This period saw the turning of “the Hinge of Fate.” As the Russians stopped the Germans at Stalingrad, the British opened an offensive at El Alamein. As Rommel’s forces were in full retreat in East Africa, the Allies landed in the West, under “Operation Torch.”
After Alexander advised Churchill to “Ring out the bells” to celebrate victory in Egypt, Churchill told a Lord Mayor’s luncheon at Mansion House: “This is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.”
On the German side, Hitler was determined to stand firm and ordered no retreat in both Russia and Africa. British cities were still not completely safe. On 31 October waves of German bombers blasted the cathedral city of Canterbury in the biggest daylight raid since the Battle of Britain.
In a broadcast to the Italian people, Churchill told them to oust their leaders or face shattering Allied air blows.[8]
On 12 January 1943 he left for Casablanca where the leaders of Britain and the United States planned the invasion of the European continent. Churchill thought that it was essential for them to alleviate the pressure on the Soviets in 1943 with an attack on Sicily and then a cross-Channel invasion. The allies also had to reassure each other of mutual support. The British feared that the Americans might give priority to the Pacific front and the Americans were concerned that Britain would pull out of the war after the defeat of Germany. French unity was also important and General de Gaulle was invited to meet with and hopefully accept the authority of General Giraud in North Africa.
The Conference had been kept secret until the press conference on 24 January. The press, wrote Churchill, could hardly believe their eyes and then their ears when they heard that the Conference had been meeting for two weeks. Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed to continue convoys to Russia, send support to American forces in China, begin plans for a June landing in Sicily, and build up American forces in Britain. They also announced that unconditional surrender was the only term which the Allies would accept to end the war.
Stalin still distrusted his allies. He demanded a second front and accused them of treachery. This was an indication of the postwar problems that would have to be faced concerning Russia. Churchill told the Editor of The Times that he favoured confederations with smaller states after the war. “I do not want to be left alone in Europe with the Bear.”
At the same time Churchill learned that ‘the Germans had developed rockets capable of hitting London and it appeared that Operation Sledgehammer, the invasion of Europe in 1943, was not going to happen. The good news was that the Allies were advancing in North Africa.
His attention was drawn to the Pacific Theatre by a fear that the Americans were going to give it more attention, despite their professed “Germany first” policy. He had no illusions about the challenges in the Pacific: “Going into swampy jungles to fight the Japanese is like going into the water to fight a shark.”
On 12 May the Trident Conference began at the White House. Churchill suggested sending the victorious armies from Africa against Sicily and then Italy and the armies in India against the Japanese forces in Malaya and Sumatra.
While in Washington Churchill received a message from General Alexander: “Sir, it is my duty to report that the Tunisian campaign is over. All enemy resistance has ceased. We are masters of the North African shores.”
On 19 May Churchill spoke for the second time to the U.S. Congress. He warned that only a lack of will or a dispute among the Allies would provide hope to the Axis and that much blood must still be shed before victory.
Two momentous decisions came from Trident: the date of the cross-Channel invasion was set for 1 May 1944 and the US agreed to share more information on the development of an atomic bomb.
Churchill flew to Algiers via Newfoundland and Gibraltar for a meeting with Eisenhower, Marshall, Montgomery, Brooke and Alexander which reached final agreement on an invasion of Sicily. He also mediated a reconciliation between the French Generals Giraud and de Gaulle.
Notwithstanding their troubles in Italy and the fact that the Allies had won the Battle of the Atlantic, the Germans opened an offensive on the Eastern Front; but it was stopped by mid-July after the great tank battle at Kursk. Churchill’s attention was also on the Balkans and the “hardy and hunted guerrillas” of Tito as he prepared to leave for Quebec and a meeting with the American President.
Travelling under the code-name Colonel Warden, Churchill boarded “Queen Mary” on the Clyde. Despite the attempt at secrecy, large crowds met them at Halifax and at every train stop on the way to Quebec. Churchill’s V-sign was extremely popular.
Churchill wanted Brooke and Roosevelt wanted Marshall to command the invasion of Europe. Roosevelt insisted that the position go to an American but eventually he could not bear to be without Marshall in Washington. They agreed that Mountbatten should receive the South-East Asia Command. They also agreed that the atomic bomb would be manufactured in the United States and that they would invite Stalin to meet them, probably in Alaska.
The Quebec conference, code-named Quadrant, began on August 17th, 1943. For a break, Churchill, Roosevelt, Hopkins and Harriman visited the Canadian Governor-General’s country retreat where they fished and discussed global strategy in a log cabin in the woods. The conference ended on 24 August.
On his return to Quebec he spoke to the people of Canada where “in mighty lands which have never know the totalitarian tyrannies of Hitler and Mussolini, the spirit of freedom has found a safe and abiding home.”[9]
The Big Three
After the Quebec Conference, Churchill went to Washington to discuss a tripartite meeting with Stalin.
