investigates any complaints about improper administrative treatment in the
bureaucracy. If a complaint is found to be valid then it is this persons
responsibility to inform the bureaucracy of how to correct the situation. It is
important to not that an ombudsman does not posses authoritative power over
civil servants but rather they ?influences’ bureaucrats to make changes.
Conclusion
This paper took a detailed look at accountability in the public sector
and political conventions associated with this subject. It has shown the
limitations of both collective and individual ministerial responsibility;
outlined bureaucratic power; and briefly touched upon legislative control.
A minister is formally held accountable to the actions of their
portfolio. But because of ministerial dependancy upon senior civil servants and
political conventions that in essence protect the government, this
accountability is not more than a moral responsibility. The power of the civil
servant is increasing becoming broader as Ministerial portfolios are combined
with the modern trend of downsizing cabinet. The influential power of the civil
servant is increased as ministers are becoming unspecialized in their portfolios.
The only effective legislative accountability is done through the office
of the auditor general. With their annual reports, they give Parliament an
insight as to the effectiveness of governmental policies. Although Parliament
has no effective way to sanction a Minister or department who’s interpretation
of governmental policy differs from their own. This is not to say that
government is beyond the means of total control. History has proven, and will
continue to prove, that in a democratic society such as Canada, that ultimately
ministers and Parliament are held accountable in the public eye at the time of
elections.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Horn, Murray J. The Political Economy of Public Administration. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Kersell, J.E. Control of Administrative Behavior. Canadian Public
Administration. v. 19. 1976.
Law Reform Commission of Canada. Political Control of Independent Administrative
Agencies – a study paper, Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada. 1979.
Marshall, Geoffrey. Constitutional Conventions: The Rules and Forms of Political
Accountability.Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.
Marshall, Geoffrey and Graeme C. Moodie. Some Problems of the Constitution. 5th
ed. London: Hutchinson University Library, 1971.
Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability. Final Report. Hull:
Supply and Services Canada 1979.
Siegel, David and Kenneth Kernaghan. Public Administration in Canada. 3rd ed.
Toronto: Nelson Canada, 1995.
Sutherland, S. l. Responsible Government and Ministerial Responsibility: Every
Reform is its Own Problem. Canadian Journal of Political Science, v. 24 March
1991.
347