NATO Intervention
The United States currently has 6,900 combat troops in Bosnia and 350 in Macedonia. As if that were not enough involvement in the volatile Balkans to tempt fate, the recent violence in Kosovo has prompted calls for more American intervention in the region–60,000 NATO troops would be necessary for a full-scale peacekeeping operation, according to one Pentagon estimate. (35) The idea of further U.S. troop involvement in the Balkans, however, is misguided.
First, the events in Kosovo pose no threat to U.S. national security–neither the territorial integrity, nor the national sovereignty, nor the general welfare of the United States is in jeopardy. Further, a peacekeeping or other noncombat policing mission in Kosovo might actually harm U.S. national security by keeping American soldiers away from military training, thereby reducing their combat readiness. In fact, reports the Washington Post,
“Over the past decade, the [U.S.] Army has been used in 29 substantial overseas deployments, compared with 10 in the four previous decades. The strain of the pace of such operations on a much reduced force has shown up in negative trend lines across all military services across various readiness categories. (36)
A Kosovo peacekeeping mission will simply add to the problem by further compromising U.S. military preparedness.
Second, military intervention in Kosovo will encounter fervent and incompatible ethnic interests that are unlikely to be dislodged by an American presence. On one side of the dispute are ethnic Albanians, most of whom boycott Serbian state institutions, resist speaking the Serbian language, and view Serbian state security forces as an occupation army. In addition, most ethnic Albanians in Kosovo are Muslim.
On the other side of the dispute are Serbs who consider Kosovo the cradle of their culture and Christian orthodox religion, and are about as willing to give up Kosovo to Albanians as Israelis are to give up Jerusalem to Palestinians. In fact, 42 percent of Serbs polled recently said they believed that “the solution to the Kosovo problem was the removal, by force or peaceful means, of its Albanian majority.” (37) And on April 23, 97 percent of Serbs participating in a national referendum reportedly said they oppose foreign mediation of talks with Kosovar Albanians. (38) Putting American ground troops in the middle of that kind of conflict is bound to produce casualties. Moreover, because intervention would entail violating the borders of Yugoslavia, it could further entrench Yugoslav strongman Slobodan Milosevic by uniting Serbs behind him.
Third, NATO intervention in Kosovo could unfold as it has in Bosnia; that is, with no end in sight. It should be recalled that in his November 1995 address making the case for sending U.S. troops to Bosnia, President Clinton assured the American public that the operation he was proposing had a “clear, limited and achievable” mission and that the total deployment “should and will take about one year.” (39) Since then, the president has twice changed his mind about U.S. troop withdrawal, and Washington now has an open-ended troop commitment to Bosnia.
It should also be recalled that the Clinton administration claimed that the Bosnia intervention would be a strictly military operation. As Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott explained in a November 1995 speech, “There will be no ‘mission creep’–from purely military tasks into ‘nation-building.’” (40) But it is now known that President Clinton allowed U.S. forces to be used to help elect Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, and that the U.S.-backed representative in charge of implementing the Dayton Peace Accords designed Bosnia’s first national currency, imposed a national flag, and is working on a national anthem–examples of nation-building at its most basic. (41)
Fourth, NATO intervention of any kind in Kosovo could cause the already deeply flawed Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia to completely unravel. Indeed, if it appears that Washington is facilitating Kosovo’s secession, Bosnian Serbs could interpret that as a sign of a broader anti-Serb Western agenda. Not only would that expose NATO troops stationed in Bosnia to possible acts of retribution like those that occurred against the American Marines in Beirut in the 1980s, it would also threaten to undermine the fragile U.S.-brokered peace there as well.