While “closing the ring” the issue of postwar boundaries in Eastern Europe had to be resolved. Stalin desired a resolution now but Churchill wanted to wait until after the war was won. Concerning Poland, the British Prime Minister said, “we should do everything in our power to persuade the Poles to agree with the Russians about the Eastern frontier, in return for gains in East Prussia and Silesia. We could certainly promise to use our influence in that respect.”
Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin agreed on the surrender terms for Italy and, on October 15th, the Royal Italian Government declared war on Germany, even though Rome would not be liberated for many months.
Stalin’s distrust of his allies’ intention to establish a second front would have to be addressed at a meeting of the “Big Three”. The appointment of a supreme commander was essential and Churchill was confident it would be George Marshall. In December Roosevelt informed him that he needed Marshall in Washington and that the appointment would go to Dwight Eisenhower.
A foreign ministers’ conference in October set the stage for a meeting of the “Big Three” at Teheran in December. Eden told Churchill that Stalin knew the British were committed to defeating Germany, but that the Soviet leader believed Churchill “had a tendency to take the easy road and leave the difficult job to the Russians.”
On 27 November 1943 they flew to Teheran to meet Stalin. After those meetings Churchill telegraphed Attlee: “Relations between Britain, US and USSR have never been so cordial and intimate. All war plans are agreed and concerted.”
In October Churchill had cabled Roosevelt. “Unless there is a German collapse, the campaign of 1944 will be far the most dangerous we have undertaken and personally, I am more anxious about its success than I was about 1941, 1942, or 1943.” [9]
On February 15 1944 the Allies unsuccessfully attacked German forces at Monte Cassio and on February 16 the Germans counter-attacked at Anzio. The hope of capturing Rome in January was now distant.
The lessons of Italy would be applied in Normandy. Bordeaux was rejected as a suitable port for landing. Churchill directed that planning keep casualties to a minimum. Meanwhile, Rommel was busy strengthening the Atlantic wall.
In their memoirs Brooke, Eden and Eisenhower all comment on the Prime Minister’s exhaustion at this time. In early May Churchill admitted to Brooke that he felt like Roosevelt, who “was no longer the man he had been.” Speaking of himself, Churchill said that “he could still always sleep well, eat well, and especially drink well, but that he no longer jumped out of bed the way he used to.”
Brooke noted in his diary: “We found him in a desperately tired mood. I am afraid that he is losing ground rapidly. He seems quite incapable of concentrating for a few minutes on end, and keeps wandering continuously. He kept yawning and said he was feeling desperately tired.”
While eagerly and anxiously awaiting the invasion of Europe, Churchill also worried about possible perfidy by the Soviets. “Once we get on to the Continent with a large commitment, they will have the means of blackmail, which they have not at the present, by refusing to advance beyond a certain point, or even tipping the wink to the Germans that they can move more troops to the West.” Force and facts, he believed, were the only realities the Communists understood. Later he would comment: “Never forget that the Bolsheviks are crocodiles.”
Churchill’s disagreement with the Americans on strategy in Italy continued. He feared that their insistence on an invasion of the south of France after Normandy, on top of Alexander’s “desolating delay,” would destroy future success in Italy. He and his American allies also disagreed on whom to support in Yugoslavia.
On June 4th 1944 Rome was liberated and Churchill’s feelings of elation about that achievement were so strong that he took the first ten minutes of his speech to the House on June 6th to ask the House to “take formal cognisance of the liberation of Rome by the Allied forces under the command of General Alexander.” Needless to say, members waited throughout that speech for his announcement about the landings in Normandy. After his speech in the House, he lunched with the King and drove with him to Eisenhower’s headquarters.
In a note to Stalin, Churchill summed up the military situation: “The enemy is burning and bleeding on every front at once.”
The enemy was still capable of inflicting serious injury, however, and many casualties resulted from the flying bomb attacks against London, starting on June 12. Unfavorable weather made it difficult for Allied planes to find the launch sites. An even greater threat was imminent from V2 rockets being tested by the Germans.
On 7 July 1944 Churchill received a full report on the situation in Auschwitz. His instructions to Eden were to provide as much assistance as possible to prevent the Germans from transporting prisoners to the concentration camp, and to “invoke my name if necessary.”
In early August the inhabitants of Warsaw rose up against the German occupier. Churchill appealed to Stalin for assistance on their behalf. He was very concerned about a “summit,” yet both Stalin and Roosevelt declined his invitation to come to Britain; but he and the American President agreed to meet in Quebec in September.
In October 1944 Churchill flew to Italy, where he met Alexander and Wilson, then to Cairo, then on to Moscow, where the “Tolstoy Conference” began. Churchill wanted to deal candidly with Stalin so he said, “Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans.” While his comments to Stalin were being translated Churchill wrote on a half-sheet of paper: “Romania: Russia 90%. The others 10%; Greece: Great Britain (in accord with USA) 90%, Russia 10%; Yugoslavia. 50-50%; Hungary: 50-50%; Bulgaria: Russia 75%. The others 25%.” Stalin took out his blue pencil and made a large tick upon it.
