billion to the war effort, Germanv committed no troops.[32] Preoccupation with reunification, especially
in light of the financial burden it had placed on the country, could be one reason that Germany did not
become involved.[33] The March 1991 article “Germany & Japan: Missing in Action” discussed the
possible reasons Germany and Japan had not become militarily involved in the Persian Gulf War. One
striking and perhaps obvious conclusion can be drawn simply from the title of the article: “Lingering
memories, however faded of the horror of World War II make many Germans recoil at the idea of
actually going to war again.”[34] The author also stated that perhaps German politicians feared that the
“democratized” army would not perform as well as the other war-time armies of historic Germany,
thereby shaming the country.[35] The threat of the USSR producing a military dictatorship in light of its
unstable government was another reason offered. With 350,000 Russian soldiers at that time still
stationed in Germany, reported Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, National Review’s continental
correspondent, the fear of “a World War III beginning in Central Europe continues to be a very real
possibility.”[36]
Perhaps the greatest reason Germany did not involve its armed forces in the Persian Gulf War is its
constitution. According to Article 57a of The Basic Law, “The Federation shall build up Armed Forces
for defence purposes…. Apart from defence, the Armed Forces may only be used to the extent
explicitly permitted by this Basic Law,”[37] which include only internal emergencies and natural
disaster. Germany could not commit troops because the war did not fall under any of these categories.
From its response to the Gulf War, it would seem that the fear of Germany as a military superpower is,
for the present, unfounded. However, a United Nations report raised allegations that German firms had
supplied Iraq with equipment used to make biological and chemical weapons and had also supplied
expertise on expanding the range of the Scud missiles. The chemical industry denied the charges, but
even the implication that Germans once again could be involved in gassing Jews, by providing Iraq with
ingredients for Zyklon-B, the same gas used in the Holocaust, creates serious misgivings for many
people about the new Germany.38 In January 1992, Iraqi officials confirmed that “they had bought large
quantities of materials from German companies to build centrifuges to enrich uranium for use in nuclear
weapons,”[39] Although German businesses were associated with this alleged atrocity, the German
government worked in close association with the United Nations to uncover the illegal connection
between the businesses and Iraq.
With the participants of the civil war in the former Yugoslavia ready to attempt peace, Germany once
again had an opportunity to demonstrate its new position in world affairs. In 1994, the German high
court passed a measure to allow German soldiers to participate in international peace-keeping missions
with the United Nations without violating the country’s constitution. With this striking change in policy,
Germany appears more ready to participate militarily on the international scene, perhaps by expanding
their domestic armed forces. In fact, a 1995 survey revealed that “85 percent of Germans believe the
country needs its own army, and 69 percent want to see that army serve in U.N. peace- keeping
operations.”[40] Sixty-one percent of Germans, however, still do not sup- port engaging their
countrymen in “peace-making” operations, during which the soldiers’ lives would most likely at risk.
These survevs show that the fears of a unified Germany starting another major warfare very
unfounded.
A reunited Germany has only been in existence for only six years, a fraction of the time since a united
Germany first was established in 1871. For this reason, analysts and observers of Germanv have relied
on predictions, not necessarily on proof, to show that the fears about the country’s military position in
the world are unfounded. The financial and economic fears, on the other hand, have proven to be verv
real. Time still is needed to determine whether the initial financial burdens of reLLrlifiCation will be
devastating or well worth the price to reunite a nation. In After the Wall, John Borneman asserts that
Berlin is “the twentieth century’s paradigmatic space–very major social upheaval of significance in this
century has either graced or scarred its surface.” Berlin has also emerged as the most svmbotic place
for both German separation and reunification. The city and the nation will still have to demonstrate
whether the reunification of Germany is a “grace” or a “scar” upon its surface.
End Notes
1. Konrad H. Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity (New York: Oxford University PRess, Inc., 1994),
4.
2. Jarausch, 7.
3. Walter Laqueur, Europe in our Time: a History, 1945-1992 (New York: Penguin Gooks, 1992),
81.
4. Ibid., 83.
5. Jarausch, 8.
6. Winston Churchill, “The ‘Iron Curtain’ Speech,” in The Western Tradition, ed. Eugene Weber
(Lexington, D.C. Heath and Company, 1995), 661-663.
7. Laqueur, 83.
8. Jarausch, 8.
9. Fergus M. Bordewich, “Can We Trust the Germans?,” Readers Digest (Dec. 1990):153.
10. Laqueur, 540.
11. The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1992, ed. Mark S. Hoffman (New York: Pharos Books,
1991), 761.
12. Laqueur, 541.
13. John Borneman, After the Wall: East Meets West in the New Berlin (New York: Basic Books,
Inc., 1991), 234.
14. Ashby Turner, Jr., Germany from Partition to Reunification (New Haven: Yale University,
1992), 234.
15. Ibid., 234. 16. Laqueur, 24.
17. Turner, 245.
18. Karen Breslau,”One People, One Country: A Scenario,” Newsweek (11 Dec. 1989), 34.
19. Robert Verdussen, “Doubts Among Eastern Europe’s Intellectuals: Will They Lose Their Identity?”
World Press Review (June 1990): 34.
20. “Notes and Comment” The New Yorker (5 March 1990): 31.
21. Abigale McCarthy, “‘Einig Vaterland!’: Old Fears & New Ones–I,” Commonweal (9 Feb. 1990): 73
22. Peter Schneider, The German Comedy (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, Inc., 1990), 143.
23. Ibid., 49.
24. Sandra Petrignani, “Agonizing Over Reunification,” World Press Review (June 1990): 35.
25. Bordewich, 154.
26. Verdussen, 36.
27. Lynn Hunt, The Challenge of the West (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1995), 948.
28. Turner, 251.
29. Nelan, 56.
30. Gary L. Geipel, “German: Urgent Pressures, Quiet Change,” Current History (No. 1994): 359.
31. Ibid., 57.
32. Christopher Knowlton and Carla Rapoport, “Germany & Japan: Missing in Action,” Fortune (11
march 1991): 58.
33. Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, “Why Germany Hangs Back,” National Review (25 Feb. 1991): 23.
34. Knowlton, 57.
35. Kuehnelt-Leddihn, 23.
36. Ibid., 23.
37. Press and Information Office of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, The Basic
Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (Germany: Wiesbadener Graphische Betriebe, 1973), 46.
38. Andrew Bilski, “Eerie Echoes of the Past: Israel Protests Germany’s Role,” Maclean’s (18
February 1991): 31.
39. “Germany A-Arms Link Admitted,” Facts on File World News Digest (16 January 1992): 30.
40. John Marks, “Germany Conquers the Cringe Factor,” U.S. News and World Report (20 March
1995): 51.
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