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Woodrow Wilson And The League Of Nations (стр. 2 из 3)

By the end of summer 1918 the Central Powers were breaking up, and on September 27 Wilson appealed to the peoples of those countries by suggesting more specific peace proposals. Once more he emphasized that right must be made superior to might. The idea of a League of Nations was beginning to take a more definite shape. Each government must be willing to pay the price necessary to achieve impartial justice, to be made effective by the instrumentality of a League of Nations. The constitution of the League of Nations must be a part of the peace settlement, for if it preceded peace it would be confined to the nations allied against a common enemy, and if it followed the peace settlement it could not guarantee the peace terms. Wilson then outlined five particulars:

1) impartial justice means no discrimination or favoritism between peoples;

2) no special interest of a single nation should infringe upon the common interest of all;

3) “there can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations;”

4) there can be no selfish economic combinations or boycotts except as “may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control;” and

5)”all international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world.”

On October 6 the German government requested an armistice; President Wilson sent a reply declaring that the armies of the Central Powers must withdraw immediately from all invaded territory. A German response dodged the issue of evacuation, and therefore another message clarifying the military situation was sent through the Secretary of State. On October 25 Wilson made perhaps one of his worst political mistakes when he requested the election of a Democratic majority in Congress in order to indicate to the world American support of the President’s leadership. This intrusion of party politics into non partisan foreign affairs was deeply resented by Republicans and in fact backfired against Wilson, as the Republicans won both houses. Meanwhile the Germans had agreed to disarm and relinquish the monarchical military leadership and wanted a peace according to the points made in Wilson’s speeches. Austria-Hungary also accepted the President’s declarations and recognized the rights of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs. The Allied Governments agreed to accept the Fourteen Points and the subsequent addresses with one reservation by Great Britain on freedom of the seas. Poland and Germany each announced themselves as republics. Finally on November 11 German representatives signed the Armistice Agreement at Marshall Foch’s headquarters. The Germans had agreed to an almost total surrender and to the payment of reparations. On the same day, President Wilson read the Armistice Agreement to Congress and promised food and relief to a suffering Europe. He pointed out the disorder in Russia and the folly of attempting conquest by the force of arms, and he asserted, “The nations that have learned the discipline of freedom and that have settled with self-possession to its ordered practice are now about to make conquest of the world by the sheer power of example of friendly helpfulness.” America must hold the light for the peoples who were just then coming into their freedom. A peace must be established that will define their places among the nations and protect their security.

Wilson decided to attend the Peace Conference in France with a select group of experts, such as geographers, ethnologists, and economists, whom he told, “Tell me what is right, and I’ll fight for it.” Unfortunately he did not invite anyone from the Senate to attend, which later was to cause irreconcilable problems. In Europe Wilson was enthusiastically greeted by thousands of cheering people almost as a messiah. In London on December 30 he observed, “Never before in the history of the world, I believe, has there been such a keen international consciousness as there is now.” On the same day in Manchester he spoke of America’s desire for peace in the world, not merely a balance of power or peace in Europe. At Rome on January 3, 1919 President Wilson explained how military force is unable to hold people together, that only friendship and good will can bind nations together. “Therefore, our task at Paris is to organize the friendship of the world, to see to it that all the moral forces that make for right and justice and liberty are united and are given a vital organization to which the peoples of the world will readily and gladly respond.”

The idealistic American President who wanted only permanent peace under universal justice with no special rewards for his country faced an awesome challenge among the European old-school diplomats who were determined to gain all they could for their own national interests. Lloyd George had just been re elected British Prime Minister under the slogan “Be tough on Germany,” and Clemenceau of France was even more adamant about making Germany pay all she could and leaving her as weak as possible. The Italians and Japanese wanted control of specific territories, and secret treaties made between the Allies during the war were to emerge and confound several of Wilson’s points. Against Wilson’s protests the conference news was censored, and what did leak out to the press tended to be through the French newspapers controlled by their government.

Meanwhile most of Europe was in turmoil, and many military leaders wanted to grab what they could get. For this reason on January 24 Wilson published a statement warning those who would take possession of territory by force that they would be prejudicing their cause, since they were placing in doubt the justice of their claims which the Peace Conference must determine. The next day he addressed the Peace Conference, which he felt had two purposes-not only the settlements required by the war but also the secure establishment of a means for the maintaining of world peace. Wilson believed the League of Nations was necessary for both purposes. “Settlements may be temporary, but the action of the nations in the interest of peace and justice must be permanent. We can set up permanent processes. We may not be able to set up permanent decisions.” Therefore the League of Nations must be made vital and continuous so that it may be ever watchful and effective. The idea for a League as an essential part of the Treaty was adopted unanimously, and a subcommittee for the drafting of a League of Nations Covenant was selected with President Wilson as chairman.

