It seems that at first the U.S. wanted to block Somoza s attempt to take over Sacasa s government, but decided not to because of past criticism of U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. Thus, the U.S. not taking action, or her policy of non-interference, permitted Somoza to have a clear path to the presidency, and even made it seem as if the U.S. was rewarding Somoza for killing Sandino (Pastor, Condemned to Repetition, 27).
A significant amount of the Nicaraguan population was aware of the way Tacho had manipulated his power as head of the National Guard, and the opposition refused to participate in the 1936 election– an act of defiance that became common during the Somoza dynasty. Once in power, Tacho changed the constitution so that he could remain in power until 1947. He used the office of presidency for profit and power, amassing a huge fortune at the cost of the Nicaraguan population.
In the 1947 elections, Tacho appointed Leonardo Arguello as the presidential candidate. The election was rigged and Arguello won, but once in power he tried to force Tacho to resign as head of the National Guard. At that point Arguello was deposed and Somoza took power once again. The U.S. withheld recognition of Anastasio Garcia s government, but this pressure was not enough to make him give up his hold on Nicaragua. He was reelected again in 1951, and perhaps in a gesture of appeasing U.S. demands, he constitutionally guaranteed the opposition party a third of the seats in congress.
Tacho consistently tried to get the U.S. to back his regime, or at least make it seem like they were backing his regime, by getting aid. In 1952 to get military and financial aid, Tacho offered to help the U.S. with its plan to overthrow what they believed to be the communist Guatemalan government. Truman declined the offer, but as administrations changed, so did their policy towards Nicaragua. Eisenhower saw communism in Guatemala as a serious threat and appreciated the loyalty of Somoza– he didn t care that he was a dictator. According to Lake, In the Cold War setting, the Guardia was no longer seen as an embarrassing barrier to democracy. It was a bulwark against communism (16). Thus, he approved a military aid agreement in which the CIA would use Nicaraguan territory to train Guatemalan rebels. With the money the U.S. gave Nicaragua, Somoza plotted against Costa Rican president Figueres, who Somoza thought was in turn plotting against him in corroboration with Pedro Juaqu n Chamorro. However, the U.S. supported Figueres, and thus reduced aid to Nicaragua. In 1956, just as Tacho was nominated by his party to serve another term, he was shot by Nicaraguan poet Rigoberto Lopez Perez.
Tacho s rule was marked by the pretense of him being a U.S. surrogate, yet he learned to dodge and ignore U.S. pressures. At the same time he left behind a ravaged, bankrupt nation that his sons, Lu s and Anastasio, would have to deal with.
After Tacho s assassination, Lu s Somoza was chosen to complete his father s term. Both of Tacho s sons viewed the country as their estate since their father had accumulated such a huge amount of wealth and land from the country. At the time, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, or Tachito, was enrolled in West Point and had completed most of his schooling (except for 4 years) in the United States. When his brother came to power, Tachito was appointed head of the National Guard, and his first decision was to arrest hundreds of opposition leaders. Meanwhile, the U.S. had enlisted Nicaragua in their effort to overthrow Castro, and Lu s volunteered the coast to serve as a staging for the Bay of Pigs invasion. There was a period of unprecedented growth at this time in Nicaragua due to the Alliance for Progress as well as the Central American Common Market. In 1963 Lu s allowed another candidate, Rene Schick to run for the Liberal Party, but as usual, the Somozas retained the real power.
In 1967 Anastasio Somoza Debayle was nominated by the Liberal party and won the election. The opposition still claimed that the elections were not free as they had in his father s time. Tachito also maintained control of the National Guard while he was president, an action forbidden by the constitution. In 1967, Lu s Somoza, the only moderating influence on Tachito, died after suffering a heart attack.
Thus, Tachito rose to power directly due to his family s dynasty and control in Nicaraguan politics. He had the strong loyalty of the National Guard, and the U.S. requested the support of his brother and eventually of him, so there was essentially nothing the population could do to keep him from gaining power. The background of Omar Torrijos and rise to power of Omar Torrijos for the most part was quite different.
In 1968 in Panama there was a collapse of the civilian oligarchy– a crisis of hegemony. This ruling elite was morally and intellectually bankrupt, and could not secure the end of U.S. colonial presence in Panama, which was exactly what the population was looking for the government to do. This oligarchy had been in power for seven decades before the October revolution of 1968, which was essentially a coup d etat. Superficially, the development of Panama seemed to be improving: the GNP had doubled from 415.8 million in 1960 to 897 million in 1970. However, the wealth was not equally distributed, and was held by a very small percentage of the population. The popular movement was provoked by these economic conditions. Workers demanded better working conditions and the middle class stepped up their struggle for sovereignty of the canal zone. The oligarchy at the time could not make the needed reforms or secure decolonization, and top of all of this , the ruling elite were arguing amongst themselves.