On the other hand, if Washington appears to be forestalling Kosovo’s independence by enforcing some sort of autonomy or republic status within Yugoslavia, NATO troops could find themselves trying to contain a still independence-minded KLA. That would mean that Americans would be fighting Milosevic’s battle for him. And according to Alexander Vasovic, a military expert with independent Radio B92 in Belgrade, a war in Kosovo will “be like Algeria or Vietnam. . . . [Soldiers will] be isolated in military compounds. The Kosovo Liberation Army will control the rest.” (42)
Encouraging the KLA
Another significant problem with NATO intervention of any kind in Kosovo is that it might actually encourage the KLA in its militant drive to break away from Yugoslavia. Many Kosovar Albanians already believe that Washington is on their side. “One of our main struggles is to convince them that we really don’t support independence,” explains Richard Huckaby, director of an office of the U.S. Information Agency in Kosovo. But “they just don’t get it. . . . I have tried really hard to lower their expectations.” (43)
Serbs, too, believe that Washington backs the ethnic Albanians. As the Washington Post reported in March,
“The Serbs also have directed their ire at Americans, whom they regard as in league with the Albanians. At a caf? owned by ethnic Albanians in the town of Pec, west of Pristina, a hand grenade splattered the walls with shrapnel recently. When [Serb] police officers came to investigate, they suggested with a smirk that the bill for the damage be sent to [U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K.] Albright.” (44)
Moreover, in June the administration added to the perception that it supports ethnic Albanian aspirations for independence when it demanded that Belgrade withdraw its state security forces from Kosovo before resuming political negotiations. White House spokesman Mike McCurry, for example, stated that Yugoslavia “must immediately withdraw security units involved in civilian repression, without linkage to . . . the ’stopping of [KLA] terrorist activities. ‘” (45) Similarly, Defense Department spokesman Kenneth Bacon said, “We don’t think that there should be any linkage between an immediate withdrawal of forces by the Yugoslavs, on the one hand, and stopping terrorist activities, on the other. There ought to be complete withdrawal of military forces so that negotiations can begin.” (46) The European Union, former U.S. senator Bob Dole, and others continue to voice the same opinion. (47)
Yet in demanding that Belgrade withdraw its state security forces from Kosovo before resuming negotiations, the administration was insisting on something Yugoslavia could not possibly agree to do; to effectively hand over one of its territories to an insurgency movement. In contrast, the administration was not simultaneously demanding that the KLA stop their attacks or pressuring Albania to end its complicity in providing weapons and sanctuary to Kosovo’s guerrilla forces. That apparent one-sidedness led many ethnic Albanians to further conclude that the Clinton administration–despite its official statements to the contrary– backed their goal of independence.
What’s more, U.S. threats of military intervention helped harden the Kosovar Albanian demand for independence from Yugoslavia. That’s because military threats conveyed a contradictory message; that although U.S. policy was officially opposed to independence for Kosovo, Washington would not allow Belgrade to forcibly resist it. The U.S. threats also emboldened the KLA rebels. As the New York Times reported,
“Recently, under pressure from Western governments, the Yugoslav forces have reduced larger-scale attacks on rebel areas. . . . Now, however, some foreign diplomats say Serbian reluctance to order soldiers to retake territory is leading the rebels to assume they have little to fear from government forces. ‘Instead of calming things down and letting us figure out how to get everyone to the negotiation table, what we’ve done is give the Albanian fighters a feeling of euphoria,’ said a Western diplomat. . . . ‘This makes them bolder, and it also makes other Albanians want to join them.’” (48)
After that, the Clinton administration softened its threats on the Yugoslav government and made an attempt to reverse the perception that it favors the ethnic Albanian side of the Kosovo dispute. In July, the United States and five European nations made their first public criticism of the KLA, issuing a statement admonishing the rebels and stressing that “violence is inadmissible and will not solve the problem of Kosovo.” (49) But the Clinton administration’s actions told ethnic Albanians a different story: The administration does consider violence “admissible.” In fact, U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke traveled to Kosovo, met with the KLA, and legitimized its violence by offering its representatives a spot on the ethnic Albanian negotiating team. In stark contrast, Ambassador Holbrooke snubbed an invitation to meet with Serbian Orthodox Bishop Artemije, who leads a two year old peace movement with a plan that would simultaneously ease tensions in Kosovo and reduce the power of Slobodan Milosevic.
Today, backed by UN Security Council Resolution 1199, the Clinton administration is once again demanding that Belgrade withdraw its internal security forces from Kosovo, or face a NATO response. But if NATO intervenes, it could encourage the Kosovo conflict still further. Indeed, if intervention consists of a cruise missile attack, air strikes, or the imposition of a no-fly zone over Kosovo, the guerrilla forces of the KLA will be encouraged to continue fighting. That’s because only one side of the conflict– the Yugoslav government–will feel the pressure of those measures; there are no KLA jets for NATO to shoot down, no KLA installations to bomb. As a result, attacking Serbia or imposing a no-fly zone will not deter the KLA from waging war for an independent Kosovo. In fact, the opposite could happen. The rebels will have everything to gain by exploiting the strategic opportunity that the Western suppression of Serb force creates for them. NATO, in effect, will be the KLA’s air force. A similar scenario unfolded in Bosnia in 1995 when U.S. warplanes dumped more than 1,000 bombs on Serb targets, giving Muslim and Croat forces an opportunity to launch an advance that triggered a wave of 150,000 Serb refugees. (50)
On the other hand, if Washington continues to make bellicose threats and then does not follow through, Kosovar Albanians could feel betrayed by the Clinton administration, resent the United States, and probably suffer more casualties than if Washington had not meddled in the first place. As Brookings Institution fellow Alan Kuperman explains,
“This dynamic has repeated itself so frequently that it’s become familiar. First, an oppressive government discriminates against a subordinate group within its borders. . . . The group then gets the attention of Western human-rights advocates and the media, who pressure the United States and/or other Western nations to issue warnings to the oppressive government, with hints of further action if it does not relent. The [oppressed] group infers optimistically from this rhetoric that the West will come to its aid if it provokes a violent government crackdown, and therefore escalates its insurgency.” (51)
That scenario not only encourages further government repression, but when the West does not intervene, many people in the oppressed group die. Thus, concludes Kuperman, “American officials should do everything they can to avoid transmitting a false message to oppressed groups that [the United States] will intervene on their behalf.” (52)
Spreading Kosovo’s Conflict
The Clinton administration says it fears that the conflict in Kosovo could spread if NATO does not intervene. As Secretary of Defense William Cohen notes, “There is a genuine concern throughout the region that if this goes unchecked, it could have much wider implications than just Kosovo.” (53) In fact, the administration worries that if Albania enters the fray, Turkey, a state with a strong Muslim tradition, could enter on the side of the Albanians, and Greece, an Orthodox Christian state and cultural ally of Serbia, could support the Serb side. NATO intervention, the administration reasons, is therefore necessary to prevent two NATO members–Greece and Turkey– from potentially fighting one another. In stark contrast, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright argued during the NATO enlargement debates earlier this year that expanding NATO would make Europe safer by increasing the number of countries that simply do not fight with each other. (54) The Clinton administration, in short, wants to have it both ways, arguing at one point that NATO should be expanded because alliance members do not fight with one another, and arguing later that the United States should intervene in Kosovo to keep alliance members from doing just that.
