One Area Of Everyday Memory Essay, Research Paper
The study of flashbulb
memories is a prime example of the problems faced in everyday memory
investigations. These memories are not experienced everyday of our lives, but
are without doubt a phenomenon that each of has experienced in our lifetime. As
shall be discussed later, problems arise due to the fact that flashbulb
memories are characterised by extreme emotional, personal and surprise
situations (Brown & Kulik,1977). By their nature these memories refer to
specific contextual conditions that would be hard to replicate in a laboratory.
Therefore flashbulb memory researchers have had to find techniques beyond the
laboratory, due to the desire not to sacrifice essential ?ecological validity?
(Neisser, 1978) to gain more empirical control. One of the main questions
concerning flashbulb memories is their relationship to other types of memory.
There are many proposed divisions and sub-divisions of human memory, such as
working memory, procedural memory, semantic memory or episodic memory. Each of
these systems are functionally related to the maintenance of what is
essentially human life. One of the many functions is what Tulving (1983) called
?Mental time travel?, the ability to experience past events. Such
autobiographical memories are thought to be structured at different levels of
temporal and spatial specificity that together are used as reference for the
construction of ?self?. This mental time travel can take place through
different hierarchic levels of autobiographical organisation. The hierarchy
level can be as general as university experiences or as specific as remembering
the topic of conversation with a certain person on a certain day (Cohen, 1998).
Autobiographical memories are therefore seen as being autonoetic in that they
carry information about the context in which they were experienced. Flashbulb
memories carry such autonoetic information, but are believed to critically
different. Brown & Kulik (1977),
introduced the term flashbulb memory to describe memories that are preserved in
an almost indiscriminate way. They postulated that these flashbulb memories
were indeed different from ordinary memories, with some defining
characteristics. Although these memories are thought to be photographic in
their clarity and detail, they do not preserve all features of an event.
Conversely Brown & Kulik proposed that idiosyncratic event details are
remembered. These details help form what has been described as a ?live? memory
in that the ?reception field? is remembered including ?where?, ?when? and ?who
with? factors of an event. One example of an extreme form of contextual
specific memory is the death of Princess Diana. Many people especially the
media ask a common question such as ?what were you doing when you heard the
news?. Many people claim to be able to remember such major moments with unusual
clarity and vividness, as if the events were etched on their minds throughout
their lives. Brown & Kulik (1977) studied memories for important events
such as the death of John F Kennedy. They found that irrelevant details were
often recalled and it appeared that they had retained ?a brief moment of time
associated with an emotional event? (Smyth et al, 1994). Brown & Kulik
suggested that flashbulb memories are formed by the activity of an ancient
brain mechanism evolved to capture emotional and cognitive information relevant
to the survival of an individual or group. To summarise, flashbulb
memories FMs are thought to be an unique survival mechanism distinct from other
form of memory in their clarity, longevity and attention to idiosyncratic
detail. These characteristics of flashbulb memories can be mapped onto issues
concerning memory. As with many memory systems, the argument over the
distinctiveness of flashbulb memories involves encoding, storage and
retrieval.? These issues relate to many
issues within Flashbulb memory such as their formation, accuracy, consistency
and longevity. It appears that these processes are interrelated with each
process being dependent on another. In terms of FM formation,
Brown & Kulik (1977) thought that the clarity and detail of FMs is
correlated with the emotion, surprise and personal consequentially of the
event. They also thought that surprise initiates FM formation, while personal
consequentially determines the elaborateness of the resulting FM. As support
for this they found that more blacks had FMs associated with the death of
Martin Luther King compared to whites (Ibid.). Apparently this was due to an
increased emotional personal consequentially felt in their part of
society.? Therefore self referring prior
knowledge of surprising important events is thought to support privileged
encoding of FMs compared to other mundane memories. In support for this
Livingstone (1967) proposed that when an event passes a certain biological
criterion, the limbic system discharges into the reticular system, which
further discharges throughout the cortical hemispheres. This firing above a
certain level has been termed the ?now print? mechanism. This system can be
seen as being rather like the flash going off on a camera. However this view is
criticised on the grounds that this ?biological level? is not specifically
identified. In a further criticism Neisser
(1982) has claimed that FMs are not specially encoded and therefore not unique.
Neisser proposed that FMs were simply ordinary memories made clearer and longer
lasting by frequent rehearsal after the event. This argument seems quite
logical, as particularly in this global age the media and society frequently
replay and retell events of extreme public attention or emotion. Flashbulb
memories could therefore be seen as memories that have be actively
reconstructed to such an extent that they can be clearly replayed in our minds.
Flashbulb memories are seen by Neisser not as a special evolutionary mechanism,
but as a method of promoting the integration of an individual within a society.
In this reconstruction, personal consequentially is applied after an event once
its importance is measured within society. This also questions the
validity and accuracy of ?flashbulb memories? in that they are memories
actively reconstructed and transformed over time. Neisser & Harsch (1992)
measured flashbulb memories of the shuttle challenger explosion. They found
that after one day 9 subjects claimed to have learned of the event from
television, however 34 months later this figure had risen to 19. As a further
nail in the coffin for Brown and Kulik’s flashbulb memory hypothesis
Christianson & Loftus (1987) found that high emotion served to narrow
attention to focus to the central aspects of an event a the expense of
peripheral details. This would seem to indicate that the idiosyncratic details
associated with flashbulb memories are more reconstructive, as the periphery
surrounding an event is filled in on rehearsal. At this point it may appear
that flashbulb memories are little more than a cultural phenomenon involving an
enhancement of ordinary memories and therefore not different from them.
McCloskey et al (1988) have pointed out that ordinary memories can be accurate
and long lasting due to frequent rehearsal. FMs are therefore may be ordinary
memories retained to some unusually high standard of clarity.However there has been a
considerable backlash in support of uniqueness of flashbulb memories. Various
researchers have pointed to the fact that personal consequentially? was not measured within either the
Challenger or other such studies. As already demonstrated by Brown and Kulik
(1977), emotional consequentially is a dominant factor in the formation of FMs
as seen in their comparison of FMs for Malcom X between blacks and whites. In a
similar study, Conway et al (1994) measured FMs of the resignation of Margaret
Thatcher. Conway took measures immediately and around 9 months. Conway found
that over 86% of British subjects had complete and accurate memories fitting
the description of FMs. Conversely only 29% of non-British subjects had ?FM?
memories. In a comparison of three studies of important news events including
his own Thatcher resignation study and a San Francisco earthquake study
(Neisser, Winograd, and Weldon, 1991), Conway (1995) concluded that FMs may be
mediated by importance and/or emotion, but not rehearsal. Conway used these
studies as support for the idea that encoding is special for flashbulb memories
and that they are not purely the production of elaborate rehearsal. Rehearsal is thought to
serve different functions for different memories. Smyth et al (1994) noted that
some memories successfully remain with us accurately for many years. They
furthered that these extended memories could be distinguished between memories
that have used over a period of time and emotionally charged flashbulb
memories. Conway (1995) suggests that rehearsal may serve to prevent these
ordinary memories from decaying while rehearsal within flashbulb memories acts
to elaborate. It may be that ordinary memories require preventative rehearsal
due to their instability. Conway (1995) believed that most autobiographical
memories are unstable and dynamic requiring effortfull maintenance. Conway
& Anderson (1993) believe that ordinary memories are constructed from
different types of autobiographical knowledge and not directly accessed as in a
?memory unit?. Flashbulb memories however are believed to represent tightly
organised and dense autobiographical knowledge.FMs are therefore thought to
be different to ordinary memories in their specificity of knowledge and
organisation within the brain. This may explain their durability and accuracy
and therefore distinction from other forms of memory. FMs can be seen to be
independent of rehearsal as shown in emotional non-public events. Christianson
and Nilson (1989) cite the unfortunate case of a rape victim who developed
subsequent amnesia. When jogging in a familiar environment a year later, a
sudden clear flashback occurred.?
However such traumatic events may not be so indelible as Wagenaar has
shown in the inaccurate long term accounts of concentration camp survivors.
Memories appear to be mixed and confused concerning their fellow prisoners and
German guards. However caution must be drawn when using multiple event traumas
as they can be more fragmented than single events (Terr, 1991).Conway, (1994) has used
neuropsychological evidence to show that FMs may have a different coding system
to other forms of memory. Bliss and Lomo (1992) worked on a long term
poteniation (LTP) theory of consolidation from short term to long term memory.
LTP involves the firing of pre and postsynaptic neuronal cells as critical
factors in the possible neuronal plasticity of memory systems. LTP has been
found in areas of the Hippocampus and Amygdala.The Hippocampus is believed
to mediate the construction of temporary outline memories, while the Amygdala
is thought to be critical for the formation of emotionally toned memories
(McGaugh, 1992). Adrenaline associated with emotive events is thought to
release glucose past the blood brain barrier, which is thought to be
responsible for increased firing within the Hippocampus and Amygdala (Ibid.).
