It did not take long after the bombings for questions to arise as to their necessity for ending the war and Japan s threat to peace. One of the earliest dissents came from a panel that had been requested by President Truman to study the Pacific War. Their report declared Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved. It is the Survey s opinion that certainly prior to December 31st 1945 and in all probability prior to November 1st 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped. Even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.45 (Bernstein ed., The Atomic Bomb. Pg. 52-56).
The decision to drop atomic bombs of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is one of the most written about contemporary historical topics. Well over seventy major, fully researched and unique books are accessible to the public on this fascinating topic, and perhaps as many as three hundred historical journals have been written as well46. Still, the majority of these articles are polarized either the dropping of the bombs was an immoral diplomatic maneuver or a glorious military action. To anyone with a sincere desire for objectivity, a moderated view seems most reasonable, recognizing that it was a combination of military, diplomatic and domestic issues that led to Truman s decision. In addition, instead of passionately declaring the bomb to have cost innocent lives, or declaring blankly that it was without doubt a savior of lives, it seems most reasonable to conclude that we simply can not tell. Furthermore, Truman became President only weeks before making his monumental decision, he seems to have dropped the bomb simply because he never considered not dropping the bomb47. Together with his advisors, Truman never thought to rethink the basic principles established under the Manhattan Project s inception under Roosevelt, and therefore, dropped the bomb because they believed in their heart it was the right thing to do, and never reconsidered. There is no way we can know for certain whether the approach of seeking alternatives would have ended the Pacific was sooner, and with fewer lives. But one may regret that such an attempt was not made. Had the attempt failed, the continuing blockade of supplies, Soviet invasion, and the atomic bombs were still available. However, anyone tempted to use the atomic bomb would have done well to share the hesitancy agreed upon Truman and President Roosevelt. Dwight Eisenhower was right, when he commented on the atomic bombings on Japan — It wasn t necessary to hit them with that awful thing. (Ike on Ike, Newsweek, 11/11/63, pg. 108).