Yet military intervention could itself cause Kosovo’s conflict to spread, perhaps leading to the intra-NATO conflict Washington seeks to avoid. For example, if intervention consists of deploying the 20,000 troops NATO military planners say are necessary to prevent the flow of arms from crossing the Albania-Kosovo border, that will not stop the fighting in Kosovo. (55) It will simply prevent many Kosovar Albanians from acquiring weapons. The resulting bloodshed of a continuing Serbian crackdown could create greater nationalist political pressures in neighboring Albania, not less, and increase the likelihood that Albania will become directly involved in the conflict.
The prospect of Albania’s further involvement in Kosovo should not be underestimated. Former Albanian president Sali Berisha refers to the fighting in Kosovo as a “holy war” and defines the “Albanian nation” as including not only Albania but also Kosovo and western Macedonia, both of which have large ethnic Albanian populations. (56) He also called Albania’s last prime minister, Fatos Nano, an “enemy of the Albanian nation” for failing to support Kosovo’s secessionist forces and has given his family farm in northern Albania to the KLA to use as a military training ground. (57) Berisha’s rhetoric and decision to deliver his birthplace to the rebels is part of his manipulation of the Kosovo crisis to mount a political comeback after his ouster in 1997. Last month, Berisha’s supporters undertook an armed uprising in Albania’s capital, seized government buildings, and set fire to Prime Minister Nano’s office. (58) Nano resigned his office two weeks later.
Despite that political backdrop, NATO has been helping to arm and equip Albania’s military, even selecting it as the first beneficiary of NATO’s Partnership for Peace private contracting efforts. (59) Further, in August and September of this year, the alliance conducted war games with Albania’s army, thereby improving its war-fighting skills and raising its confidence. (60) The CIA, meanwhile, has intensified ties with Albania’s SHIK secret service agency, helping it restructure and modernize its intelligence-gathering capabilities. (61) In carrying out such activities, Washington may be unwittingly helping to build up the very forces that will initiate the spread of the Kosovo conflict should Berisha return to power.
The most dangerous scenario for spreading Kosovo’s conflict is that NATO intervention inadvertently assists the KLA in its pursuit of forging a Greater Albania. The KLA has made it clear that its goal is not simply to liberate Kosovo from Yugoslavia, but to unite the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania. (62) It is for that reason that Macedonia’s foreign minister, Blagoj Handziski, and Greece’s foreign minister, Theodoros Pangalos, have put aside the squabbles between their countries and issued a joint statement opposing air strikes against Serbia because they could bolster the KLA’s campaign.
“Once the bitterest of neighbors,” explains the Associated Press, “Greece and Macedonia have united in the fear that a successful campaign by the separatist Kosovo Liberation Army could spell disaster for the Balkans.” (63)
Economic Sanctions
But it’s not only military intervention that could have unintended consequences for Kosovo. Economic sanctions could prove counterproductive as well. During the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia, for example, the West imposed comprehensive economic sanctions on Serbia. Those measures caused young people to abandon the country and impoverished the general population, while Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic accumulated riches through smuggled imports.
What’s more, Milosevic’s grip on power actually tightened when sanctions were last imposed. He controlled several newspapers and television stations, and the sanctions enabled him to blame external forces for his failed economic policies. Leading Cuban dissidents have long pointed to similar tactics used by Castro’s regime to explain away Cuba’s economic woes. (64)