Although the Panamanian army had been abolished by the U.S. in 1904, a National Guard was organized in 1953 by Antonio Remon Cantera. It was this institution that initiated the coup in 1968. This police force was quite different from its counterparts all over Latin America in that it was not set up as a tool of an intervening foreign power (such as the U.S.)– instead it was set up with the idea of eradicated such an interventionist force. The problem in 1968 was that the civilian oligarchy could not secure political dominance on its own– but at the same time could not achieve an alliance with this National Guard.
Torrijos attended a U.S. sponsored military training institution just as Somoza had, and just as Somoza had, Torrijos rose through the ranks of the National Guard to eventually become its head. Torrijos attended The School of the Americas, which at the time was located in the canal zone. According to Collazos, this institution had produced 34,000 graduates from the time of its founding in 1949 to the mid 1970 s. Of those, 3,500, or the fourth highest number, were from the Panamanian National Guard (34). The difference between the two dictators was that while Somoza perhaps achieved this because of his daddy , Torrijos actually got to where he was on his own.
With the aid of Major Manuel Noriega, Torrijos led the 1968 coup, reorganized the National Guard, and by 1970 was the undisputed leader of the National Guard and the country. To do this he got the middle sectors and students of society, who had been causing the oligarchy so many problems, on his side. His strategy of co-optation and assimilation worked. He abolished all traditional, liberal institutions, including the National Assembly and all political parties. He also constitutionally combined legislative and executive power into the hands of the military. Thus, while both Torrijos and Somoza can be considered military dictators, they rose to power in very different ways. An analysis of what they did once they were in power, including a description of their programs and their constituency, would further aid in understanding their distinct legacies.
As Tachito was coming to power in Nicaragua, Nixon was coming to power in the U.S. Both saw communism as a major threat in the hemisphere (Pastor, Condemned to Repetition, 36), therefore Tachito had the full support of the Nixon administration.
Tachito s constituency was basically made up of the same people who had supported his father. The upper classes, the landed oligarchy, the Liberal party, and of course, the National Guard all loyally supported him.
A turning point in Tachito s rule was the earthquake of 1972. This event brought to light how corrupt the Somoza regime actually was, if not to the Nicaraguan population itself (a majority of whom already realized this), then to the rest of the world. Eight to ten thousand died in the earthquake, while hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans were left homeless. Tachito, meanwhile, concentrated on turning his country s crisis into a personal gain. Because his family owned most of the means of production of Nicaragua, he was the one making money off of the restoration of Managua. He basically pocketed all the aid that was sent to Nicaragua to help the victims of the earthquake while doing little to actually help those who were suffering.
Because of this, those who were not already fed up with the Somozas were losing patience quickly. The business community s contempt for Tachito stemmed from his obvious exploitation of the earthquake. Because of this he lost the support of the middle and upper classes.
As the time of the elections were coming around again in 1974, Somoza once again rewrote the constitution in order to run again. The opposition, which was united with Pedro Juaqu n Chamorro, once again refused to take part in them. With the 74 election Tachito lost the support of church when the bishops and the opposition refused to be a part of his inauguration. At this point, Somoza was becoming aware of the strong opposition that had built up against him, and later confided to an aide that My single biggest mistake was running for reelection in 1974 (Pastor, Condemned to Repetition 37).
By this time the opposition had already consolidated against Somoza to form the FSLN, or Frente Sandinista de Liberaci n Nacional. Turning Sandino into a figure that was larger than life , even a martyr, the Sandinistas opposed the Somoza dynasty while constantly reminding the NIcaraguan people of the sin the first Somoza had committed: killing Sandino. In 1974 Tachito s government received a huge blow when the Sandinistas raided a Christmas party held in honor of a U.S. ambassador. They took many important hostages and demanded release of prominent political prisoners, a large sum of money, publication of their propaganda and radio time. Somoza conceded grudgingly to these demands, but as soon as he could he declared marshall law and authorized the National Guard to wipe out the Sandinistas, which they almost succeeded in doing.
As Carter came into office in the U.S., Tachito began to feel pressure not only from his opposition in Nicaragua, but the U.S. was for once making real demands on his regime. Carter s administration concentrated on the advancement of human rights and democratization mainly because they were free of the fear of communism. Carter s administration promoted human rights through the reduction or increase of foreign aid, depending on the improvement made within the country in question. Thus, the friendship that Somoza had built based on mutual fears of communism with past administrations was null and void with Carter s. Carter made this clear by stating that Being confident, we are now free of the inordinate fear of Communism, which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear (Pastor, Condemned to Repetition 50). Carter viewed the inherent continuismo in Nicaragua as the cause of instability, and thought the Sandinistas to be just the symptoms of a problem (Pastor, Condemned to Repetition 50).
