Nuclear War: Why We Need Our Nukes Essay, Research Paper
Nuclear War: Why we Need our NukesAfter much research and discussion I have decided to bring up the constant and ever rising conflict of nuclear warfare and why we need to keep our nuclear weapons.I believe very strongly that we need to keep, test, and build nuclear weapons, people will say that we need to keep a peaceful world and ban all nuclear weapons. The people that talk like that are simply ignorant; because if there is ever any kind of nuclear war or any type of superior threat that needs to be dealt with strongly and promptly nuclear force is most likely going to be the most tactical and reasonable choice.If all the test ban treaties ever written were to come into effect our nation would be in serious danger. Due to the simple fact that everybody else would advance in the world of nuclear technology why we are over here sitting on our sorry asses trying to make the world a better place for plants, animals, and ourselves. I believe either our nation is incredibly ignorant or they are not telling the public everything the amendment grants to us. I strongly believe that if we knew everything that was going on in the world of nuclear warfare, the opinions of very many people would change.Right now as we speak Russia, China, Pakistan and many other countries have access to nuclear weapon’s which makes them a threat! So why they develop new ways to nuke us, we are fighting with the people about weather or not we should waste tax dollars on a project that could some day save the lives of the United States. You can’t forget that nuclear weapons are not used so much as a weapon but as a deterrent. What I am saying by that is, instead of finishing a war with nukes, we could prevent the war all together by using the nukes as a scary little tactic to keep them at bay.This will never be a nuclear free world, you can’t dismiss the ever growing world of technology, there will always be the threat of nuclear war, and if its not nukes it will be something more advanced and more dangerous. I just don’t understand the big deal!Whoops, hit the wrong button. I really don’t care much about the people, or the particular arguments involved on either side. I can only say that it is not something that can ever be right or wrong one way or the other. I don’t truly believe that any one with nukes ever intends to use them, but I think the point of nukes is the “what if” scare factor. Is anyone really willing to take that chance? Nuclear weapons have become the standard for gaining international voice and power, and as far as I can see there really is no other medium for gaining either. The only way for a poor, unindustrialized country (such as Pakistan) to be heard is to instill a fear of annihilation, or just severe damage, in the hearts of the people of other more developed countries. Let’s face it, if they didn’t scare us, we would never look twice in their direction. Nuclear weapons are, I feel, a permanent part of our world for as long as it continues to exist. Mine as well get used to them.Here is an interview given on Tuesday night to Michael Krepon’I fear the treaty will be in limbo for many, many years’Michael Krepon provided rare insight into the arcane Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on Tuesday night. The president of the Henry L Stimson Centre was engaged in an illuminating discussion with some of India’s bestknown analysts on defence issues– Achin Vanaik, Praful Bidwai, Raja Mohan and C Uday Bhaskar. Check out the transcript. It’s fascinating.amberish (Tue Aug 13 20:58:41 1996 IST): Mr Krepon, let us begin now. Would you like to comment on how non-officals in the US view’s India’s stand? Krepon (Tue Aug 13 21:02:21 1996 IST): Amberish: The idea of a timetable for diarmament remains firmly rooted in the game-plans of many states and NGOs, but I’m not sure that the idea is spreading. The NWS–except China–remain firmly opposed. The negotiating tactics by some NNWS in Geneva demanding more by way of preambular commitments toward complete nuclear disarmament may be tragically wrong. These tactics assume that the NWS are the demandeurs for a CTBT, and that this provides leverage to get more on disarmament. In fact, only the US Government is strongly interested in a CTBT at this point. The other NWS would just as soon see the Treaty wither and die. Moreover, support for the CTBT here in the US cannot be taken for granted–witness the Republican Party’s presidential platform calling for a resumption of testing and opposition to CTBT ratification. The chances for a CTBT are slipping away.pat (Tue Aug 13 21:03:44 1996 IST): Hello Mr Krepon,Why should India sign CTBT when it is surrounded by neighbours who have a track record of hostilities commited against India.amberish (Tue Aug 13 21:06:44 1996 IST): Mr Krepon, true that at this stage it is the US pushing the CTBT while others would rather watch it die. That is