However as FMs involve more than just emotion, other brain structures are
thought to be activated in this way. As the frontal lobes are reciprocally
related to many areas of the cortex and the Amygdala, as well as being involved
with episodic and working memory (Stuss et al, 2001)it is plausible that this
area will reveal much of FM function in the near future. Conway, (1990) argued that
the distinction of FMs and Autobiographical memory is the reconstructive
quality of ordinary memories. However studies of patients in intensive care
units have shown unpleasant emotions coupled with drugs enhances memory for
internal events such as hypnogogic hallucinations (Jones, Griffiths & Humphris,
2000). Attention shifts during these events from internal to the external.
Patients show poor memory for their environment, but vivid memories for
hallucinations and nightmares. The fact that these memories were constructed
internally may weaken Conway?s (1990) idea that FMs are not mere elaborate
reconstructions of past events. However, the fact that the idiosyncratic or
contextual details were not remembered may rule these memories out as being
classed as flashbulb memories.It seems that FMs have been
applied to so many extreme memory phenomenon that they can be considered to be
part of a ?broad family of experiences? that include drug flashbacks,
palinopsia, palinacusis, post-traumatic memories and memories recurring from
mental disorders Mauricio and German (1999). However, as the longevity and
accuracy of memories involved with post-traumatic stress disorder have been
questioned (Baddeley, 1997) one could also question the validity of FMs and
therefore their uniqueness. In balancing this argument, Winnington, Hyman and
Dinnel (2000) suggest that the definition of what constitutes a FM may have
been lost over the debates. They state that Brown and Kulik?s (1977) original
definition should be re-addressed to ensure that flashbulb memory researchers
are indeed investigating the same entity. They suggest that not all past
research into flashbulb memories may not have strictly adhered to the ?emotion,
surprise and personal consequentially definition of Brown and Kulik. However
one may further that this definition itself is open to question and debate.The arguments forming the
theories of FMs are thus both productive and engaging, however some of the
debates may be limited by the research methods used. Winnington, Hyman and
Dinnel (2000) found that the initial indexing of an event influences the
apparent consistency of the memory for the event. In most FM studies, subjects
experiences of the event of indexed to get the full description of the
experience and then tested at a later date. Winnington, Hyman and Dinnel (2000)
wrote ?it appears that the time of initial testing needs to be considered when
conducting flashbulb memory studies? (pp. 214). It was found that those indexed
later had subsequently better recall of the OJ Simpson trial. They suggest that
those questioned earlier will be able to describe more and therefore have more
to remember when it comes to the recall situation. Another idea is that
additional information is given after the event, making the immediate period
following an event turbulent in terms of contrasting information. In this way
those indexed later may have ?settled? their memories compared to those just
after the event. Brewer (1992) suggests the ?wrong slice? hypothesis as people
may talked about the event in a number of different places, but been indexed
only one of these, subsequent recall may have referred to another correct but
un-indexed place of discovery of important news. Winnington, Hyman and Dinnel
(2000) conclude that researchers should try to obtain an indexing of events as
soon as possible. They write ?After an event, a memory may be gradually
consolidate as people forget? some
information, incorporate some information from other sources, and develop a
narrative of the event? (pp. 215). In conclusion, it seems that FMs are indeed
an interesting phenomenon. FMs do seem to reflect memories that are generally
more vivid, reliable, accessible and more important than other memories. The
distinctiveness of FMs does seem to be a bit of a grey area. One interpretation
is that there is more of a qualitative difference rather than quantitative with
FMs and other memories.The research into FMs is an
excellent example of everyday memory being investigated outside of the
laboratory. The issues of control and ecological validity are still significant
constraints on the research. However this research certainly doesn?t appear to
be ?bankrupt? (Banaji & Crowder, 1989) and has produced many new productive
and challenging theories to research into memory. With neurological findings
and new brain imaging techniques complimenting FM research, the area is
producing many controlled and ecologically valid research findings that
complement and challenge laboratory based memory research. References Cohen, G. (1998). Memory in the real world
(2nd Edition). Hove, UK. Psychology Press LtdBrown, R & Kulik, J. (1977). Flashbulb
memories. Cognition, 5, 73-99 Conway, M. (1995). Flashbulb memories.