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Automotive Air Bags Essay Research Paper American

Automotive Air Bags Essay, Research Paper American politics, for better or worse, is prone to elitist control of various issues, some of which affect the general public in significant

Automotive Air Bags Essay, Research Paper

American politics, for better or worse, is prone to elitist control of

various issues, some of which affect the general public in significant

ways. This system is described by the distributive model of politics,

where people representing narrow segments of society with high stakes in a

particular issue influence public policy to a substantial degree. This

explanation of policy making can be effectively used to examine and

explain some political actions. However, the model is not without its

flaws, and other models have developed to explain policy changes that take

place under different circumstances, and with anomalous results. In areas

dealing with science and technology, the knowledge-driven approach is

often employed to explain policy transitions that do not fit the

distributive model. The knowledge-driven approach examines how

technological and scientific advances that favor diffuse interests can be

used by policy entrepreneurs to bring about broad change, often against

powerful and determined special interest groups. The case of air bag

regulation can be used to describe and examine both the distributive and

knowledge-driven models, as it originally fit distributive explanations,

and was eventually taken over by the knowledge-driven system. The

discussion of air bag regulation will include an overview of the relevant

events, an examination of the distributive system of auto safety, and an

explanation of the eventual changes ushered in under the knowledge-driven

system.

The issue of auto safety regulation began to receive attention in the

sixties, when death due to auto accidents rose from under 40,000 deaths in

1960 to nearly 55,000 in 1969 (Fortune, 100). In 1965 and 1966

congressional committees held hearings on specific incidents of automotive

safety neglect, which resulted in the passing of the Motor Vehicle Safety

Act of 1966 (Nader, Unsafe, xvii). This act was the first of its kind,

giving the federal government the right to impose automotive safety

regulations on the auto industry. The job of regulation was delegated to

the National Highway Safety Bureau (now the National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration), a division of the Department of Transportation.

This department was given the authority to impose safety regulations,

review industry compliance, and study automotive safety in general. In

1970 and 1971 the automotive industry began to discuss the use of passive

restraints in collisions to increase safety. Passive restraints are those

which do not require any actions on the part of the driver or passengers,

unlike seatbelts. The most popular and seemingly most feasible solution

was the air bag. This bag, placed in front of the driver, would deploy

automatically in an accident. Initially, the NHTSA planned on making air

bags mandatory on ^?all cars built in or imported into this country after

Jan. 1, 1973 (Wargo, 11).^? The auto industry responded negatively, saying

that there was not enough time to develop a working system, and that a

premature addition would open the auto industry up to excessive liability

suits. The NHTSA did not issue the controversial mandate for 1973, but

instead issued a mandate that all cars must have passive restraints by

1976. The safety regulations, continually attacked by auto industry

experts, were delayed time and again. The situation reached such a

standstill that Ralph Nader, policy entrepreneur, accused the NHTSA of ^?A

virtual de facto moratorium of its safety standards function (Nader,

Washington, 2).^? This continued until 1977, when President Carter

appointed former Ralph Nader lobbyist Joan Claybrook to head the NHTSA.

Claybrook actively sought to establish an effective safety restraint law,

and her efforts partially paid off when Transportation Secretary Brock

Adams ordered all new cars to have safety belts or air bags by 1984 (CQ,

1-2). Debates ensued between the NHTSA, Congress, the auto industry, and

eventually President Reagan. In 1981 the NHTSA repealed the regulation,

but the courts blocked this action. The case went before the Supreme

Court (State Farm Mutual vs. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Administration),

where it was decided that NHTSA had arbitrarily, as a result of auto

industry influence (State Farm, 2, 3). The Supreme Court ordered the

Department of Transportation to reconsider the regulation. The Department

of Transportation issued new regulations ordering Auto producers to

install air bags between 1986 and 1989. But it left one loophole: If, by

1989, states comprising two thirds of the US population implemented

mandatory seat-belt use, the federal regulation would not apply. In 1991,

President Bush signed an act that required cars made after 1996 to have

air bags (CQ, 8). The measure went into effect successfully, ending a

battle that began nearly twenty-five years before. The distributive model

dictates that special interest groups with high stakes in a particular

policy issue will attempt to influence changes through sub-governments.

In the case of air bag regulation, this model is useful for understanding

the delays and complications involved in air bag policy. The auto

industry used the NHTSA, various presidents, and some congressmen to

influence the regulations imposed by the NHTSA. Each of these groups will

be examined separately to determine how the auto industry influenced each.

The NHTSA is seen as the primary player in the issue of auto safety

regulation, but the agency itself is subject to the whims of the President

and Congress. The President appoints the director of the DOT and the

NHTSA, while Congress appropriates funding. The first NHTSA director was

Dr. William Haddon Jr., a man truly concerned with auto safety and policy.

But his stay was short, and Nixon did not wait long to appoint his own

man, Douglas Toms, to the position. Toms was a traffic administrator by

profession, and displayed ^?little of Nader^?s (or Haddon^?s) hostility

toward the automotive industry (Fortune, 100).^? Toms did feel a need for

automotive safety, and was successful in gaining support from

Transportation Secretary John Volpe for air bag research (Nader, Unsafe,

xxxiii). But this ally proved to be useless, as Volpe was soon removed

from his position. Nader asserts that Volpe^?s initiative in this area

^?isolated him from the corporate yes-men in the Nixon Administration and

probably played a role in his removal as Secretary of Transportation

(Washington, 4).^? It seems that Nixon did not want to upset the auto

industry, and his continual inaction in this area only supports this

claim. Under Toms^? direction, the NHTSA did receive increased funding

and staff, but failed to build the test laboratory for which congressional

funds had already been appropriated (Nader, Washington, 2). Instead of

performing research in its own labs, the NHTSA contracted out its

research, often to auto industries or groups affiliated with automotive

production. When Carter took office, he appointed Joan Claybrook to the

head of the NHTSA, an act that signaled change. Seemingly having lost its

influence over the office of the President, the auto industry sought

control through Congress. While Claybrook had required specific safety

measures for automobiles by 1984, Congress sought to undermine this

mandate. In 1979, Congress included in its appropriations a rule that

barred any federal funds from being used to enforce the air bag

regulations (CQ, 4). But the congressional resistance never became a real

issue, as Reagan had views similar to those of Nixon. As previously

shown, the air bag requirement was lifted, yet the Supreme Court forced

the DOT to reconsider. The DOT regulations for 1986-1989 had a loophole,

and the auto industry took advantage of this. Finally, President Bush

signed the law that made air bags mandatory. The control of government by

the auto industry special interests is clear, but what is not clear is how

and why they lost that control. To this end one must examine the

situation through the knowledge-driven model. The knowledge-driven model

has several distinct, yet related components. It involves a new

discovery, credible experts, policy entrepreneurs, timing, significant

change, and diffuse interests. Individually each of these ideas may not

seem coherent or meaningful, but each forms a part of the model. And the

best way to understand the model is not to explain it in abstract terms,

but to examine it in a case study. The beginning is always a new idea,

invention, finding, etc. In the case of air bags it is the air bag

itself. The idea was originally tested for NASA and airplanes, but its

applications elsewhere seemed logical (Resh, 1,2). Next it is necessary

to find out what the experts think about the idea. In this case two kinds

of experts are necessary: automotive safety experts and engineers. The

safety experts agreed almost immediately and with little reservation that

passive restraints could be effective (Nader, Washington, 19). The main

issue among experts was feasibility, an issue that slowed progress of the

air bag. With such disagreements among experts, it was easy for the auto

companies to delay and confuse the issue. And without clear indications

from experts, no government body is willing to openly support a policy

change. But in 1975 General Motors offered air bags as options on some

cars, and the devices not only worked properly, but saved lives (Nader,

Washington, 21). This, in addition to other studies, settled the issue of

expert views. The next component of the knowledge driven model is the

policy entrepreneur. While Ralph Nader is an obvious choice for this

position, there were others as well. Joan Claybrook, former NHTSA

director and Nader underling, now heads Nader^?s organization Public

Citizen (Grier, 7), a group created for various entrepreneurial

activities. In fact, the air bag issue had received support from various

people and institutions since it birth. People like Professor Robert

Hess, director of the Michigan Highway Safety Research Institute, and

Professor Donald Huelke of the University of Michigan medical school

(Fortune, 100, 143). These people, and people like them, made up the body

of the policy entrepreneurs that supported air bags requirements. These

entrepreneurs serve to first expose key players to the issue, then to

present the issue to the general public. In the case of air bags, the

entrepreneurs brought the issue before NTHSA directors, presidents,

congressmen, and the public. Nader published various reports and books on

auto safety and other issues, which were read by both politicians and the

general public. In many ways, Nader^?s ^?Unsafe at Any Speed^? did for

the auto industry what Upton Sinclair^?s ^?The Jungle^? did for food

processing industries. It was already stated that Carter appointed

Claybrook to NHTSA director, and this appointment clearly shows how the

policy entrepreneurs influenced Carter. But policy entrepreneurs are only

part of a larger picture. For policy to change under the knowledge driven

model, three streams of influence must coincide at the same time. These

streams are problems, politics, and policy (solutions). The problem

stream is based on an identifiable problem in society, whether it is a

gradual rise in the significance of a problem, or a sudden emergency or

focusing event. In the case of air bags, it was a consistent rise in the

number of deaths caused by auto accidents, as previously shown (paragraph

2). The politics stream can come into effect if there is a change of

political allies, a shift in national mood, or a change in the balance of

political power. Certainly Nixon was unwilling to impose restrictions on

the auto industry, but when Carter came to power there were chances for

advancement of the program. This is an example of a change in political

allies, where the new president allies himself with a different group that

