Philosophy Berkeley Essay, Research Paper
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Philosophy
The initial groundwork for Berkeley’s position is the truism
that the materialist is a skeptic. In the writing of his three
dialogues, Berkeley develops two characters: Hylas (the materialist)
and Philonous (Berkeley himself). Philonous draws upon one central
supposition of the materialist to formulate his argument of skepticism
against him; this idea is that one can never perceive the real essence
of anything. In short, the materialist feels that the information
received through sense experience gives a representative picture of
the outside world (the representative theory of perception), and one
can not penetrate to the true essece of an object. This makes logical
sense, for the only way to perceive this real essence would be to
become the object itself! Although the idea is logical, it does
contain a certain grounding for agnosticism. Let the reader consider
this: if there is no way to actually sense the true material essence
of anything, and all knowledge in empiricism comes from the senses,
then the real material essence can not be perceived and therefore it
can not be posited. This deserves careful consideration, for the
materialist has been self-proclaimed a skeptic! If the believer in
this theory were asked if a mythical beast such as a cyclops existed
he would most certainly say no. As part of his reply he might add that
because it can not be sensed it is not a piece of knowledge. After
being enlightened by the above proposed argument, though, that same
materialist is logically forced to agree that, because the “material
substratum1″ itself can not be sensed, its existence can not be
treated as knowledge. The materialist belief has, in effect, become as
futile as proving that the cyclops exists; his ideas have lead him
into skepticism.
Having proven that the materialist is, at best, a doubter,
Berkeley goes on to offer the compelling argument that primary and
secondary qualities are, together, one thing. As the materialist
believes, primary qualities of an object are those things that are
abstract (not sense oriented). Examples of these would be number,
figure, motion, and extension. Secondary qualities are those things
that are concrete (sense oriented), such as color, smell, sound, and
taste. The materialist feels that these primary qualities persist even
when the secondary ones are not there. Thus, if a person were blind,
then that individual would not be able to hear or to touch items; yet
the so-called real qualities such as figure would remain existent in
the objects. As previously shown, the materialist is agnostic in his
belief of these real (primary) qualities. It is here that Berkeley
directs an alternate hypothesis: that the abstract primary qualities
don’t exist at all. In fact, the immaterialist position states that
these qualities are merely secondary in nature, as they, too, can not
be perceived as being separate from an object. For instance, if a
person is asked to imagine a primary quality alone, as an abstraction,
it is impossible. To illustrate this point, suppose that a person is
asked to think simply of number alone. This person may reply that the
idea he is formulating is that of three red spheres. In truth this is
not an abstract idea, because when the qualities of color (red) and
shape (sphere) are taken away, all that is left is three of nothing!
Thus, it is impossible to think of the abstraction of number, given
that an abstract quality can not focus on anything concrete (such as
red spheres in the above mentioned example). Therefore, it follows
that, since no primary, abstract quality can exist alone, it is the
same as a secondary quality in which an actual object must first be
perceived.
Berkeley moves on to show that the perceived qualities of an
object are ideas which exist only in a mind. To do this, he states
that a sensation is an idea. This is logical, for sensations can not
be felt by mindless objects. However, it is this point which Berkeley
scrutinizes in the materialist statement that an external object “is a
material substance with the sensible qualities inhering in it.2″ The
materialist is proclaiming that sensible qualities, which exist in the
mind only, are actually in the object. Logically, the only possible
way for this to occur is if the external object had a mind for the
qualities to be thought of and stored by. The notion that inanimate
objects have minds is ridiculous, and thus the materialists’ belief
has been reduced to absurdity. Let the reader consider this example to
reinforce the point. A ten-story building is erected, and a person who
lives in a single-story house in the country sees the new building. To
this person the structure may seem quite tall, as he has never seen
any building taller than three stories. However, a construction worker
comes across the same building and perceives its height quite
differently than the previous man. Since the second man usually works
on buildings about thirty stories high, he thinks that the building is
fairly short. Obviously, the new building can not be both tall and
short at the same time; yet this is the outcome if one believes that
the quality of tallness is inherent in the object. In fact, if the
idealist (immaterialist) position is considered it seems logical that
one person could view something differently than another. This is
because the idea concerning that thing could be different in the two
separate minds.
At this point Berkeley explains that the so-called tertiary
qualities of an external object are non-existent. The materialist
defines these qualities as the ability in one object to produce change
in another object. In the three dialogues, Hylas brings up the point
that these qualities are “perceive[d] by the sense… and exist in the
object that occasions [them]3.” An example of this quality would be a
burning candle. Suppose that a person puts his finger in the flame
long enough to feel the pain of a burn. The materialist would
attribute this pain to the lit candle itself, stating that the ability
to produce pain is inherent in it. However, this can not be the case.
