DISCUSSION: The communications equipment available over-the-counter in the U.S. can sustain a tactical squad of any police department in America in force entry operations. Yet, the U.S. infantryman must rely on systems designed for the open battlefield. The right equipment for conducting urban combat is available, but if that equipment is on the shelf, it is not providing our soldiers with the tools they need to train and fight in an urban combat contingency.
RECOMMENDATION: Communications problems that can occur during combat in a city environment must be detected and fixed during training NOW. These potential communications problems are not on-the-site problems; they represent a series of complex problems found only in a segmented urban battlefield with electronic interference, dead spots, and anomalies that hinder command and control. The U.S. Army must train with the equipment, weapons, communications, soldiers, and leadership to develop the doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) needed to win in urban combat.
OBSERVATION: Realistic NBC hazards are not incorporated into urban combat training.
DISCUSSION: The recent examples of chemical use in Tokyo by a terrorist group should have sent a shock wave throughout our military. This action makes the use of NBC operations in urban combat inevitable. The enemy our forces are likely to face will be technologically inferior, and, despite our best efforts, will attempt to negate our advantages in conventional weapons and combat operations. NBC represents a tremendous equalizer for any potential foe. The very terrain presented by a city begs the use of these potent weapons in isolated “no-win” skirmishes as the enemy tries to escape to fight again in the next block or around the next corner. Urban combat creates an opportunity to fight to allow separation and escape to fight again. In some cases, the sacrifice of forces, by the enemy, to create a catastrophic loss on an opponent will probably be a choice. The more friendly forces committed to a fight in a particular building allows a determined foe more options to use all the weapons at his disposal. One dreaded enemy option is to neutralize the building using NBC, and create catastrophic loss for U.S. forces.
RECOMMENDATION: The U.S. Army must take the threat of NBC in urban combat seriously. This threat is real and presents a dilemma to any force trying to conduct urban operations. The Army needs to conduct liaison operations with all related government and intelligence agencies to gain a better understanding of the threat and to incorporate that intelligence threat into urban combat scenarios, with other government agencies participating.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR TTP DEVELOPMENT.
In the research effort necessary for this article, and as the result of separate discussions with observer controllers in round-table discussions at the Joint Readiness Training Center, a number of recurring trends were identified. These trends are supported by observations submitted over time to CALL for inclusion in the CTC trends publications published semi-annually. The recurring trends are listed below and are grouped by the battlefield operating system (BOS).
INTELLIGENCE BOS: TA.5
The intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is not specific enough for MOUT.
Lack of a decision support template and timeline preparation hinder the planning process.
There is limited intelligence focus on the routes to the objective.
The force ratio analysis is rarely done, if done at all.
Identification of key terrain and fields of fire is not effective.
Intelligence gathering and development of input for the planning process is not complete.
Use of psychological operations and civil affairs operations are not planned.
Identification of decision points and setting conditions for success is not emphasized.
Units fail to get eyes on the objective to confirm the intelligence template.
Little care is given to collection from and care of civilians on the battlefield.
MANEUVER BOS: TA.1
The movement plan to the object is usually not well done.
There is a lack of focus in the movement to the objective, resulting in significant casualties.
Casualties in the movement prevent units from achieving mass on the objective.
Units do not achieve mass at other decision points.
There is a failure to isolate the objective and protect the force from counter-attack.
A lack of combined arms TTP for armor, aviation, and close air support for urban combat.
Uncoordinated maneuver and overwatch are more common in the urban fight.
An unclear doctrinal base confuses units about correct procedures for clearing rooms.
Marksmanship at all levels is poor with the exception of some special operations units.
There is confusion among units as how to delineate inside from outside battlespace.
FIRE SUPPORT BOS: TA.2
Use of restrictive Rules of Engagement and dealing with collateral damage and effects.
Units have problems with allocation of resources and positioning of fire support assets.
Units poorly use precision guided munitions.
Suppression of enemy air defense for assembly areas is poorly planned.
