“the anarchy within states rather than between states is the fundamental condition that explains the prevalence of war since 1945″.
A strong state is founded on the inter-relation between its physical attributes i.e. its territory, population, resources and its underpinning cultural base of affections and ideology. The paramount criteria that causes the gulf between assorting and a weak state is legitimacy, having legitimacy is quite simply the division between the states that succeed and fail. For legitimacy to exist a state must satisfy the following characteristics; the physical basis including, effective sovereignty, and a international consensus on territory. Supported by an implicit social contract and a consensus on the concept of the state. It is exactly the failure to meet these dimensions that lead to the perils of the weak state, there are several causal factors to why periphery nations have difficulty achieving legitimacy. It stems from the nations development, many of which emerged from colonialism. The colonial legacy has very negative consequences for the developing nation, principally because the social and political institutions left to the new nation hinders it rather than helps. The political institutions were founded on a western premise, political participation, accountability and constitutionalism are not always the suitable basis for development, it is as if the new nation has to set itself against a western template. The bureaucratic structure was inherently elitist, decisions made in the capital were often resented in the country. Colonial authorities sustained cultural elite’s to rule over their inferiors, this was exactly the case in Rwanda.
“In a number of instances ..the allocation by the state of differential rights of access was based on a normative scale according to which groups were seen as superior to others, and at times these normative evaluations were projected into the collective images which Africans formed of themselves.”
Colonialism also left organised military and police forces, often used as instruments of coercion. In a deteriorating state they become a law unto themselves, selling themselves as mercenaries to wealthy independents. For the few states that do develop most descend into civil war, rebellion, wars of succession and political corruption, “between 1958 and 1985, there has been 65 forcible changes of government in Africa alone.” It would be inaccurate to presume that Europe is spared these problems but the Intra-war in ex-Yugoslavia shattered this illusion. A feature of the war in Yugoslavia was ethnicity, ethnic hostilities hidden under the silencing hand of communism were emerging. Experts on ethnicity such as Ted Gurr suggests that ethnic hatreds and affinities can be products of the weak state, they are not primordial but arise in particular political, social and economic conditions. The state can often be seen as exploiting ethnic grievances for their own political ends.
Emerging peripheral nations have been unable to cope with the pressure of rapid economic modernisation and the legacy of colonialism, the tensions that arise cause stress on the basic foundations of the developing nation leading to a decent into revolutionary violence. This alternative strategy of war fare is becoming increasingly prolific. the last major state confrontation could be viewed as the cold war and the nuclear stalemate that ensued, since the advent of nuclear weapons inter-state war has become obsolete because of the threat of total annihilation that is posed. The new form of war-fare is Intra-state war and insurgency. ” in the last eight years alone there have been no less that 164 internationally significant out breaks of revolutionary violence” .
The terms insurgency and revolutionary war-fare are largely inter-changeable, they refer to a particular variety of revolutionary activity that involves a protracted struggle using irregular military tactics. Tactics involve psychological and political operations in addition to conventional military strategies. The goal is generally to form a new system or political structure from within the state. Insurgency is markedly different to conventional war, T.E Elliot defines it as “an influence, an idea, a thing intangible, without front or back, drifting like a gas.” Conventional war focuses its attention on military considerations were insurgency is a multifaceted activity in which conflict takes on many different dimensions. Revolutionary warfare extends the battle front, the war is fought in a political, cultural, socio-economic and ideology. Military operations have an intimate relationship with politics, this view espoused by those such as Mao claims that all conflict must have a distinct political direction to succeed. Like the NLF in Vietnam and MIN YUEN organisation in Malaya, insurgents see the population as key to the struggle the battle becomes on for hearts and minds.
“the defeat of the military enemy, the overthrow of the government are secondary tasks, the primary effort of revolutionary warfare is to mobilise the population, without which no government can stand for a day. (Mao).
Revolutionary warfare can been seen to have had varying rates of success. China, indo-china, Algeria, Cuba, Nicaragua were all notable victories whilst failures resided In Greece, Kenya, Peru and Bolivia. The existence of internal instability and grievances coupled with favourable terrain and the open availability of arms from outside, means that revolutionary warfare will continue as a feature of Intra-state war-fare. It is a potent instrument that can force change. Insurgency is clearly a more tactically sound method of conducting warfare, for ideological reasons it is alleged that the USA used the CIA to organise and conduct military insurgencies into target states there is an allegation that the USA secretly committed US ground forces in Cuba, naturally the USA deny this. For the past 200 years theories have emerged on warfare; game theory, deterrence , balance of power theory, all product of the realist paradigm. ‘Great Powers ‘ feature prominently from the balance of power era to the BI-polar cold war, a theme through out is that lesser powers were relegated to objects of the stronger states rivalry , subordinating them as less than self directed actors. Modern theory should concentrate on the major sources of war that will continue to derive less from the character of relations between states and than what goes on within them. The focus of international politics must shift from the activities of the great powers to a concern with what we have traditionally considered peripheral actors, such as the developing nuclear confrontational stance of India and Pakistan. The nature of war has changed, technology now presents the west a mobile platform from which to militarily threaten those collide with our ideals. Air raids continue presently over Kosovo, indicating how Nato can wield military muscle without the risk of committing troops and bogging down in a land war, conflict without much risk. As for the prospects for peace, it is now the UN’s duty to sustain and resuscitate weak states to best serve its peace keeping ideals, Rwanda was a catastrophe that must not be repeated, it must get better.
Bibliography
Just and unjust wars, Walzer 1997.
Contemporary strategy, Baylis, Booth, Williams. 1997.
Internet sources CNN “Rwanda” Article,
World politics kegley and Wittkopf
International war Melvin Small, J David Singer 1996
Books related to evaluation of classical set piece wars
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Just and unjust wars, Walzer 1997.
Contemporary strategy, Baylis, Booth, Williams. 1997.
Internet sources CNN “Rwanda” Article,
World politics kegley and Wittkopf
International war Melvin Small, J David Singer 1996