What Is Happiness, And Is Our Own Happiness The Only Thing We Ultimately Desire Essay, Research Paper
Happiness, according not only to
utilitarianism but also to popular culture, is something that we should not
merely desire, but actively pursue. This seems to be, at first glance, a
plausible, indeed laudable, goal, but there is one inherent detail that needs
to be explained ? what happiness actually is. This is especially important in
the case of a philosophical doctrine like utilitarianism, to which the idea of
happiness is axiomatic. In this essay, I will argue that most attempts to
define the concept by using objective definitions of ?pleasure? are impossible,
and that ?pleasure? itself, although an element of happiness, is
unsatisfactory. An attempt will be made to suggest that ?virtue? and morality,
whilst commendable, cannot even form part of a subjective reading of happiness
A case will, though, be made to argue that despite the inability to find a
satisfactory definition, happiness is merely one of a group of feelings which
we ultimately desire. In Utilitarianism, Mill
defines happiness as ?pleasure and the absence of pain?, and the antonym
was defined as ?pain and the privation of pleasure?. Jean Austin has
pointed out that in his essay, Mill appears to sometimes use ?pleasure?
interchangeably with happiness. If this were Mill?s intention, then Mill is
using it erroneously. ?Pleasure? is a temporary experience, whilst happiness
relates to an overall assessment of one?s feelings over an extended period. I
may have been depressed all week, but I got momentary pleasure when I attended
a concert. Thus a better reading of Mill?s definition, which he does in fact
give, would be to see happiness as the net balance of pleasures contrasted to
pains. This goes some way to being more satisfactory: if I had an enjoyable
week I could say that I had lot of pleasurable experiences, and if there were
only a few minor disappointments it could indeed be said to be a ?happy? week.
Conversely, if it were truly unbearable save for one incident, it would be
absurd to say that happiness was obtained at least once during that week. Yet,
it still seems forced to consider ?pleasure? to be the sole ingredient of
happiness. A manic depressive may, despite experiencing many pleasurable
experiences, still be unable to be considered ?happy?. Despite these limitations, it still
appears that pleasurable experiences are the backbone to any attempt to define
happiness. Many things, though, can be said to offer pleasure, yet it may be
hard to justify most forms of temporary pleasure as a form of happiness. A
pleasurable sensation can be obtained more easily from alcohol than from
hiking, yet we would consider someone who preferred the former to the latter to
be a drunkard. Any definition of happiness would not wish to allow chemically
induced forms of pleasure to be an acceptable form. Mill wrote of a difference
between ?higher? and ?lower? pleasures, the latter being more sensuous and the
former more intellectual. Yet by suggesting this, he is turning pleasure into
an objective issue: how people consider the actions of others. I may prefer
listening to Mahler?s symphonies at a concert whilst my friend may prefer
dancing and drinking all night long in some nightclub. Indeed, we might equally
abhor each other?s choice. To say that the former is a higher form of pleasure
is not very far from displaying snobbery. Pleasure, and what constitutes it, is
a subjective decision. Further, some forms of pleasure that we should condone
are likely to be classed as ?lower? pleasures. Is an intellectual who has read
every publication about hill walking, contributed to debates on what kind of
footwear is more appropriate for various types of terrain, and maybe even
written extensively on the theory behind the sport, yet never actually set foot
on a moor in his life indulging in a higher form of pleasure than someone who
heads out into the wilderness at every opportunity? Most of us would be
inclined to consider the latter to be experiencing a higher form of pleasure,
yet Mill?s distinction seems to suggest the former would.[1]
Any attempt to redefine the categories to allow for such examples would
ultimately fail: what gives pleasure and what does not is a matter for the
individual.? For these reasons, any attempt to
define happiness in terms of pleasure is unlikely to lead to a satisfactory
result. Indeed, there is a case that a certain element of pain may be needed to
achieve happiness. Risk-taking is usually applauded by society: even if the
plan fails one can learn from it. It may even lead to a more fulfilling life,
in which one is continually striving for happiness yet has to undergo numerous
setbacks. This, though, also seems to suggest an objective form of happiness:
someone wants an easy, risk-free life is likely to be just as happy as the
risk-taker. We, when asked to pass judgment on who we consider to have had the
more fulfilling, and thus happier, life may disagree, but to do this to suggest
that happiness is objective, rather than subjective. Novell Smith has described
this quite acutely when he says that a drunkard and a gourmet both aim at
pleasure, ?but what pleases each of them is a different thing?. If pleasure is
to be accepted into a definition of happiness, it can only do so in a
subjective way. Whilst pleasurable actions might be said to contribute to
happiness, their temporary nature needs to be accounted for. Moreover, one may wish to do things
that do not provide pleasure, yet still lead to happiness. The obvious paradox
of masochism aside, there are cases where this can be suggested to do so. A
martyr may choose to go to the stake because of a belief of some reward for
remaining true to one?s beliefs in the next world. As will be discussed later,
a hedonist may feel that he therefore gets pleasure from this expectation, but
it still can be said that he is not gaining pleasure from the actual process. If happiness cannot be defined, can
it still be said to be the only thing we ultimately desire? Before hedonism is
discussed, it is worth looking what is meant by ?to desire?. Austin accuses
Mill of using this verb to cover the same ground as the verb ?to want?, which
by doing makes the statement that we desire pleasure a necessary truth. That
this extension is an erroneous one is easy to explain: ?to want? suggests immediacy.
