Kelly had inherited a flawed, corrupt, unproductive government after she was elected following Barry’s arrest. There was little she could do to turn the city around. Her personality was not as genuinely likeable as Barry. Perhaps an even greater disadvantage, Kelly had a much lighter complexion than Barry, although she was African American, many did not view her as “black.” Kelly has also fumbled in areas Barry had success. Barry had been able to chit chat and rub noses with the big business boys of the region. Barras writes, “Kelly botched efforts to keep the Washington Redskins in the city, and without a group of influential business leaders on her side, she would have fouled out on Abe Pollin’s offer to build a sports arena for his Washington Wizards basketball team and his Capitals hockey team.” Barras goes on to describe another one of Kelly’s negatives, “Evidence of the District government’s rudderlessnes became apparent with Kelly’s revolving-door personnel policy . . . In four years, she went through three housing directors, two city administrators, two chiefs of staff, three deputy mayors for economic development, and two heads of the city’s Department of Finance.” During a portion of Kelly’s Administration from 1990 to 1994, the District like the rest of the country was suffering through a recession and had to endure “declining real estate revenues, escalating unemployment, and diving tax revenues.” In short the Kelly administration was a series of mishaps, perhaps doomed to be unsuccessful by the circumstances it inherited. As the mayoral election approached she received only 14 percent support in a Washington Post poll. Meanwhile, residents from all eight of the city’s wards called Barry’s city council office as many seemed to think he was still mayor or at least mayor in waiting.
Neither Ray or Kelly wanted to run against Barry. His popularity was too hard to overcome. Ray focused his campaign against Kelly’s disasters administration; however he lacked the personnel appeal of Barry. Barras writes how The Washington Post struggled to endorse any of the candidates. The paper concluded that they could not decide, none were without their faults, although Ray seemed to have had success as a city councilman.
Barry, with the financial assistance of boxing promoter Rock Newman started a major voter registration campaign. Newman helped workers register voters in Anacostia and other areas around Ward 8 were Barry was the council representative. Never questioned for his political ability, Barry’s plan for a win the Primary was abundantly clear. Barry would use his newfound financial assistance to “stack the cards in his favor” as far as voter registration was concerned. He developed and followed a clear strategy of what areas in the city he would target and wish he would not and finally he would use his newfound religious feelings to rebuild the bridges he had burned from his embarrassing arrest.
In practical terms, Newman the promoter of Heavyweight Boxing Champion Rid*censored* Bowe, funded voter registration. Of the 19,000 people that registered from May 1, 1994 to August 30, 1994, one third of them lived east of the Anacostia River. As Barry told The Washington Post, “People can think all they want that these kind of voters aren’t going to come out on Election Day. I know they’ll be motivated because they have someone to vote for.”
Barry’s close friends from his original administration had too found themselves recovering from personal struggles and were close allies to the former (and future) mayor. Chief among these was Ivanhoe Donaldson. Realizing the 1978 election plan was successful, the group decided to follow it again in 1994. Barras described the strategy, “He went after Wards 5,6 and 7 disregard Wards 2 and 3, and tried to break even in Wards 1 and 4.” Barry, by being the councilman from Ward 8 and large secure voting bloc he could depend on there.
Although image is not the only thing in American politics, how a candidate acts, dresses and presents himself plays an enormously large role in the success or failure of the campaign. And Barry, a successful politician for decades, through a series of ups and downs was no stranger to that concept. Barras observations of Barry’s behavior are very complete. She writes, “Barry had long understood the psychological bondage in which blacks hold themselves, and he often used it to his political advantage.” He describes in detail his various campaign appearances, “Throughout the summer, the wily Barry alternated wearing African-inspired clothing and tailored, traditional business suits. In poor neighborhoods where black nationalism ran high, he strutted in Dashiki. In middle class communities, where blacks strongly felt themselves to be insiders who were nonetheless victims of racism, he donned a suit. Casting himself as a seasoned professional, he touched a raw nerve about the arrogance of the white power establishment. Once again, Barry understood that religious themes were always powerful magnets in black America.”
It was these strategies that led to Barry’s victory in the primary. And as the media often do, many national newspapers painted Barry’s victory as underdog, people’s favorite that had made a comeback against heavy personal obstacles. According to Barras, both The Boston Globe and The Los Angeles Times mentioned Barry’s comeback victory in the lead of their national election story.
Although some gave Carol Schwartz a chance to win the general election, Barry’s popularity soared after the primary. As expected, many Democrats that had opposed him, rallied behind him. Barry, aware of the polarizing effects on racial relations his victory might have on the city, focused efforts in Schwartz’s backyard, Ward 3. Barry appeared in Ward 3 numerous times during the general campaign, sometimes hoping to win votes, however it was mainly a public relations maneuver to ease white voters into accepting another Barry administration. Four years after being caught on tape smoking crack cocaine, Marion Barry received 55 percent of the votes to become the next mayor of Washington, DC.
Barry’s political comeback would run into major opposition from the newly elected Republican run Congress. Many would not dispute the fact that Barry, although popular with the electorate was not running the city in the efficient manner he had during the glory days of his first administration a decade and half previously. Congress created a Control Board to watch over the city. Under Barry, the office of the mayor gradually lost more and more power. A five person, Control Board appointed by the President oversaw all major decisions and financial matters. Many saw Congress’s actions as a personal attack on Barry since he had embarrassed the country before.
Despite the pressure from the white establishment Barry was a popular with the people of the city. Barry’s failures and battle with Newt Gingrich and the Republican Congress even furthered the feeling many longtime residents of the District. The white establishment, be it Congress, the White House, the media did not trust a group of relatively poor and uneducated African Americans to govern themselves. Tensions between the two groups reached a pinnacle, when Marion Barry, a convicted drug user was reelected as the city’s mayor. Barry’s fourth term was disastrous and unsuccessful by nearly all accounts. His poor performance forced Congress to strip the mayor of his power.
Now, the current mayor Anthony Williams is working hard to overcome what years of poor policy resulted in. At the current time, Williams seems to be more popular with the white establishment than his predecessor. Hopefully, the two governments in Washington the national and the local will be able to look past racial lines and political party alliances and work together to provide services and community to the District and restore the tarnished civil pride of the Federal City.
Barry’ success was in simplest terms a brilliant political use of the so called “race card.” His comeback, based on a three-prong strategy; increase voter registration in Ward 8; campaigning along racial lines as he done successfully in 1978; and portraying himself differently in various areas of the city all the while using religion and redemption carried Barry to win back the Mayor’s office. He had a connection with the residents. They put their trust in him again, this time he failed. He would be no match for the Republican Congress, and could not recover from an infamous January night in 1990. In analyzing Barry’s connection with the majority of the District’s electorate, Barras concludes, “Marion Barry’s recovery became symbolic of large numbers of black communities in recovery – both in the city and throughout the country. Many District voters had experienced falls similar to Barry’s, and while some knew they were not of his socio-economic ilk, the experiences they shared with him created a sense of identification.”