exactly the fear, especially India’s, that others really do not want to de-arm. And how far can India go with a China on its borders, which even the US is wary of?Nikhil Lakshman (Tue Aug 13 21:07:02 1996 IST): Mr Krepon, has Pakistan agreed to sign the CTBT? Is it true that Washington has struck a deal with Beijing to persuade Pakistan to sign the CTBT?Krepon (Tue Aug 13 21:07:19 1996 IST): Nikhil and Amberish: Many thanks for inviting me to join you tonight for this chat. I am grateful to you for opening this direct line of communication. Right now, the Clinton Administration is quite concerned that chances for a truly comprehensive and verifiable test ban treaty are slipping away, in part because of India’s stand, in part by the non-constructive roles played by other countries. Most recently, Iran has indicated that it would join India in taking blocking action, preventing the transmission of the CTBT from Geneva to the UN General Assembly. I’m not sure that this is the kind of company that India wishes to keep.Vinay (Tue Aug 13 21:09:43 1996 IST): Mr Krepon, does this mean you wish India to sign the CTBT?amberish (Tue Aug 13 21:10:59 1996 IST): Mr Krepon, perhaps Iran’s stance comes about because right now the US is planning sanctions against Iran. An Iran pushed against the wall is hardly going to be cooperative. And while, I suppose, India is wary of being identified too closely with Iran, its opposition to just a CTBT has been constant.Krepon (Tue Aug 13 21:11:51 1996 IST): Nikhil: China’s support for a CTBT has been less than fulsome, as is evident by Beijing’s opposition to a flexible entry-into-force formula for the Treaty. My sense is that Islamabad would have great difficulty signing the CTBT if New Delhi refuses to do so. Benazir’s political opposition has expressed itself against this course of action, which limits her freedom of maneuver on this issue. I am not privvy to whatever “deal” was struck between the US and Chinese governments, but I doubt if Beijing could or would choose to force Islamabad’s hand on signing the Treaty–assuming one emerges from Geneva.amberish (Tue Aug 13 21:14:34 1996 IST): Mr Krepon, India is against joining the CTBT for fear of its security. So is the US in a position to give some sort of a guarantee against a nuclear threat to India? How valid and useful would such a guarantee be?Nikhil Lakshman (Tue Aug 13 21:16:39 1996 IST): Mr Krepon, There is amazing consensus on this issue in India and no political party would ever risk ignoring that consensus and sign the CTBT. Again, many Indians feel Washington persistently ignores New Delhi’s security concerns, so why they feel should India go along with the US on this issue? Krepon (Tue Aug 13 21:17:41 1996 IST): Amberish: Iran is actively pursuing the nuclear option, as is evident from Tehran’s purchasing interests on black markets, and its odd pursuit for a nuclear power program, despite its considerable oil reserves. Tehran would not be too displeased if the CTBT didn’t happen, which may account for its unfortunate blocking tactics. Vinay: Yes, I would like India to sign Nehru’s treaty, and I would like India not to block other states from signing Nehru’s treaty. This treaty is an essential precondition to the elimination of nuclear weapons. I believe it would be tragic to loose this treaty in pursuit of objectives that are unobtainable at this time.Nikhil Lakshman (Tue Aug 13 21:20:29 1996 IST): Is there a way out of the impasse? Or will the CTBT go ahead minus India, Iran and Pakistan? What happens three years hence? Some Indians fear likely sanctions if New Delhi refuses to sign by that deadline. Do you think that is possible? rajamohan (Tue Aug 13 21:21:30 1996 IST): hi michael, this is raja mohan and c uday bhaskar at the same number. could you tell us about the prospects for ratification of the ctbt in us congress, since the republicans seem tohave come out against the ctbt in their election platform?amberish (Tue Aug 13 21:23:30 1996 IST): Mr Krepon, the history of disarmament talks has been one of failures. And it fails because the status quo do not give any margin to accommodate the other powers-in-waiting. So how can this rigidity of the statu quo powers be overcome. And why on earth do Britain and France need nuclear weapons today. If they were to agree to disarm, would it not go a long way in convcing others of genuing disarmament desires?Nikhil Lakshman (Tue Aug 13 21:25:50 1996 IST): Mr Krepon,invoking Gandhi and Nehru may cut little ice with the Indian people who are fed up with what they interpret as Washington’s consistent balming of Pakistani interests, despite evidence of that country’s nuclear programme. In any case, why is India’s demand that the nuclear powers set a deadline for the obliteration of their nuclear arsenals impractical?uday bhaskar (Tue Aug 13 21:30:03 1996 IST): michael, has there ever been an EIF of this nature – where a nation that is opposing the