found a way too resupply its weapons, Iran could develop into a “Lebanon-type anarchy” or even
worse, become a satellite state of the Soviet Union.
A Lebanese magazine reported in November of 1986 that the United States had negotiated
an arms deal with Iran (popularly referred to as the Iran-Contra Affair), at the urging of the Israeli
government. Iran’s motives were simple, that of obtaining arms to fight a war it was falling behind
in. For the U.S. the motives were mostly to achieve the release of its kidnaped American hostages,
and to improve relations with Iran and to ensure future influence in the region that could thwart
Soviet interests. “By making arms the currency of the dialogue, the U.S. raised a host of questions
about its intentions, its judgements, and its firmness when it came to dealing with ‘terrorist’ states.
For our purposes it is sufficient to note that the direct supply of U.S. arms appears to have included
some 2,000 TOW (antitank missiles) and some 235 HAWK (air defense, SAM) missiles . . . and did
not come from Iran’s confiscated assets. They were delivered on three installments in June 1985,
July 1986, and October 1986.” (Chubin 211).
Iraq on the other hand was under no U.S. or Soviet arms embargo, and could replenish their
military continually, while Iran was subject to regular and frequent attacks by Iraq without hope of
improvement as long as the arms embargo was in place. Although the three shipments of arms to
Iran from the United States helped to keep balance in the war, it ended in disaster, and rocked the
Reagan administration like no other foreign policy debacle. It also proved to be a major
embarrassment for the United States who secretly supplied arms to Iran in direct violation of
existing United States laws. As a consequence the United States lost credibility with all the players
in the region. Another consequence of this ‘deal’ being revealed was increased “animosity and
hostility between Washington and Teheran” and an increased desire for the U.S. to see that Iran
would lose the war. “There are strong reasons to argue that had the arms deal [fully] succeeded . . .
it would have almost certainly enhanced the military capability of the Iranian forces in the war and
9
would have very likely resulted in an Iranian victory. It would have also ensured better diplomatic
relations with the United States in the future” (Tarock 95).
The United States by early 1987 began to express concern over the threat posed by Iran, as
well as the safe navigation of the Persian Gulf when Iran acquired Silkworm anti-ship missiles. The
catalyst for this concern was Kuwait’s request to the U.S. to reflag twelve of its oil tankers and
provide them with naval protection. When the U.S.S. Stark was inadvertently bombed, it served to
reinforce these perceived threats to the safe navigation of the Gulf. “The U.S. decision to become
directly involved in the Gulf stemmed from several overlapping and not wholly compatible
considerations: (1) a desire . . . to reassure the Gulf states (especially Kuwait); (2) to pre-empt any
Soviet role in the Gulf; (3) and to serve notice of concern about the safety of navigation [in the
Persian Gulf]” (Chubin 214).
The direct presence in the gulf by U.S. reflagged Kuwaiti tankers would serve to deter
Iranian attacks on them, but it did nothing to stop Iraq’s air assaults of Iranian tankers and oil
platforms. It also did not address the increase of Iraqi air assaults on Iran’s oil trade capabilities.
Although Iran took precautions not to confront the U.S. directly, they did attack oil installations,
and offshore platforms of third parties in retaliation of the Iraqi assaults. This could be viewed as
another example of the United States clearly siding with Iraq with a new twist. It appears that the
U.S. is getting closer to fighting the war for Iraq. Clashes and near-misses between Iran and the
United States continued in the Persian Gulf for a good portion of 1987 in what is referred to as the
‘tanker war’.
Attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf indirectly brought other countries into the conflict,
including the U.S.. “By 1988 Iran had lost the will to continue the war. Iraq forces resumed the
offensive, but with economic development in both Iran and Iraq at a standstill due to reduced oil
exporting capabilities, an agreement for a cease-fire was reached in August 1988 with the help of
the United Nations” (Encarta). Final peace between Iran and Iraq was delayed for nearly two years,
but Iran and Iraq resumed formal diplomatic relations in 1990 and divided control over the Shatt al
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Arab waterway. By 1991 Iraqi troops were withdrawn from Iranian soil and prisoners of war were
exchanged. The Iran-Iraq war was now over but Iraq would soon set its sights on its neighbor to
the south. Hussein would invade Kuwait leading to another war for Iraq, this time against the
United States.
Conclusion
In many ways the Iran-Iraq war was the culmination of, and epitomizes the Cold War.
Never before had the two superpowers taken such a great interest in two third world countries who
were at war. There is also enough evidence to suggest that had the superpowers not supplied Iran
and Iraq with arms during the 1970’s (and resupply after the war began) this conflict might have
remained a simple border dispute lasting a few months, rather than escalating to full war that
lasted eight years. Certainly the Persian Gulf region (particularly Iran, and Iraq to a lesser degree)
was geopolitically important for both superpowers. For the Soviets, Iran meant access to the “warm
waters of the Indian Ocean,” and for the United States, Iran meant 1200 miles of shared borders
with the Soviet Union which expanded by 530 miles in 1985 because of the occupation of
Afghanistan. To both superpowers, the unrestrained flow of oil was important in regards to the
world-economy, as well as their individual interests. The catastrophic outcome of superpower
involvement in this conflict left two third-world countries in economic ruins. It also resulted in
1.7million wounded, and one million dead in one of the bloodiest wars ever fought.
11
Chubin, Shahram & Charles Tripp. Iran and Iraq at War. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1988.
Persian Gulf War, Iran, Iraq. Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia 99. CD-Rom. Redmond, WA:
Microsoft Corporation, 1999.
Turock, Adam. The Superpowers’ Involvement in the Iran-Iraq War. Commack, New York:
Nova Science Publishers Inc., 1998