related crimes and deaths. He claimed that the waiting period would not only curb the spread of
guns by keeping the lethal weapons out of the hands of convicted felons, but it would also
reduce the crimes committed in the heat of the moment by providing a cooling off period.
Senators whose States had already adopted waiting periods demonstrated with data that the
waiting period had already been proven to work in stopping a significant number of handgun
purchases by convicted felons. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) showed that her State’s 15-day
waiting period stopped 8,060 convicted felons, 1859 drug users, 827 people with mental
illnesses as well as 720 minors from purchasing a gun during January 1991 and September
1993. The freshman Senator from California maintained that even though her State’s crime rate
was “unacceptably” high, it could have been much worse without the legislation.
Dole and other GOP opponents, however, insisted that they would continue their efforts
to thwart the passage of the bill unless the preemption language was included. Mitchell promptly
rejected the GOP demand, criticizing the double principles of those who, having once insisted
that they could not support the Brady bill because it was the Federal Government telling the
States what to do, turned around and said that they now liked the preemption. Metzenbaum
joined in the argument against the GOP opponents, saying they were blocking the bill “because
they were scared to death of the National Rifle Association,” and calling their demand for the
preemption provision “an effort to kill the bill.” Both sides did not yield, and with two cloture
motions having failed to quash the Republican-led filibuster, one in the afternoon (57-42) and the
other at 11 o’clock at night (57-41), the Brady bill was thought by many dead again in the
Senate.
It was the dissatisfaction of a handful of Republicans with the outcome and their dread of
being blamed for killing this popular legislation that saved the life of the Brady bill. The following
day, the discontent of those Republicans who decided to cast a straight vote sent Dole to the
negotiating table again, where he was forced to settle down with a new compromise which
carried no preemption language. It was actually identical to the one that he and other GOP
opponents had filibustered the day before except for the change in the sunsetting period; the
compromise bill would end the waiting period four years after its enforcement, instead of five
years, with a possible extension for another year upon the Attorney General’s request.
Consequently, by unanimous consent, the Senate agreed to vote on the House-passed
version of the Brady bill (HR 1025) with the text of the compromise inserted in lieu thereof, and
also to request a conference with the House to reconcile the differing versions of the Brady bill.
The Brady bill (HR 1025) as amended was passed easily on a vote of 64 to 36, and sent back
to the House with a request for a conference.
Toward the passage
On November 22, the House agreed to the request of the Senate for a conference upon
the adoption of House Resolution 322 by the vote of 238-187. The conferees were appointed
by the Chairs of each chambers: Brooks, Hughes, Schumer, Sensenbrenner, and Gekas from
the House and Joseph R. Biden. Jr. (D-DE), Kennedy, Metzenbaum, Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT),
and Larry E. Craig (R-ID) from the Senate. Later, Senate Republicans replaced Hatch and
Craig with Stevens and Dirk Kempthorne (R-ID). The outcome was a conference report which
preserved the House 5-year sunset of the waiting period with no provisions for the Attorney
General to replace it with the instant check system before then. Several Senate-passed
provisions had also been dropped: the provision expanding the definition of antique firearms
exempt from gun restrictions to include thousands of functioning World War era rifles, and the
one allowing gun sales between dealers from different states. A new provision was added in the
report which would require that the police be notified of multiple purchases.
Soon after the conference, the chief Senate negotiator Biden explained how they got to
the conference report. According to his statement, at the beginning of the conference, Stevens,
a member of the NRA board of directors, announced that the only acceptable outcome for the
Senate Republican conferees, Kempthone and himself, would be the Senate-passed version of
the Brady bill unchanged. The Senate bill had a provision ending the waiting period as early as
two years after the enforcement if the instant background check met certain standards. All of
the House conferees including the House Republican conferees rejected that demand, which led
to the adoption of the conference report accepted by all the House conferees, Republicans and
Democrats alike, and the Senate Democratic conferees. Thus, the conference report was made
with Stevens and Kempthorne casting dissenting votes.
The House approved the conference report (H. Rept. 103-412) easily on a vote of
238-187. In the Senate, however, after the explanation on the conference report, Dole and
other Republican opponents fired at Biden with accusations that he and other Democratic
Senate conferees completely ignored the wishes of the Senate in the conference. Dole said, “I
don’t think that under these conditions, cloture will be invoked this year or next year.”10
Throughout the day November 23, the hostile atmosphere occupied the Senate floor as
the debate continued. Majority Leader Mitchell declared that he was determined to force the
issue to another vote during the year even though it would mean the post-Thanksgiving session
which nobody wanted. Later in the day, he presented two cloture motions for November 30
and December 1.
The breakdown of the impasse came the following day, November 24, when Dole
agreed to accept the terms of the conference report under a compromise that he would submit a
separate bill with the Senate-passed provisions, which was to be considered and voted
immediately in January as soon as the Senate returned to business. Obviously, this solution was
prompted by the loathing of most senators to come back from their respective States to
Washington after Thanksgiving break as well as by the pro-Brady public pressure.
Consequently, the Senate approved the conference report by unanimous consent.
After seven years of debate, the Brady bill was finally passed by the 103rd Congress.
President Clinton, as he had promised, signed the bill into law on November 30, and the Brady
bill became Public Law 103-159.
Beyond the passage
Three years have passed since the passage of the Brady bill, but the fight of Jim and
Sarah Brady and other gun control advocates still continues for stricter gun control legislation. In
early 1994, they succeeded in passing the assault weapons ban with the Brady momentum, but
since then the NRA has intensified its lobbying, declaring to repeal the gun control legislation. In
1994 elections, for example, the NRA spent $3.2 million to get its supporters elected.11 The last
1996 election was also a victory for the NRA in that many of its supporters got re-elected even
though their member Dole was defeated by Clinton in the Presidential race. Their most powerful
supporter in the Congress is probably the House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA), who once
wrote in his letter to the NRA chief lobbyist Tanya Metaksa: “As long as I am Speaker of this
House, no gun control legislation is going to move in committee or on the floor of this House.”12
Even with the GOP majority in Congress, however, it is sure that NRA supporters will face a
major obstacle in the newly-reelected President Clinton, who has declared: “For all the things
that will be debated, you can mark my words, the Brady law and the assault weapons bill are
here to stay. They will not be repealed.13″
Currently, the Supreme Court is hearing a lawsuit filed by NRA-backed gun control
opponents. They claim that the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act violates the 10th
Amendment of the Constitution which protects state and local government from certain federal
interference. The NRA says it wants to repeal the waiting period as well as the background
checks,14 which reveals the organization’s true intention when it supported the background
checks in its fight against the passage of the Brady bill. The battle between the NRA and the
Handgun Control Inc. will continue with the NRA supporters leading the Congress and
President Clinton challenging them with the veto power. Nevertheless, the Brady bill, with its
unwavering public support, will be the hardest bill to repeal.
The passage of the Brady bill of 1993 is one of the best case studies of the legislative
process in the U.S. Congress. The seven year history of the bill demonstrated how partisan
politics played a crucial role in the outcome of the bill, and how difficult it was to make bipartisan
compromises to move the bill through Congress.
In concluding this research report, I would like to express my deepest respect for those
who worked hard for the passage of the Brady bill, including Jim and Sarah Brady.