draft is being named or shall we say being dragged into the treaty?and as a follow up – why was the US not able to prevail with the original EIF which talked about the five nuclear powers only?StarWar (Tue Aug 13 21:30:08 1996 IST): Does this episode emphasise the rhythm that third world countries can influence the world, only, by putting their foot down? Comments..amberish (Tue Aug 13 21:31:36 1996 IST): Mr Krepon, can there not be a CTBT minus the recaltricant nations, who might be persuaded to join a few years later if they realise that there is no point in being out of the CTBTKrepon (Tue Aug 13 21:33:13 1996 IST): To Pat, Kikhil & Amberish: I don’t believe India would seek or accept US security guarantees in order to sign the CTBT. Even if such a guarantee were to be forthcoming from Washington, would it be believed? India has legitimate security concerns vis a vis China and Pakistan. This is not at issue. The real question is how India’s security concerns are best advanced–with the CTBT or without it? Many of the articles I have read in India against the CTBT assert that the Treaty must be blocked because it would foreclose the nuclear option, and without the nuclear option, New Delhi cannot ensure its security. I find this argument very weak. India should have the scientific talent and capabilities to maintain the nuclear option WITHOUT TESTING. The design of simple fission devises is no mystery–the US figured this our fifty years agao without the benefit of computers. In other words, India should have the capacity to destroy a Chinese or Pakistani city with a Hiroshima-sized detonation without testing. India can design fission warheads for its recessed deterrent while signing Nehru’s treaty. Is not twenty kilotons of damage enough to deter India’s neighbors and to secure India’s security? The CTBT will block India’s ability to develop with confidence a THERMONUCLEAR, or fission, weapon. This would take a series of tests–without question. But why should India block a CTBT in order to maintain the option to design 200 kiloton weapons? Isn’t a 20 kiloton weapon enough to destroy a city? Would Pakistan’s position on the[praful and Achimn] we are on line now. (Tue Aug 13 21:33:58 1996 IST): [praful and Achimn] we are on line now. Would Pakistan’s position on theWe are looking for information concerning India’s views about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. (Tue Aug 13 21:36:22 1996 IST): We are looking for information concerning India’s views about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Would Pakistan’s position on theWe are looking for information concerning India’s views about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. (Tue Aug 13 21:36:23 1996 IST): We are looking for information concerning India’s views about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Would Pakistan’s position on theWe are looking for information concerning India’s views about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. (Tue Aug 13 21:36:23 1996 IST): We are looking for information concerning India’s views about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Would Pakistan’s position on theWe are looking for information concerning India’s views about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. (Tue Aug 13 21:36:25 1996 IST): We are looking for information concerning India’s views about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Would Pakistan’s position on theWe are looking for information concerning India’s views about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. (Tue Aug 13 21:36:49 1996 IST): We are looking for information concerning India’s views about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Peace (Tue Aug 13 21:37:16 1996 IST): Mr Krepon: Do you think that it is fair for the government of the United States of America to talk about peace when they are sitting on such massive amounts of arsenal that can destroy Earth many times over, when the USA spends so much time trying to focus on other nations problems and causing problems in the bargain so that they can sell of their weaponery , Vietnam, Iraq………………some names to illustrate my point . Comment please(Tue Aug 13 21:38:05 1996 IST): [Praful and achin]Michael: we tend to agree with your description of India’s capabnility which the CTBT is not going to eliminate. We are appalled at India’s atand. Two wrongs do not make a right. EIF provison concerning INdia is wrong but this does not justify India blocking the treaty. This risks losing a good arms’ restrint measure at a crucial stage.amberish (Tue Aug 13 21:39:06 1996 IST): Mr Krepon, thanks. But a further query. Definitely there is no reason to believe that after doing everything to stop testing, attempts will not be made to spread computer technology which can help develop nuke bombs. In fact, a few years ago, the US admin stopped the sale of certain computers fearing that it would be used to