political moves Sadat had made previously, meant that he was totally
in control and able to implement the programs he wanted. He was the
hero of the day. In 1977 the outlook for peace between Israel and
Egypt was not good. Israel still held most of Sinai, and negotiations
had been at a stalemate since the second disengagement agreement in
1975. Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin was a hard-liner and a
supporter of Israeli expansion. He approved the development of
settlements on the occupied West Bank and reprisal raids into southern
Lebanon. After the food riots of January 1977, Sadat decided that
something dramatic had to be done, and so on November 19, 1977, in
response to an invitation from Begin, Sadat journeyed to Jerusalem,
and agreed upon peace.
Many Egyptians accepted peace with Israel if it meant
regaining Egyptian territories. Of the Arab countries, only Sudan,
Oman, and Morocco were favorable to Sadat’s trip. In the other Arab
states, there was shock and dismay. The Arabs felt that Sadat had
betrayed the cause of Arab solidarity and the Palestinians. In spite
of Sadat’s denials, the Arabs believed that he intended to go it alone
and make a separate peace with Israel.
In fact, that is what happened. In December 1977, Egypt and
Israel began peace negotiations in Cairo. These negotiations continued
on and off over the next several months, but by September 1978 it was
clear that they were deadlocked. President Jimmy Carter had become
closely involved in the negotiations. In an effort to break the
deadlock, Carter invited Sadat and Begin to Camp David. The
negotiations were tense and almost broke down several times. On
September 17, however, Carter announced that the Camp David Accords
had been reached. They consisted of two parts, the Framework for Peace
in the Middle East and the Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace
Treaty between Israel and Egypt.
The Camp David Accords made Sadat a hero in Europe and the
United States. The reaction in Egypt was generally favorable, but
there was opposition from the left. In the Arab world, Sadat was
almost universally condemned. Only Sudan issued an ambivalent
statement of support. The Arab states suspended all official aid and
severed diplomatic relations. Egypt was expelled from the Arab League,
which it was instrumental in founding, and from other Arab
institutions. Saudi Arabia withdrew the funds it had promised for
Egypt’s purchase of American fighter aircraft.
In the West, where Sadat was extolled as a hero and a champion
of peace, the Arab rejection of the Camp David Accords is often
confused with the rejection of peace. The basis for Arab rejection was
opposition to Egypt’s separate peace with Israel. Although Sadat
insisted that the treaty provided for a comprehensive settlement of
the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab states and the PLO saw it as a
separate peace, which Sadat had vowed he would not sign. The Arabs
believed that only a unified Arab stance and the threat of force would
persuade Israel to negotiate a settlement of the Palestinian issue
that would satisfy Palestinian demands for a homeland. Without Egypt’s
military power, the threat of force evaporated because no single Arab
state was strong enough militarily to confront Israel alone.
The Camp David Accords brought peace to Egypt but not
prosperity. With no real improvement in the economy, Sadat became
increasingly unpopular. His isolation in the Arab world was matched by
his increasing remoteness from the mass of Egyptians. While Sadat’s
critics in the Arab world remained beyond his reach, increasingly he
reacted to criticism at home by expanding censorship and jailing his
opponents. In addition, Sadat subjected the Egyptians to a series of
referenda on his actions and proposals that he invariably won by more
than 99 percent of the vote. For example, in May 1979 the Egyptian
people approved the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty by 99.9 percent of
those voting.
Sadat’s handpicked successor, Husni Mubarak, was
overwhelmingly approved in a national referendum on October 24.
Mubarak’s main concern in regard to the Israeli conflict was concerned
to regain the Sinai Peninsula for Egypt and to return his country to
the Arab fold. One of Mubarak’s first acts was to pledge to honor the
peace treaty with Israel. In April 1982, the Israeli withdrawal from
Sinai took place as scheduled. A multinational force of observers took
up positions in Sinai to monitor the peace. Egypt was allowed to
station only one army division in Sinai. Since then, Egypt has had a
decent relationship with Israel and the United States, and it has been
seen by many Arab Countries as the traitor in many circumstances.
It is perceivable that without the influence of the United
States the peace in Israel would have been different, if not sooner.
The United States, in order to push the cold war policies saw Israel
and Egypt as pawn in their global game of politics. Especially in
the early years, neither country saw the United States as a enemy nor
as a ally, and thus depended on it for little. Yet, both countries saw
the possibility of gaining resources from the great western power, or
at least its enemy the USSR.
Under Carter, however the United States, perhaps for the first
time, played a peace-making role in the Middle East. Perhaps Carter
was being the peaceful President, or more likely he realized the need
for peace in the middle east in order to lower the gas prices, and for
the US to harness the immense resources of the region.