Hanoi that presented a opportunity for peace and instead continued to escalate ground
troops.
George Ball also urged Johnson on April 21 to explore the North Vietnamese points
because they provided a basis for negotiations ( Barrett,150 ). A month later, on May
18, Mai Van Bo, a North Vietnamese diplomat in France, passed a message to
Washington via the French Foreign Ministry: ” The four points of April 65 should not be
considered as prior conditions but rather as working principles for negotiations ( Helsing,
116 ).” This quote argues quite obviously that Hanoi wanted to start talking. Johnson’s
failure to recognize or to at least entertain the invitation of Hanoi seems unacceptable.
Even with his advisors strong wishes to do so, Johnson was uninterested in exploring
whether Hanoi’s four points provided any opening for negotiations. Johnson believed
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that any eagerness to negotiate would be a sign of weakness. Also, the belief that
eagerness would show the United States lacked the will to stay the course in Vietnam
( Helsing, 116 ).
Johnson conducted his John Hopkins speech for peace to appeal to the Left by
appearing moderate and diplomatic while actually taking no initiative other than
maintaining a stronger military commitment in order to appeal to the Right ( Helsing,
117 ). Conducting government politics in this fashion is common but with so much
riding on peace, it is hard to understand Johnson’s position. Peace talks early in the
conflict might have saved Johnson’s presidency as well as his Great Society projects.
Conditional negotiations for peace could have manipulated to save face against the
communist and the ideology of the domino theory. Last but not least, it would also have
saved thousands of soldiers their lives not to mention the millions of Vietnamese that lost
their lives. Johnson’s failure to listen to his political experts on discussions of peace
emphasizes the presidents ineffectiveness as commander in chief.
President Johnson continued to have trouble maintaining his domestic programs
aimed at obtaining the great society. This was in large part because of the escalation in
South Vietnam. Johnson wanted to avoid any national debate on the Vietnam War in
order to protect his domestic agenda. . In theory, this was done to avoid disrupting the
tremendous economic growth and prosperity as well as the legislative program he hoped
to build into the Great Society ( Herring, 122 ). Johnson’s strong desire for both guns
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and butter was a trap from which neither he nor the country could escape, a trap for
which the president was mostly responsible( Helsing, 256 ). This trap, as it is referred to,
was unavoidable circumstances that arose as a result of Johnson’s decision to
downplay the escalation of military force in Vietnam. As a result of the decision,
numerous failures emerged . The failure to mobilize and maintain public support for the
Vietnam War actually extended the war and started to erode economic stability. The
failure to win the war or negotiate unconditionally with the North Vietnamese enabled
the domino theory to carry on despite U.S. efforts. As president, Johnson failed the
nation as a leader, and he failed on his own terms, losing the war and his Great Society
( Helsing, 249 ).
Lyndon Baines Johnson was a president that often times lacked the decision making
ability necessary to make confident quick decisions. Surrounded by top military leaders
and political advisors, Johnson was unsuccessful in negotiating with North Vietnam.
Johnson’s Great Society programs were destroyed because of the United States prolonged
involvement with the war in Vietnam. In the end it was his inability to maintain public
support for his policies in Vietnam that destroyed his presidency. Johnson’s most
devastating failure during his administration was his inability to make decisions
necessary to win the war in Vietnam.