upgrade weapons. What might happen is that there will be a total technology cartel, which would no way solve Indian fears.Pat (Tue Aug 13 21:40:32 1996 IST): Why is India spending so much on its Defences. It’s not as if we want to the reason is we are worried about those nonsensical people sitting across the borders who will be using arms supplied by Washington.michael, your observation about 20 kilo tons fission weapons is a very thought-provoking one. would the nuclear weapon powers be willing to accept this as the bottom-line in some agreed upon time-frame and then give up thermo-nuclear weapons in the first instance? this could be the first step towards “rolling back” the imposing nuclear arsenals of the PN- 5 or is it the operative 3? (Tue Aug 13 21:40:43 1996 IST): amberish (Tue Aug 13 21:43:13 1996 IST): Mr Krepon, why can’t the US go even a little way in disarming itself and its allies, especially Britain and France who today have little use for their weapons. this would in turn weaken India’s stanceStarWar (Tue Aug 13 21:47:12 1996 IST): Uday, aren’t testing and dismantle two different issues? Everybody knows the chances of a conjunctive treaty, of this proportion, are slim. Was this not considered. What is your justification?Krepon (Tue Aug 13 21:48:24 1996 IST): Nikhil: I see that I made a spelling error in my last transmission: The CTBT would not preclude an Indian fission nuclear option, but would preclude an Indian fusion nuclear option. You ask why a deadline for nuclear disarmament would not work in the NWS. Take the US, for example. The declarations that you most wish to hear and the commitments that you seek are absolute poison in US domestic politics. Any President that declared fealty to a time-bound fraework for complete nuclear disarmament would open himself to charges of weak-headedness by the political opposition, congressional resolutions of opposition, and a storm of protest by very powerful constituencies. As a mental exercise put yourself in the shoes of a US president. If you declare for a timetable, you gain support from third world nations, and you invite big problems with the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, the weapons labs, the military industrial complex, your own party in congress, the political opposition, editorial writers, etc. What would you choose to do? Ronard Reagan could talk about eliminating nukes without penalty because he was so hawkish, because he did not set deadlines, and because no-one took his vision seriously–not even the disarmament community here. I see no other political figure here who could afford to do this. Thus, I believe that the best strategy to adopt to devalue nuclear weapons is to maintain an absolute ban on testing, and to continue the practice of non-use, now 51 years in the making. Visualize a world in which nuclear weapons are not tested for the next fifty years. Visualize a world in which the practice of non-use contiues for another fifty years. How valuable will nuclear weapons be then? How large will stockpiles be? This is why it is so important to conclude the CTBT and have it enter into force. [prafula nd achin] (Tue Aug 13 21:50:01 1996 IST): how can India be let off the hook with regard to the EIF providoion which is unfare and destructive of the treaty?(Tue Aug 13 21:52:16 1996 IST): star war – this is uday. yes, testing and dismantling are two different issues. my observation was apropos michael’s point about the adequacy of 20 kilo-ton fission weapons. but while on this subject, i would argue that the indian stand perceived the ctbt as apart of a larger package towards disarmament. in that sense, the spirit to my mind would take testing and dismantling under the same umbrella. it is raining here in this part of delhi. where are you star war? amberish (Tue Aug 13 21:56:07 1996 IST): Michael, the idea of world where weapons are not tested for the next 50 years is wonderful, but perhaps utopian. Because in the absence of a definite method to resolve outstanding disputes, the temptation to go to war, and to use one’s total arsenal, remains. Can we be sure that the NWS would never use their weapons, especially when there is no fear of a counter-attack?Krepon (Tue Aug 13 21:56:12 1996 IST): Uday and Raja: Good to hear from you, albeit at a distance. Will be in Delhi in September–maybe we can get together again then. You ask about the Republican Party’s opposition to the CTBT in it’s platform. This, frankly, came as a shock, as there were no prior statements against the CTBT or for a resumption of testing by key party figures. But this goes to show you how captured the Republican Party has become to ideologues. How serious a problem is this? Hard to say. Dole and Kemp are both claiming not to have read the platform, and I doubt that nuclear testing will figure prominently in the election. But Dole’s departure from the Senate will hurt ratification chances, for sure. Lesser folks are