One can want ice cream or a life free of poverty, and both may be said to be
obtainable at some point in the short-run. ?To desire? suggests some goal that,
whilst it may be fulfilled, has to be striven for. To take part in a gold rush
because one wants gold suggests there is a chance of obtaining it, bringing
immediate pleasure. To do so because one desires gold not only suggests
some form of satisfaction that will be gained, but also a sense of yearning for
something that may not happen.[2]
If this logic is followed (providing it is correct), then one can want
pleasure, but happiness can only be desired. I may fulfil a want for
pleasure from canoeing, but I cannot fulfil my desire for happiness by going
out on the water once. Of course, as will be discussed, there is neither any
reason why one can only desire one goal, nor is there any validity in saying
that happiness is all that can be desired. A hedonist would argue that
ultimately all human actions are done for the sake of pleasure. Thus, all our
actions are undertaken because we only desire happiness. The immediate
criticism is that we do things we do not enjoy, like undergoing a painful
dental operation. This can quickly be countered by saying that we desire the
pleasure of the painless mouth we will have after the operation. Yet, as has
often been pointed out, all actions can be ultimately broken down into the
quest for pleasure. Charity work may be considered undertaken because one feels
that it is beneficial to society, but closer analysis would seem to say that it
is only undertaken because one enjoys the pleasure obtained from doing it.
Thus, all altruistic actions are selfish. Gosling gives an example of parents
undergoing poverty and hardship in order to provide for a decent education for
their children. It might be argued, following the reasoning above, that
pleasure is their motive, even though they may not live to see its fulfilment.
A counter argument suggests that they do it not for pleasure, but because they
consider it their duty: virtue thus excludes hedonism. Gosling gives three
attempts to try to reconcile the pursuit of pleasure with the concept ?duty?:
one of them involves the people blindly following irrational notions, another
is that they are stoical and see pleasure in hardship, and a third is that
society, noticing they failed to undertake one duty, may think he fails in all
their duties and responsibilities. Surprisingly, he appears to miss a simple
method of reconciling the two: they may be thrown into such moral angst that
until they decide on a course of action they cannot sleep at all, are
miserable, or some other ailment. By choosing to do what they consider their
duty, they are able to have a more pleasant life. Admittedly, blind obedience
to a concept of duty is not to be applauded ? most of us value independence ?
but such a criticism is likely to degenerate into an unacceptable objective
form of happiness. The above can thus be used to give a
hedonistic reason for altruism. Indeed, it can be said that hedonism and altruism
are not incompatible: giving money, time, and/or services to charity, whatever
the motive, is still altruistic.? Novell
Smith is right in saying that if such actions are undertaken in order to
satisfy one?s generosity, this means his motive was generosity. He is right to
say that selfishness implies hostility to others, making altruism compatible
with hedonism. Many philosophers, like Mill or
Aristotle, have considered virtue to be an extremely important aspect of
happiness. It is easy to understand why. If one were to seek happiness from
torturing animals, it would be absurd to consider his happiness as advanced as
that of St Francis of Assisi. Virtue is a form of happiness that is to be
applauded, to be aimed for, and is the noblest form. Yet to hold such a form is
to suggest that happiness is an objective concept. What constitutes virtue or
morality is decided externally. All societies have a moral creed, and we all
judge the morality of the actions of another. What is morally acceptable to
one, say abortion, may be abhorrent to another. But earlier, happiness was
defined as a subjective concept. Altruism may indeed give one a warm glow and a
feeling of pleasure, and increase one?s overall happiness. But to say that one
who dedicates his life to others is happier than one who only begrudgingly puts
loose change in a charity box is to make happiness an objective judgment. ?Most of us, I am sure, would relish a society where all aided one
another, and selfishness et al were banished from the earth. Whether this would
make each individual happier is another question. For these reasons, any
definition of happiness which includes a concept of virtue is flawed. If this
accepted, then it is easy to follow through that happiness cannot be the only
thing we ultimately desire, as this would prevent universal altruism or virtue
from being a goal we should all aim for. Happiness may indeed be desirable. An
individual may consider that he cannot walk past suffering without feeling an
urge to help another, else his happiness would suffer. This remains valid. All
that is being denied is that happiness is sole end we desire as a society. [1] Admittedly,
he does go on to suggest a superiority of the ?active over the passive?, yet in
this example it can be said that both are equally active ? one in the drawing
room, one on the moor. [2] Is there a
difference in motive? The obtaining of the gold is what is being sought in
both, but I am trying to suggest that to say one wants gold is different to
saying one desires it. ?To want? appears only to be used as an expectation of
immediate fulfilment. Austin thinks it is a wide verb, yet she lists a number
of close synonyms like ?to wish?, ?to choose?, which she argues are not the
same. Yet ?to want? cannot cover the same area as ?to wish? unless one is
confusing the two verbs. To use her example, ?I wish to be young again? is
correct: ?I want to be young again? is either wrong, or merely the restating of
a wish but with a different verb.