Another cost associated specifically with military research and development funding is that the funded research and development will fail after large amounts of money have been funneled into a project. This cost-issue is an important concern for managers who make the decisions as to which projects to undertake, which contractors to award the projects to, and when to discontinue R&D of a certain type altogether. Unrealistic performance goals and unnecessary initial requirements can contribute to the eventual failure of a project and the loss of funds that were allocated to it. This again implicates the managers who must oversee the process from beginning to end in order to assure the eventual product or technology is both possible and worth the costs.
Analysis of Professional Opinion surrounding R&D Funding
The professional opinion surrounding R&D funding is overwhelmingly supportive. While many critics point out the shortfalls of some of the instruments used by the government to appropriate funds, and the inherent inefficiencies of the contracting process, the theoretical issue of whether or not fund military research and development is a positive consensus. The “proposed initiatives with real merit in areas such as military research and development simply cannot be overlooked.” (O’Hanlon, 42) Klette states that there exists “little controversy amongst economists about the desirability of governmental; support to these activities. (1) The real question that emerges once the necessity for the R&D is established is how that should be done. To answer that question, however, there is little consensus.
Critics are quick to point out the weapons labs that exist under the DoE but produce weapons technology for DoD as wasteful costs. These critics acknowledge the value of the weapons labs during the Cold War, but now question whether they are still necessary in a world where the trend is toward dismantling the weapons that these labs once produced. These labs are targeted as the first place where costs can be reduced. Yet, some proclaim their value; “the DoE’s five-year old technology transfer project is finally beginning to show some credible results.” (Cortdz, 34) Supporters of these labs state that it is more an issue of paying for the long-term research these labs tackle, or allowing it to go undone.
One singular factor that continues to appear throughout the research related to military R&D funding is the issue of military and civilian cooperation and collaboration. In their article in Issues in Science and Technology, Senator Bingaman and Admiral Inman state that “DoD must be able to work more effectively with the commercial sector – for its own sake.” (84) This position was advocated some years later when Bill Clinton became president. In a speech during his campaign he commented that “government can play a key role in helping private firms develop and profit from innovation.” (Clinton, 1) Clinton kept this campaign promise, supporting civilian technology and dual-use technology development. This theme of public-private partnerships is echoed by Cordtz about the DoE weapons labs. He claims that under CRADAs and CAs the labs can work with private firms to continue to research and develop technology of great value. Collaboration is advocated by Wong in her analysis of opportunities within the army. She cites that “the Army should adopt a policy that considers collaboration as a primary approach to achieve its R&D goals.” (28)
There is also debate that surrounds the idea of whether the government’s R&D policy complements or substitutes private R&D investment. In their working paper for the National Bureau of Economic Research, David, Hall, and Toole examine thirty-three different studies of this subject. Their conclusion after evaluating these studies was that “complementarity appears more prevalent and substitution all but disappears.” (49) This study seems to counter the notions of the other studies that the direction of federal R&D policy has shifted to replacing private R&D.
Conclusions
Based on the research conducted, continued funding of military R&D is essential. It is also necessary that the funding be continued at present levels with adequate increases each fiscal year. With national ballistic missile defense (BMD) being debated, R&D funding should be increased substantially to compensate the costs related to BMD.
Reform may be possible within the contracting process. The recent changes by the DoD to make their procurement process more accessible and efficient are positive steps that should be built upon. The notion of forming more public-private partnerships seems to be working well. While whole privatization of R&D is impossible, collaboration efforts present a feasible solution. The emphasis on dual-use technologies will afford opportunities for this collaboration. One idea that seems particularly intriguing is the idea of OTs that allow for return on investments. This presents the government and DoD with a unique opportunity not only to promote R&D in the private sector but to also profit from the research conducted.
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