committee on September 24 defending the United

States? interests in North Korea through KEDO. He verified that the Agreed

Framework ?also provides a means to engage North Korea on other key concerns

as terrorism, MIA remains and missile activities.? The State Department

basically stated that through constructive engagement with KEDO, we could open

new doors to negotiations with military and economic ideals. He also cited the

benefits of the use of United States humanitarian aid towards North Korea as an

enhancer of relations. The Department of Defense?s news briefing on September

8, 1998 seemed to be pessimistic towards the North Korean?s claims of the

purpose of the launch; to place a North Korean satellite in orbit. At that time

SPACECOM had not observed any new object in orbit around the earth that could

comply with the North Korean?s claims. Also no radio transmissions were picked

up from the frequency in which the North Koreans claimed their satellite was

transmitting. The Defense Department seemed rather amused at the notion of a

North Korean attack on any troops abroad. Kenneth Bacon, a DOD representative

and briefer stated, ?I think any country that would contemplate using weapons

to attack United States troops abroad would have to expect a very swift and

decisive, maybe even massive, response. I?m sure the North Korean?s are

aware of that. If they?re not, they should be aware of it now.? James Rubin

followed up on this with a State Department briefing the next day. He reflected

the notion that they were still assessing data on the launch. He also reported

progress on talks that were currently taking place in New York concerning the

Agreed Framework and the DPRK?s nuclear program. These Four Party Talks

(Japan, United States, South Korea and North Korea) had been taking place since

the beginnings of KEDO. Another was to take place at the beginning of October.

In the briefing, however, Mr. Rubin stated, ?We have no illusions about

dealing the North Korean government, and we do not trust North Korea.? A

reporter later asked Rubin whether or not he was aware that a South Korean

spokesperson said that S. Korea, Japan and the US had reached a consensus that

the missile was a failed satellite launch. Rubin again stated that the US was

still looking at all possibilities and that additional launches should not be

repeated. He also stated that KEDO would attempt to proceed with the

implementation of the Agreed Framework. Talks resumed on October 1 about United

States doubts in the North Korean missile programs. James Rubin praised the

resumption of the talks. He also reiterated the point that the United States was

very interested and worried about the North Korean missile programs and exports.