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What Is The Significance Of Hu Essay (стр. 2 из 2)

Thus, the idea of Dasein grasping its existence as a totality seems to be a contradiction in terms: for Dasein to be a whole is for Dasein to be no longer, and so to be no longer capable of relating to itself as a whole

Death then, is an end, it is the end of the continuity of our existence; but it is not the sort of end that will allow us to see ourselves as having completed a whole (life). It is not an event that we can experience. It seems then that Dasein cannot ever grasp its existence as a whole. Equally important is the fact that death cannot be thought of as a fulfilment because Dasein can cease to exist (Heidegger calls this demise), and indeed is likely to, without fulfilling all of its potential choices. One may be struck down at any moment; this possibility diminishes the prospect of a life being fulfilled. More importantly however, Heidegger says, With its death, Dasein has indeed fulfilled its course . But in doing so, has it necessarily exhausted its specific possibilities? Rather, are not these precisely what gets taken away from Dasein? Fulfilling is a mode of finishedness and is founded upon it. Finishedness is itself possible only as a determinate form of something present-at-hand or ready-to-hand (288-289). What Heidegger is essentially saying here is that the idea of finishedness is not applicable to an entity that has the defining characteristic of being ahead-of-itself Being-already-in-the-world. Instead, the term may only authentically apply to a kind of being that is in-the-world as a potentially practical entity i.e. something-present-at-hand or, ready-to-hand. For example, a road may be thought of as finished when it has reached its end. The end of Dasein however cannot be thought of in this way because it can never appear in this way to itself. Neither can others think of the death of a person/Dasein as fulfilment or finishedness. This is because the person who has died becomes an object of concern in the ways of funeral rites, internment, and the cult of graves. (282). This means that the one who has died is still, even in her death, more than just equipment or, something ready-to-hand. In taking part in the cult of graves , the others still possess a being-with alongside the deceased, a kind of being that exists in a mode of respectful solicitude . So, not only can we never grasp our own lives as a totality thereby allowing ourselves to gain a proper understanding of the Being of Dasein as a being-a-whole, we also cannot grasp the totality of another s life.

Death can only be analysed in the terms of one s own death or, as Heidegger states, Our investigation is thus forced into a purely existential orientation to the Dasein which is in every case one s own. (284). By keeping in mind this purely existential requirement for an understanding of death and thus, dismissing the notion of death s being a kind of event, we can see that death is inherent in our being. If we are to understand it, we must analyse it in terms of an existence that is continually pushing forward in-the-world. Death can never signify a being-at-an-end therefore it must signify a being-towards-an-end. It is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is. (289).

Furthermore, it is a way to be that may possibly be realised at any given moment. This perpetual possibility suggests that for Dasein, death is its ownmost possibility To a large extent, this exemplifies the previously mentioned extremely personal sphere to which Heidegger has moved philosophy into. This is because, more than anything else in Heidegger s ontology, Dasein s ownmost possibility reveals the mineness of existence.

Death then is not to be thought of as a future event that draws closer and closer as a person approaches old age, this view is erroneous because we can never dismiss the possibility of our demise at any given moment of our lives. In our throwness into-the-world, we are thrown into the possibility that each moment will be our last, that we will realise the possibility that will spell the end of all possibilities.

This perpetual threat of annihilation is so personal, ( In dying, it is shown that mineness and existence are ontologically constitutive for death 284), that no one else can substitute it for me. Dying is, as Heidegger says, something that every Dasein must take upon itself at the time that it happens; furthermore, No one can take the Other s dying away from him (284). It outstrips my relation to others, my being-with-others, and thereby isolates me completely.

It is in the authentic acceptance of this definition of death, as the possibility which is one s ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped. (294), that we come face to face with the existential notion of the contingency of existence (an issue that is perhaps more readily associated with Sartre than Heidegger). If we can never escape this thing that inhibits us from the possibility of seeing our lives as having been completed or fulfilled, then what chance do we have of attaching any real meaning to our existence? It would seem that at the end of our lives, we needn t have existed at all. This existential notion of contingency is explored in great detail in Sartre s 1943 essay on phenomenological ontology, Being and Nothingness . Sartre places human consciousness, or no-thingness, in direct opposition to thingness. Consciousness is not a material entity (is not-matter) and by this token escapes all determinism. The message, along with all of the implications, is a hopeful one; yet the incessant reminder that human endeavour is and remains useless lends an air of tragedy to the book as well. Concerning Heidegger s existentialism, the necessity of an entity/possibility that will end all of our possibilities (i.e. our choices) and will not allow our lives to possess any form of completeness shows us that all of our choices/possibilities will have been contingent. Thus, if Dasein is, as Heidegger claims, possibilities then it is also contingency.

If we are to have an authentic outlook upon death, then we must consider it existentially. In doing so, we must accept that death plays an integral role in our being in such a way that we have a being-towards-death. Our being-towards-death is a matter of Dasein making it s every projection upon an existentiell possibility, in the light of an awareness of itself as mortal. If we are to confront death, then we must confront it as the possibility which is not to be outstripped thereby accepting, as Mulhall states, that one s existence is ultimately to be given up or annihilated, and so is utterly contingent, and in no way necessary .

It could be said that this being-towards-death is, in its essence anxiety because of the contingency of our existence combined with the facticity of our thrownness and the ever-present possibility of the end of all possibilities.

One cannot imagine that it would be easy for the average person to dwell upon the contingency of existence presuming that she is leading the typically inauthentic lifestyle. Authenticity on the other hand requires a kind of optimistic stoicism in which death is embraced as a possibility and man faces the nothing . This is in accordance with Heidegger s analysis of the structure of our being; an analysis that reveals an affective existence i.e., through such existential attitudes and feelings as care, anxiety and so on.

Having investigated the convoluted methodology behind Heidegger s ontological analysis of death we may now consider the actual significance of the role of Human mortality in his philosophy.

Anxiety functions to disclose (dis-close) authentic being, freedom, as a potentiality. It manifests the freedom of man to choose himself and to take hold of himself. The relevance of time, or more specifically, the finiteness of human existence is then experienced as a, perhaps unnerving, freedom to meet his own death, a preparedness for and continuous relatedness or, being-toward, his own death. In anxiety, all other entities disappear into a nothing and nowhere , man hovers in himself as ex-isting, being nowhere at home. In facing this no-thing-ness all obvious everydayness disintegrates and so he faces the potentiality for authenticity. Thus, anxiety, care and the implied confrontation with death are for Heidegger primarily of methodological importance: through these fundamental parts, elements are revealed such as potentialities for being joyfully active, knowing joy [die wissende Heiterkeit] is a door to the eternal . Anxiety is the existential instrument which opens man up to Being and, according to Heidegger, to think Being is to arrive at one s (true) home . Unsurprisingly, the overall theme of Being and Time is not too dissimilar to Sartre s later masterpiece. The implications of contingency leave one with a similar air of tragedy . However, if we can gather the strength to adopt an authentic way of being, if we can see that we have a self to find and overcome the repression for selfhood, we can at the very least be freed from the mistaken view of death and thus, be freed from the irrational fear that normally accompanies it. The role of mortality in Heidegger s philosophy may be methodological and catalytic, but the import of mortality to Human Being, whether authentic or inauthentic is and always has been significant in conjunction with our cultural overlays and traditions. Heidegger s phenomenological view of death as a way-of-being is significant to us because it provides a workable alternative to the common dogmatic views of death and it can help to guide us through a profound existence, that is laden with the traps and pitfalls of inauthenticity.