As previously discussed, the external objects are merely ideas which
we perceive through sense experience. Just as these objects do not
possess any primary or secondary qualities, they also can not have the
ability to cause change in something else. In fact, these tertiary
qualities are also ideas perceived only in the mind.
Given that objects are ideas and humans possess minds to
perceive them with, the nature of both ideas and minds deserves
careful consideration. Berkeley assumes the view that ideas are
passive and only perceivable in a mind. He goes on to state that these
ideas are existent only when a mind is perceiving them. This is
logical, for when something is not being ruminated upon it does not
exist in the realm of knowledge at that particular time. As an
example, if I were to move to another country and, after some time,
forget about my old house in America, it would not exist to me
anymore. In accordance with the immaterialists’ view, my actively
perceiving mind would be electing not to reflect back upon the past.
Thus, only the active mind can create the purely passive idea.
Since an idea only exists when it is being perceived or
reflected upon, this brings into question the nature of reality. For
instance, assume that a person attends an art museum early on Sunday
morning. As that person views the artwork, the paintings themselves
are sensible things, or ideas, actively being perceived by a mind; in
short, they exist. However, when the museum closes and the person goes
home, does the artwork continue to exist? Obviously the person pursues
other activities of the day, and he ceases to think about what he did
earlier. However, at a certain time those paintings were part of what
the person knew to be true through sensation; the artwork was part of
the person’s reality. Do the paintings therefore cease to exist since
they are no longer being thought of?
Berkley argues that such objects still exist because the mind
of God is always perceiving them. Unlike the materialists’ view, the
immaterialist puts God at the center of his views. In truth, God is
the “omnipresent external mind which knows and comprehends all things,
and exhibits them to our view in such a manner and according to such
rules as He Himself has ordained and are by us termed the ‘laws of
nature.’4″ It is important to stress the idea that God shows people
the ideas in his mind, and these ideas make up the reality beheld by
the human mind. Therefore, for any person to perceive something, the
idea must be in the mind of God first.
The fact that there are two distinct minds raises questions
about the nature of these minds. The idealist proclaims that the human
mind is strictly finite in its ability to have sense experience. With
this being the case, a person can only have a single sensation at a
time. Since sensations are the same as ideas, humans can only have one
idea at once. On the other hand, God’s mind is infinite and is thus
able to have multiple perceptions. These perceptions of God are also
ideas, and it follows that these ideas comprise the reality beheld in
the finite human mind. Instead of the materialists’ belief in the
representative theory of perception, where a material object has real
(primary) qualities which humans perceive as sensible (secondary)
qualities, Berkeley has posited an alternate theory. This is that God
upholds all of the ideas which comprise human reality, and people
perceive these ideas as sensations directly from God’s infinite mind.
It should also be noted that just as the finite mind is
different from the infinite mind, the ideas in each mind have some
certain distinctions. The finite mind can only contemplate a limited
range of thoughts. To illustrate this, let the reader attempt to
imagine an infinite number of stars. After some intellection, the
reader will realize that it is an impossible task. This is because the
human mind can only think in terms of bounded entities; thus, in the
above mentioned case, the reader may have thought of a great many
stars. However, the stars were finite in number and could therefore
not represent the notion of infinity. In short, the finite mind can
only conceive finite thoughts. Not only this, but, as previously
disgussed, humans can perceive only one thought at a time. If the
reader does not think this to be the case, then let her attempt to
imagine a small boy and a thunderstorm as completely separate ideas.
Although both ideas may be thought of, the only way for this to occur
is when they are placed in the same mental picture. In summary, the
human mind has important limits which can easily be observed.
On the contrary, the infinite mind of God is limitless in its
ability to perceive ideas. In God’s mind, an infinite thought (a
thought without boundaries) can exist. This infinite idea’s existence
in God’s mind is more that possible; it must necessarily be the case.
This is because infinite concepts such as the number system and the
universe must come from, as do all thoughts, a mind. However, since
the human mind is finite and therefore incapable of conceiving
boundless thoughts, then those infinite ideas must arise from the
infinite mind of God. Not only does God’s mind contain infinite
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End Notes
1. George Berkeley. “Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous.”
Reason and Responsibility. Ed. Joel Feinberg p. 175.
2. Berkeley, p. 165.
3. Berkeley, p. 165.
4. Berkeley, p. 191.
5. Berkeley, p. 179.