that of the old president. But the congress under Carter was still

strongly opposed to the regulations, and opposed them. There is little

data about the national mood on the issue, but people generally want to

survive auto accidents, and with the help of policy entrepreneurs the

public most likely began to support air bags in growing numbers. However,

there is no indication that this was the final cause of the shift in the

politics stream. The final shift was a change of alliances, where the

Supreme Court took the side of air bags, and previously shown. Once the

Supreme Court decides on such an issue, there is that special interest

groups can do. Bush undoubtedly saw this, and decided to play for the

winning team, the air bag supporters. But there is still one more stream

to consider: The policy, or solutions stream. This stream requires a

policy-specific, feasible solution. Meaning, that working, reliable,

medium priced, unobtrusive air bags had to be available. In possibly one

of their bigger blunders, General Motors had air bags as a safety option

on some of their cars, and the air bags worked surprisingly well (Nader,

Washington, 22). In addition to European reports of air bag successes, it

was clear that the policy stream was open. So where does all of this

confusion and madness become clear? In the garbage can. The garbage can

model states that for a change to occur in the knowledge-driven approach,

all three streams of influence must open up at the same time. Or to

follow the metaphor, all three streams must end up in the garbage can

together, at the same. In essence, each stream is open for a certain

amount of time, a window, and all three windows must be open at the same

time, for a sufficient amount of time, for change to occur. The problem

stream was open from roughly 1960, when auto accidents skyrocketed,

through the present. The politics stream had some brief openings, when

Volpe headed the DOT, and when Carter supported air bag regulations, but

the real opening came when the Supreme Court forced the DOT to reconsider

its air bag delays in 1982. The policy stream was open essentially from

1975 on, when air bags were first installed and used successfully in

American consumer automobiles. So the three windows eventually lined up

around 1982, and change eventually took place in the nineties. A

knowledge-driven change must involve a significant change in policy or

attitudes, and there are two distinct ways that policy changes: Bottom-up

or top-down. A bottom-up change consists of grass roots change initiated

by organized citizen groups that eventually changes the attitudes and

policies of politics and government. A top-down change involves an

opening in the three policy windows which allows policy entrepreneurs to

act in a manner that they believe represents the interests of a large

group of people. The change in air bag regulation is a perfect example of

the top-down approach. The three streams lined up, Nader and other policy

entrepreneurs spoke out, and there was little the special interest groups

could do to stop the change. An essential element of changing from the

distributive model to the knowledge-driven model is that in the

knowledge^?driven model there must be something at stake for a large

number of people. In this case the rising death toll has been discussed,

but the money issue has not. Auto accidents cost people money in many

different ways. Insurance premiums rise to cover claims; taxes rise to

cover disability, cleanups, and emergency personnel; individuals involved

in accidents have additional personal costs; and lost wages hurt the

economy. In 1972 the NHTSA estimated that the total cost of auto

accidents to society was (unadjusted) $40 to 45 billion a year (Fortune,

99). This is a significant cost to society, and the figures for following

years were undoubtedly similar. Given the rising death toll and the cost

to society, one can easily understand how diffuse the interests were on

the air bag issue. The distributive model of political policy dictates

that special interest groups with large stakes act to influence

sub-governments in particular ways. While this is often the de facto

system of politics in specific areas, events can change in a way that

changes the system of political change itself. This change is known as

the knowledge-driven model. This model shows how a new idea, supported by

credible experts, can be used by policy entrepreneurs to bring about a

significant change, affecting diffuse interests. This change took place

in the policy debate over air bag regulations in America. When the

knowledge-driven model is applied to this area, it can be seen how the

invention of air bags was supported by experts, used by Nader and other

policy entrepreneurs to change regulations that affect every driver in the

nation. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Congressional Quarterly Researcher. ^?Auto Makers Faulted.^? July 14,

1995. Online. Available:

(http://library.cq.com/cgi-bin/do_form.pl?cqrsrchOP&ID=7085).

Paragraphs: 1, 2, 4, 8.

Fortune Magazine. ^?Auto Safety Need A New Road Map.^? April 1972.

Pages: 99, 100, 143.

Grier, Peter. The Christian Science Monitor. ^?New Air Bag Laws Will Go

Into Effect ^?Unless States Make Riders Buckle. Online. Available:

(http://www.csmonitor.com/archive/archiveascii.html). Paragraph: 7.

Nader, Ralph. Unsafe at Any Speed. Grossman, New York, 1972. Pages

xvii, xxxiii.

Nader, Ralph. ^?Washington Under The Influence: A Ten Year Review of

Auto Safety Amidst Industrial Opposition.^? April, 1976. Publisher Not

Available. Pages: 2, 4, 19, 21, 22.

Resh, Robert E. Scientific American. ^?Air Bags.^? June 1996. Online.

Available: (http://www.sciam.com/0696issue/0696working.html).

Paragraphs: 1, 2.

State Farm Mutual vs. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Administration.

December 15, 1997. Online. Available:

(http://moby.ucdavis.edu/gaws/166/quebec/FARM.HTM). Paragraphs: 2, 3.

Wargo, James. Product Engineering. ^?Washington Tells Detroit: Cure

Auto Accidents now.^? June 8, 1970. Page: 11.

32a

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