General Jan Christiaan Smuts, the leader from South Africa who had confronted Gandhi, published a pamphlet, The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion, calling for a strong and active League which would not only prevent wars but also be a living, working organ of peaceful civilization. It must have general control of international affairs involving commerce, communications, and social, industrial, and labor relations. Wilson and Colonel House, the American members of the committee, managed to get together with the British delegates Smuts and Lord Cecil, who also had his own draft, to hammer out what was called Wilson’s second draft, which was revised into an Anglo-American version. Although the French and Italians submitted drafts, this version was accepted as the basis for discussion. Working every night the committee of fourteen members turned out its Draft Agreement after eleven days. Wilson announced that a living thing had been born.

On January 27 Wilson suggested a solution to the problem of what to do about the German colonies. Because he felt world opinion was against annexations, the League of Nations could mandate that districts be administered by a mandatory power “with a view to the betterment of the conditions of the inhabitants” and without discriminatory economic access.

A proud President Wilson presented the League of Nations draft to the Peace Conference with an address on February 14. The League was to consist of a body of delegates, an executive council, and a permanent secretariat. Any issue of international relationship would have free discussion, for “that is the moral force of the public opinion of the world.” Nevertheless if moral force did not suffice, armed force was to be in the background, but only as a last resort. The League was designed to be simple and flexible, yet a definite guarantee of peace, at least in words. Securing peace was not the only purpose of the League; it could be used for cooperation in any international matter, such as ameliorating labor conditions. All international agreements must be registered with the secretary general and openly published. Wilson believed the mandatory policy of aiding development was a great advance over annexation and exploitation. All in all Wilson felt that they had created a document that was both practical and humane, that could serve the conscience of the world. The day after the draft was accepted by the plenary session, the President departed for the United States.

In Washington Wilson met with Congressional representatives to discuss the League. By the time he returned to France in March American public opinion was insisting on four alterations. First, the Monroe Doctrine must be explicitly protected. Second, there must be a way nations could withdraw from the League. Third, domestic disputes must be exempt from League interference, including tariffs and immigration quotas. Fourth, a nation must have the right to refuse a mandate for a territory. Wilson did not feel that these provisions were necessary, but he was willing to get them put into the covenant for the sake of its acceptance. However, he had to compromise in order to do so, and thus his position on other issues was weakened.

Colonel House had been compromising on every side at the Peace talks such that when Wilson returned to Paris, he felt he had to start all over again. This caused an irreparable breach between the President and his close friend and advisor. The Allies were forcing unbearable reparations and indemnities on Germany and the defeated nations. Wilson did not consider it wise for England to retain naval supremacy or for the American and British navies to patrol the world together. Militarism on the sea is the same as on the land. He felt that power must not be vested in a single nation or combination of nations; the sea is a free highway and should be protected by a league of all the nations under international law. To fulfill one of his most important points Wilson developed a comprehensive plan for disarmament. Armaments were only to be used to preserve domestic safety and to maintain international order according to the League. Compulsory military service and the private manufacture of munitions must be abolished. Disarmament policies must be worked out after the peace settlement, be unanimously agreed upon, and have publicity to assure compliance. Although disarmament was temporarily forced upon Germany, these policies were never universally carried out. Wilson persistently argued for a new attitude of mind, for an organization of cooperation for peace which considered moral force above armed force.

Returning to the negotiations of the peace settlement Wilson faced intransigent obstacles to his principles. Several territorial arrangements had already been agreed upon by the major powers during the war in such secret agreements as the Sykes-Picot Treaty and the Treaty of London. Wilson spoke up for self determination, and at his suggestion a commission of inquiry was sent to the Middle East to discover what the peoples’ wishes were. The other powers verbally agreed but never did send their representatives. By the time the Americans went and returned with their information, the issues had been settled. The French wanted not only Alsace-Lorraine but the coal mining district of Saar and a buffer state in the Rhineland. Italy wanted not only the opposite coast of the Adriatic including Trieste which had been promised in the Treaty of London, but they also demanded the port of Fiume which represented Yugoslavia’s only hope for a commercial port. England and Japan had divided up the German colonies in the Pacific Ocean, giving Japan those north of the equator and Britain those south of the equator, but Japan also wanted Shantung on the mainland. In early April Wilson became ill. He had reached the limit of his patience and requested that the oceanliner George Washington be prepared to take him home. The President decided to take his stand on the issue of Fiume which for good reason had not been included in the Pact of London, because it naturally belonged to the new Jugo-Slav state. Wilson consequently went to the public with his arguments, and the Italian delegation withdrew from the Conference.