in key leadership positions, and may well take blocking action–assuming the Treaty makes it out of Geneva. Several have asked why the Treaty has been saddled with such a lousy entry-into-force provision. The simple reason is that a number of countries really don’t want the CTBT to enter into force, and are using this procedural device to leave the nuclear option open. India has risen to the bait, and now, I fear, the Treaty will remain in limbo for many, many years. Surely, this is a great shame. [praful and achin] : (Tue Aug 13 21:57:59 1996 IST): what is missing from the Indian debate is that the draft provides for a future conference that can alter the EIF provision.Nikhil Lakshman (Tue Aug 13 21:58:00 1996 IST): Thank you, Mr Krepon. But the situation in India is about the same. No Indian prime minister could afford to sign the CTBT. It would be the chalice of hemlock for him. Just as a declaration that we seek from the US would be to an American president.StarWar (Tue Aug 13 22:00:19 1996 IST): Uday, I am in Los Angeles, CAPeace (Tue Aug 13 22:02:38 1996 IST): Wwhy is the American government so condecending towrds the third world countries?[praful and achin] : (Tue Aug 13 22:03:09 1996 IST): the Indian demand for ‘time bound’ link to ctbt is an utterly unconvincing cover for its own duplicity and its obsession wiht keeping the nuclear weapon’s option including the fusion option indefiniteoy open.Krepon (Tue Aug 13 22:04:06 1996 IST): Amberish: The idea of non-testing and non-use for the next fifty years may well be utopian, but this would be an easier task than phased reductions to zero. Actually, I propose to pursue both simultaneously, although not with the deadlines that India and other states demand. To me, a CD negotiations on deadlines for disarmament is a recipe for stalemate. Worse, it would let the US & Russia off the hook for START III, IV, & V. (Sorry for the fishing metaphors–have just spent a few days with friends dropping lines in the water.) Actually, the least difficult strategy is to demand no more tests and no more use. This is the most direct approach to devaluation. StarWar (Tue Aug 13 22:07:10 1996 IST): Raja Mohan, when was India responsible for an imbroglio concerning nuclear issue? Any precedence. If so, is there a learning piece from that experience that you (India Ministry) are not employing to execute the CTBT successfully. [praful and achin] (Tue Aug 13 22:07:49 1996 IST): Nikhil: you can always create a situation thro media manipulation where a consensus is manufactured and then say that you cnanot sign a ctbt etc. the same govt signs unequa;l treaties e.g. gatt but refuses to sign a nondiscriminatory ctbt. Let’s be precise. NPT is disciminatiory but a CTBT can at best be claimed to be disciminatory — depending upon your interpretaition of various provisions. New Delhi’s stand is unconvincing and inconsistent.(Tue Aug 13 22:08:24 1996 IST): This is raj. Achin and Praful seem to think only India has motivations in its approach to the ctbt. What about the US? Why has the US been so enthusiastic about the ctbt after so many years? It is worth asking this question. Many US officials are on record saying that the principal gain –for the US– from the ctbt is that it will freeze the nuclear capabilities of all others. That the UsS will gain much less from additional testing than the threshold states. The CTBt is part of a larger arms control strategy of the US where it wants to retain its primacy in the international system. Why do praful and achin love the US hegemony so much?amberish (Tue Aug 13 22:11:10 1996 IST): Michael, thanks. No more tests and no more use. Here comes one tricky part, how do we ensure that those with nuke weapons won’t use them or blackmail others with them (precisely India’s fears vis-a-vis China, and definitely Pakistan’s fear against a nuke India). So what can be done to have some surety at this stage that signing a CTBT is not India’s death warrant?Krepon (Tue Aug 13 22:12:12 1996 IST): Praful & Achin: Thank you for joining us. I am at a loss to figure out how to mend the EIF problem at this late date. China, Russia, Egypt, Pakistan, Iran, and perhaps other countries have indicated that they cannot accept a less inclusive list of states that must sign, ratify without disabling conditions, and deposit ratifications before the CTBT’s entry into force. Given the difficulties involved in getting 44 countries to take such action, it is mystifying why New Delhi has declared that it will block transmittal of treaty text from Geneva to New York. Hell: The Republican Party seems to have decided to take cary of India’s problem. That India should have adopted such an extreme position is rather extraordinary. What is the matter of principle or sovereignty that is so great as to disallow other countries from signing the CTBT?Krepon (Tue Aug 13 22:14:42 1996 IST): Nikhil: This is our sad lot: The political arguments that “work” in India are hemlock in the US; the arguments that “work” for a CTBT here (such as “stockpile steawrship”) reinforce worst fears in India.[praful and achin] (Tue Aug 13 22:15:30 1996 IST): Raj: we will not descend to the gutter level. We have been consistently critical of the US and all other nuclear weapon states, more so than you and others who are preapared even to compromise on the NPT. Our opposition to the npt let’s remind you, is a) more accurate b0 more comprehensive c) more consistent than yours, Subramaniam, sunderji etc. We do question US motives.But we are not so stupid as to argue that the motives determine the objective outcomes of all treaties or that motives should primarily decide whether India shoudl sign the CTBT.Nikhil Lakshman (Tue Aug 13 22:15:50 1996 IST): Mr Krepon, do you think (Tue Aug 13 22:18:52 1996 IST): Mr Krepon: Do you think it is fair for America to arm twist the other countries into signing the CTBT infact even talk about it, after they have perfected their Nuclear capacities and built up their arsenal as well as become A one stop shop for terrorists and warring nationsKrepon (Tue Aug 13 22:22:04 1996 IST): Amberish: You and Rajamohan and many other thoughtful and intelligent Indians talk about the coercise power of nuclear weapons–even though they may no longer be used, they still have political utility. This notion may have been true in the past, but is it true today? How “useful” were nukes in the Vietnam War? Or the Suez Crisis? When the US recently threatened Libya, elliptically, over the CW facility under construction, which country was more damaged–the US or Libya? Why continue to foster the myth that nukes provide political utility or coercise power? What power resides in a weapon that cannot be used? The real instrument of coercison today is economic power, not nukes. Stop repeating arguments that no longer make sense! Nikhil Lakshman (Tue Aug 13 22:27:08 1996 IST): Mr Krepon, you mentioned a little while ago that the CTBT will be in limbo for many years. Does that mean the treaty is brain dead, and that the CD in Geneva will end in a stalemate? Is there hope for the treaty to be revived? And what will it take for that to happen?(Tue Aug 13 22:29:05 1996 IST): michael, this is raj. i dont have to tell you that the US has drawn profound lessons from the gulf war. that nuclear weapons and other mass destruction weapons can be used to constain US conventional superiority in regional conflicts. Both the US nuclear posture reveiw and the counterproliferation doctrine have reemphasized the utility of nuclear weapons. Can we really deny that? I think the US is being prudent. why dont you give the same benefit of doubt to India?amberish (Tue Aug 13 22:30:00 1996 IST): Michael, there is no doubt that economic power means a lot more than weapons in the armoury. Which is why Japan is a power today, and India is not (nor for that matter suspected nuclear states like Pakistan, Israel, N Korea). But Japan is protected by being close to US and is part of US economic ties. Regarding the use of N-arms, that is precisely the fear: that the only time they were used was against a country that did not posses them (Japan, August 1945), and never again when there was a threat (howsoever remote) of retaliation – Vietnam and Suez had at least covert Soviet backing. In fact, other opposing powers kept a check, and today it is this very system of checks and balances that is missing. and which must be redressed, in part, by the US.Nikhil Lakshman (Tue Aug 13 22:31:12 1996 IST): Mr Krepon, have you been in touch with the Pakistanis? Do you sense a weakening of their resolve? (Tue Aug 13 22:33:39 1996 IST): michael, this is raj. i dont have to tell you that the US has drawn profound lessons from the gulf war. that nuclear weapons and other mass destruction weapons can be used to constain US conventional superiority in regional conflicts. Both the US nuclear posture reveiw and the counterproliferation doctrine have reemphasized the utility of nuclear weapons. Can we really deny that? I think the US is being prudent. why dont you give the same benefit of doubt to India?StarWar (Tue Aug 13 22:36:11 1996 IST): Michael Krepon, If today’s coercion is economic biggy, why not legislate the ‘treaty pass’ in U.N as majority & not unanimous. This was incidentally suggested by Jaap Ramaker of Netherlands. Secondly, if China, Russia, Britain and France opt to wait till India, Pak and Israel ratify your goddamn treaty, comments like the four B’s are hiding behind Indian sari may not be very diplomatic. Capitol Hill has a reputation, you know.Krepon (Tue Aug 13 22:36:13 1996 IST): Raja: You have become quite adept at putting those who disagree with your perspective on the defensive–but I miss your analytical talents. You ask why the US has all of a sudden become so supportive of the CTBT. Surely there must be some nefarious ulterior motives, such as putting India into a strait jacket.