Somoza knew he was in trouble with the Carter administration. He tried to change the human rights policy by hiring lobbyists in Washington and rallying the support of friends who had once been his classmates, but now held important positions in Washington. This was all to no avail. Eventually Somoza gave in, if only a little. He said that he would make sure that the National Guard would curb there violations of human rights and perhaps more important to his eventual overthrow, he ended censorship.
With censorship gone, the opposition could promote their views to a broader audience and gain more support. Pedro Juaqu n Chamorro, the leader of the middle class opposition began publishing criticism of the regime in La Prensa and the FSLN got more radio time. However, Tachito didn t seem to realize the implications of this. He counted on the Somoza dynasty continuing, in part because of his son, Anastasio Somoza Portocarrero, and believed that when a new administration came to power in the U.S. his power would be restored as well– he said that this was not the first time that chilly winds had blown down on the Somozas from the north, and he would do as his father and brother had done, crawl into his shell like an armadillo and wait for the wind to pass (Pastor, Condemned to Repetition 55). What Tachito didn t realize was that this time that tactic wouldn t work.
The spark that led to Tachito s downfall perhaps wasn t ignited by him, but it was certainly attributed to his regime, which is all that mattered. On January 10th, 1978, Pedro Juaqu n Chamorro, the descendant of two Nicaraguan presidents and most obvious leader of the opposition was assassinated. This action aligned the moderate opposition with the radical left, and in the process legitimized the FSLN. The shooting of Chamorro seemed to be a replay of the assassination of Sandino by Debayle s father almost 45 years before.
Thus it seems as though Tachito s program was quite simple and self centered. He was primarily an anti-communist, but perhaps this was only due to his clientalistic relationship with the United States. He militarized the country and extended the power and control of the National Guard. And of course, one cannot forget the essential component to his program: continuously altering the constitution in order to lengthen his stay in power.
Having analyzed the convoluted program of Anastasio Somoza Debayle, and his staunchly loyal constituency, the differences in Torrijos constituency and program will seem as different as night and day.
Torrijos was also a military dictator, and much of his constituency did stem from the National Guard, but instead of using it to oppress the people Torrijos created a populist alliance of the Panamanian military and people to legitimize his rule. He realized that if he was going to succeed where the past oligarchical leaders hadn t he would have to have a very different approach to governing the masses. Although he centralized power in the executive, he created structures in order for the people to participate in the government locally. He realized that he would need to incorporate the lower classes (workers, peasants and especially the students who had led all past anti-government movements) into the political system without losing control of the military or falling out of favor with the oligarchy. Unlike Somoza, he did not have the luxury of having a constituency ready made for him, he had to give people a reason to want him in power other the fact that his family had been in power as in the Somoza dynasty. He also couldn t count on the undying support of the military, although he was the head of it, because he already saw the factionalism that could develop within it.
Priestly describes Torrijos plan to appease all sectors of society as bonapartist, in other words, a leadership style in which the leader is able to rise above all classes and establish some autonomy for the state (4). This bonapartist approach can be seen as a revolution from above . It would include the modernization of society, and due to this modernization the bourgeoisie would exchange their political rights and power for the assurance of economic expansion. In this way, Torrijos would not be a captive of the ruling class.
He wanted to create popular participation for the working classes in the political system, while giving the private sector a role in production and distribution in combination with the state playing a significant role in the economy. He created a labor code which favored the interests of the workers, while introducing an economic strategy that was based on export oriented industrialization so that the economy would continue to prosper. In this way he thought he could appease the complaints of the working class and remediate at least some of the unequal distribution of wealth without upsetting the income of the oligarchy.
He did this by enhancing Panama s role as a transport hub and abandoning the policy of import substitution. Instead he stimulated agricultural exports without displacing the private sector. They went along with his economic proposals because they saw their chance to make money. He even convinced U.S. business men to invest by allowing the unrestricted movement of money in and out of the country. In a meeting with some investors, Torrijos told them that he would pursue a policy of expanding markets…favorable to international business and he promised an honest, modern and more responsible public administration (Priestly, 29). He even assured them stability in the Panamanian political arena. In this way he lobbied for foreign investment.
For the lower classes he promoted redistribution through public spending, initiated public sector employment, distributed both public and private lands for agricultural reform, provided social services as well as creating local health groups.
Thus, by creating institutions that would involve the popular classes in politics, and by creating an economic program that would give job opportunities to all Panamanians he included the lower sectors of society who had always been excluded from the government s services. Priestly makes an accurate observation comparing Torrijos regime to others in Central America: