Among those injured were Khaled Abdullah, Audrey James, Eardley James, and Velma George. The plaintiffs filed lawsuits alleging that the ?pilot and flight crew negligently failed to take precautions to avoid the turbulence and negligently failed to warn the passengers of the turbulent conditions to enable the passengers to take the necessary precautions to protect themselves?. A jury trial began in August of 1995 in the District Court of the Virgin Islands, Division of Saint Croix, where the court consolidated the cases together into one. Upon conclusion of the trial, a jury found ?American Airlines liable, with no contributory negligence by the plaintiffs, and awarded the plaintiffs more than two million dollars?.
This case showed that even though the pilots turned on the ?fasten seatbelts? sign, the fact that no one directly warned the passengers to do so, entitled them to their respective settlements. American Airlines tried to appeal this case saying that FAA regulations (simply turning on the seatbelt sign) already outlined the minimum standards of air travel. Why, then should the plaintiff?s be allowed to bring a case against American Airlines saying the pilot showed aviation negligence? ?The Court, however, held that Congress intended to preempt the entire field of air safety, but allowed plaintiffs to recover damages under state or territorial remedies?. Foul weather does not only happen when the aircraft is in flight. It can create havoc for pilots on runways and can cause several hours of delay at airports nationwide. All types of aircraft are subject to bad weather, not just large commercial airplanes. On February 13, 1980, a twin-engine airplane crashed near H!
ot Spri!
ngs, South Dakota. The plane was carrying a pilot and three passengers. The pilot, Charles M. Largent, was also the plane?s owner. He, along with business associate Louis Altringer, were on their way to California for business. The estates of Largent and Altringer brought action against the United States, alleging that the government negligently failed to warn Largent of adverse weather conditions that led to structural icing causing the plane to crash.
The government, however, claimed that it was Largent, not the Flight Service Station specialist, (an FSS is a Federal Aviation Administration air traffic facility that provides services to airmen such as weather briefings, receiving and processing flight plans, and communicating with airborne aircraft) who was negligent and ultimately responsible for the crash. The problem lay in the fact that when Largent phoned to speak to the FSS at approximately 4:16 a.m., he was not told of icy conditions reported because that warning was set to expire at 6:00 a.m. That was the same time Largent had planned to take off for California and the FSS specialist felt the ice warning would be irrelevant by then. However, approximately two minutes before Largent again called the FSS, one specialist replaced another and he too failed to mention the now expired ice warning to Largent. So, Largent and his three passengers took off, supposedly thinking that moderately fair weather lay !
ahead o!
f them. However, shortly after takeoff, the plane crashed and it was determined by investigators that the reason was an ice buildup on the plane, which was not fitted with de-icing equipment. ?FAA regulations mandate that the pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft?. So, keeping this in mind, the court decided that even though both FSS specialists were negligent in not telling Largent of the reported icy conditions which led to the crash, the ultimate responsibility still fell on Largent. Also, the court found that Altringer was negligent because he too could have seen the poor weather of the morning in question and therefore should have used better judgment when deciding whether or not to fly.
As mentioned earlier, pilots have an enormous amount of responsibility on them when they take the controls of a plane. Under FAA regulations, they are responsible for themselves, as well as all passengers in the plane. For this reason, groups like the Air Line Pilot?s Association (ALPA), which represents over 59,000 pilots at 49 airlines in the U.S. and Canada, are pushing for more laws governing things such as flight time for fatigued pilots. On November 20, 2000, the FAA interpreted a rule clarifying that ?16 hours is the maximum time a pilot can remain on duty, regardless of delays caused by weather, air traffic control, or maintenance?. The FAA, in concert with the ALPA, has worked together to gain strides like this one to keep airlines from forcing their pilots to fly without adequate time for rest and relaxation. FAA Deputy Chief Counsel James Whitlow wrote, If, when using the actual expected flight time [for a segment], the carrier cannot find at least eig!
ht hou!
338