Allied fortunes in the Mediterranean had always been a priority for Churchill and his attention was now focused on Greece and the Communist threat following the Nazi withdrawal. Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins warned him, however, that American public opinion might not support Allied intervention in a Greek civil war.
Deciding almost on the spur of the-moment to see the situation for himself, Churchill flew to Athens on Christmas Eve. On 26 December Churchill, Eden, Alexander and American and French representatives met with the warring parties in Athens. With the support of the Americans, Churchill was able to persuade the Greek King to make Archbishop Damaskinos the Regent without Communist participation in the Government.[10]
Looking forward to final victory, Churchill glumly but prophetically commented: “I think the end of this war may well prove to be more disappointing than was the last.”
In February 1945 he met Roosevelt and Stalin in the Crimea where they signed the Yalta Agreement. With full understanding of the Anglo-American relationship with the Soviets, Churchill commented that “the only bend of the victors is their common hate.” His parting toast to Marshal Stalin was that the Soviet leader would live “to see his beloved Russia not only glorious in war, but also happy in peace.”
Churchill was deeply anxious about the fate of Poland and Greece. On his return from Russia he visited Athens where he was wildly received in Constitution Square. The Acropolis was floodlit for the first time since the beginning of the war.
In Egypt he met his friend Franklin Roosevelt for the final time. As they parted, Churchill recalled that “I felt he had a slender contact with life.”
Back home his worst fears were realised concerning the Soviets’ intention not to uphold the Yalta Agreement regarding Poland. Specifically, he learned that soldiers of the Polish Home Army were being rounded up. Jock Colville recorded: “The PM and Eden both fear that our willingness to trust our Russian ally may have been vain and they look with despondency to the future.”
Shortly after he made the following valedictory comments about the life of his great American friend and ally, Franklin Roosevelt. “As the saying goes, he died in harness, and we may well say in battle harness, like his soldiers, sailors, and airmen, who side by side with ours are carrying on their task to the end all over the world. What an enviable death was his. He had brought his country through the worst of its perils and the heaviest of its toils. Victory had cast its sure and steady beam upon him.”
The end of April brought the death of two of his mortal enemies, Mussolini and Hitler.
The two days of victory celebrations were some of the most celebratory in Churchill’s long life. On 8 May after lunch and an appearance on the Buckingham Palace balcony with the King and Queen he returned to 10 Downing Street and then drove to the House of Commons in an open car. No engine power was necessary, said his bodyguard. The car was literally forced along by the crowd.
He led a procession of his Cabinet and members of the House of Commons to St. Margaret’s Church for a Thanksgiving Service. He spoke to the crowd several times from the balcony of Whitehall. “This,” he said to them, “is your victory.”
Later in the month Churchill was informed by the Labour Party that the coalition could not continue. At the King’s request he took over a caretaker government while conducting a general election, continuing the war with Japan and creating a post-war Europe with Truman and Stalin.[11]
Here the words by Christopher C. Harmon about the Big Three could be quoted:
“The Grand Alliance had historical singularity. For example, it was unusual for the U.S. to bind itself so closely to any other power, even Britain. This partnership was among the closest bilateral relationships between independent powers in all of history. It might also serve as a model alliance. It brought together three global powers, each very different from the others. Here was a joining of unlimited efforts for a limited common purpose.
It was, by war’s end, an enormous alliance: “Great Amalgam” is perhaps more apt a tag than “Grand Alliance.” Wartime coalitions with so many partners cannot be a blissful union. But the whole did survive immense tests; it did last through the war. And then, after victory, it became fractious and discontented. That is very common for alliances.” [13]
To the Opposition
During June Churchill fought an election, on one day visiting ten cities. As it became clear that the people thought Labour had a better post-war policy and were about to express their long-held resentment against the Conservative pre-war appeasers, Churchill hoped that his own popularity could withstand the tide. He advised the overseas troops that there is “no truth that you can vote Labour or Liberal without voting against me.”
As grateful as they were, many people expressed concern that the great war leader would not be a good peace leader. He was even heckled at Walthamston Stadium. He responded to that challenge by telling the hecklers that he forgave them because they were about to receive a thrashing.
Perhaps the most important is that he overestimated his popularity and offered no program to the electorate. The Conservative election propaganda only consisted of accusations against the Labour party, trying to prove that the Labourists were Socialists, and emphasising Churchill’s role in the winning of the war, not bearing in mind that the British people were interested in what would happen after the war. At the same time, the Labourists offered a positive program that promised important reforms in the social sphere, nationalisation of some branches of economy and extensive construction of dwelling houses.