With the Italians already turning their back on the League, the Japanese saw their chance to push for control of the Shantung Province in China. Wilson backed China’s rights and lectured the nations on their duties toward each other. However, he did not want Japan to leave also and perhaps form an alliance with Russia and Germany; neither England nor America was willing to go to war with Japan over Shantung. Therefore it was agreed that Japan would control Shantung temporarily, and Wilson hoped that the League of Nations would later rectify the situation for China. Above all, Wilson struggled to save the League itself. The Italians never did get Fiume, but they did return to sign the final Treaty. By preventing an unjust decision, a war between the Jugo-Slavs and the Italians was made less likely. Wilson also compromised with the French on the Saar and Rhineland districts, and annexations were modified into temporary mandate agreements.

Germany had been suffering greatly; a food blockade by the Allies had been maintained against them for four months after the Armistice. Finally at the instigation of Herbert Hoover, President Wilson convinced the Allied leaders that the blockade must be lifted for humanitarian reasons. The Treaty agreed upon by the Allies and neutral nations was presented to the Germans on May 7. Their response on May 29 repeatedly complained of failures of the Treaty to adhere to the “Fourteen Points and subsequent addresses.” They felt unnecessarily humiliated by the severe provisions the French had demanded. However, with the threat of Marshal Foch moving the French army in on them, the Germans decided to sign the Treaty. On June 2 the Treaty of Versailles was signed by Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Wilson, and other representatives of the nations.

Wilson was greeted by ten thousand people when he returned to New York. However, in the Senate there were strong isolationist sentiments against the Treaty. Presenting it to the Senate on July 10 President Wilson wondered forebodingly, “Dare we reject it and break the heart of the world’?” A few “irreconcilables” were completely against the League. Many senators favored it, but ratification of a treaty required two-thirds of the Senate. A third group led by Senator Lodge demanded reservations, particularly to Article X of the League which read:

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

For Wilson this was the key article; it was the Monroe Doctrine applied to the world and protected by all. The President explained to the senators that this was a moral obligation but not necessarily a legal obligation. Senator Warren Harding asked what good it would do if it was only a moral obligation which a nation could ignore since it was not legally bound. Wilson pointed out that because it was not legally binding, the nation would have the right to exercise its moral judgment in each case. Lloyd George explained that the covenant did not necessarily imply “military action in support of the imperiled nation” but mainly economic pressure and sanctions against the aggressing nation. Former President Taft agreed that the chance of getting involved in a war was small because of the universal boycott which in most cases would be effective; only a world conspiracy would require the “union of overwhelming forces of the members of the League,” and in that case “the earliest we get into the war the better.” Taft, a Republican, believed the United States could not be forced into a war against its will, and to think so was “a narrow and reactionary viewpoint.”

Nevertheless opposition in the Senate was growing. Therefore President Wilson decided to take his case to the people with a busy speaking tour across the whole country. Young Americans had fought and died in France, and he would not give up the struggle for a world of peace without giving all he could. Wilson argued that the League of Nations was founded according to the American principles of self-government, open discussion and arbitration instead of war, a universal boycott of an offending nation, disarmament, rehabilitation of oppressed peoples, no annexations but trusteeships, abolition of forced labor especially of women and children, rejection of secret treaties, protection of dependent peoples, high standards of labor, the Red Cross, international regulation of drugs and alcohol, and prohibition of arms sales. He warned against violent revolutions such as had occurred in Russia rather than revolution by vote. The United States could be isolated no more, for “we have become a determining factor in the history of mankind” and in the development of civilization. He declared, “The peace of the world cannot be established without America.” Seven and a half million men had been killed in the war; this was more than all the wars from 1793 to 1914. He spoke of the children who would have to die in a worse war if the League of Nations was not established. Wilson pushed himself to the limit, traveling 8,000 miles in twenty-two days and giving thirty-eight speeches. He had increasingly bad headaches which became constant until he finally collapsed in Pueblo, Colorado. The train took him straight back to Washington where he suffered a stroke, leaving the left side of his face and body paralyzed.