Units do not use counter battery fires effectively in urban conditions.
Q36 are not being effectively used against enemy mortars.
MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY BOS: TA.6
Unit movements to their objective is not well done.
The plans do not properly allocate engineer resources for the urban fight.
There is usually little unity of the engineer effort.
Units are not effective in suppress, obscure, secure, and reduce (SOSR) at all levels.
Engineers are attrited prior to the objective.
Lack of eyes on the objective (scouts/aviation) prevent identification of obstacles.
COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS: TA.4
There is a lack of synchronization across in the battlefield operating systems.
Units do not effectively locate their command and control nodes.
Battalion taskforce is overloaded with requests from higher.
Wargaming and course of action development for urban combat need work.
Leaders are unsure how to effectively fight once in the city.
Communications problems in urban conditions are a major challenge.
Leaders at all levels have problems with Rules of Engagement and proportionality.
There is poor use of Judge Advocate General in the brigade combat teams.
The fight needs to be defined and clear to each unit level of responsibility.
Units fail to get eyes on the objective (scouts/aviation) to shape the battle.
Sniper teams are not properly used in planning and nor considered eyes on the objective.
Confirmation of intelligence template is denied when no one can observe the objective.
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS: TA.7
Allocation of assets to support the fight in the urban fight is poor.
Re-supply and casualty evacuation in the urban fight are not conducted well.
Urban specific supply items: ladders, knee and elbow pads, and ropes with grappling hooks.
Units do not plan for urban combat and the high died of wounds rate.
Speed, not haste, in the tempo of urban operations is the norm.
AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY BOS: TA.3
There is a poor allocation of ADA assets to support the urban fight overall.
Focusing of the right ADA assets at the proper place and time in the battle is poor.
Attack aviation vulnerability in battle positions is not taken into consideration in the plan.
CONCLUSION
The world in which the Army will fight in the 21st century is even more politically complex and dangerous than just a few years ago. There is a dramatic increase in the lethality of weapons available to hostile elements. The United States must cope with advanced technologies that re-invent themselves in hours, days, and weeks. The Army now faces a dangerous world without a defined foe. The enemy is nebulous, and the Army is caught between a highly successful, but increasingly outmoded doctrine and the desire to prepare to meet future adversaries. Urban combat will be a small piece of any new doctrine. The Army cannot wait for the next revision of FM 100-5, Operations, to be completed. Possibly the best approach is to develop new TTP for future contingencies and conflicts now. Developing and formalizing the TTP may generate broader thought that will lead to the new doctrine.
The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is attempting to develop current TTP to provide a stopgap measure until doctrine is updated and distributed. This method requires the support and contributions of soldiers in the field. CALL is not a doctrine writing organization. CALL has the mission to support the deployed unit, provide assistance to the follow-on unit, and provide the Army as a whole with the lessons learned from these experiences. These lessons in the form of TTP can be the first step in revising doctrine, or the first step in recognizing that the Army has a potential problem.
The Army, as an institution, needs to be straightforward in dealing with its leadership, its soldiers, and the American people in addressing these problems, and must begin NOW! Positive leadership is the key ingredient toward success of urban combat operations. The casualties, resource requirements, and collateral damage of urban combat are now and will always be unacceptable and will remain so unless the Army addresses this subject and prepares for this contingency. Ignoring urban combat simply leaves the American people to pay the butcher s bill.
The intent of this article is to inspire a healthy debate and dialogue that will eventually improve our readiness for urban combat. The question may arise as to the need for a specific urban combat doctrinal manual, or whether urban combat operations can be considered a combat condition. If this later approach on urban combat is accepted, then should urban combat be incorporated into field manuals as an appendix or annex or incorporated into the text to address the “how to fight doctrine” for each discipline within the U.S. Army? The problems discussed are real. Those who believe urban combat can be clinical are wrong. The hard truth about urban combat operations is that “it is a dirty business, but somebody has to do it.”