The Chinese begin military exercises in the strait and announce an area that covers all of Taiwan. This caused financial unrest in Taiwan. The Taiwanese attempt to obtain a seat in the UN with a bid using the name of the Republic of China on Taiwan. It fails to be voted on and Taiwan is denied membership again. As the Chinese begin to increase their missile and military exercises, Washington decided to send American carries to the region as a jester of friendship to china and a show of American naval power.
On November 17, 1995 three days of talk begin in Beijing between the US and China. The two countries agree to resume a program of high military contacts and to exchange top military officers the following year. After the meeting the defense department issued a statement. It stated that the US stands for a peaceful resolution of disputes across the Taiwan Strait, and any use of force by China against Taiwan would be a serious mistake. Over the next year China and Taiwan go through a series of military standoffs and at times the US sends carrier groups into the area as a warning to the Chinese. China continues its intimidation policy towards Taiwan, but it fails to produce the desired result.
This brings me to the policy triangle between the three nations. For the past fifty years the US has changed its policy position on Taiwan more than once. The problem of never agreeing to Chinas claim to Taiwan has done little to help the situation. The new twist in this problem is the Clinton administrations foreign policy, or should we say a lack of an effective one. Clinton has held to the Nixon communiqu s as his shell for his policy, but he has taken it a step forward, by adding he recognizes “one china” with two standards. Clinton s policy on Taiwan lacks consistency. He has stated that his administration has a one china policy and that he does not support Taiwan s independence Although this is his stance he has come to it not by clear decision making, but by threat of the truth of his illegal campaign contributions from Beijing coming to light. He has compromised his policies in an attempt to pacify the Chinese and keep this issue on the back burner. Clinton has done a poor job when it comes to Taiwan.
This policy triangle at first was hard to decipher, but after researching it, it is apparent it is of great importance on many levels. Taiwan posses a great economic structure, while china is beginning to build one with the recent reacquisition of Hong Kong. In looking at the whole picture, maybe Taiwan is the final piece in Chinas puzzle in becoming an economic superpower. In this it is possible for a peaceful resolution to the situation, China has implemented “one china”, two standard systems in Hong Kong and it is currently working well. So one could ask what keeps Taiwan from returning to china?
I think the answer to that question is a lot harder than the question. First of all you have to look at Taiwan s peculiar history that I alluded to in the beginning of the paper. It has never been a colony or a true part of china, what complicates this further is Taiwan is now a democracy. Its democratic status has clearly required a new understanding between china and Taiwan and the expectations placed on the US role in this tripartite relationship. The question is what to do from here?
If the US try s to maintain the structure of the of the three Sino-American communiqu s and Taiwan Relations act to would be impossible for The US to come to a conclusion on this issue. I am not implying that we should choose a side; it s not that simple. It is possible for China and Taiwan to reach a peaceful resolution to this problem. A resolution that will redefine what the two sides should expect from the US is not the best policy either. This would allow the Chinese and Taiwanese to figure out what is best for them, not what is best for the US in all of this. If a cross strait agreement happens it is likely to come in a two-phase process. First as interim period has to be allotted and Taiwan s quest for acknowledgement has to be granted and a longer commitment to a cross-strait dialogue has to be maintained for the purpose of the goal, reunification.
The one major drawback and source of controversy here that may never be resolved is that any cross strait understanding would have to be based on the principle of one China. This would defer the experiment until the Hong Kong experiment results are clear. It would also give Taiwan what they have wanted official recognition as a political actor in the UN system.
With all of this established, I want to now address the US role in all of this. The US and other countries in the region that would like to see a peaceful resolution to this problem will have the role do mediators in a cross-strait dialogue. The US could prove to be helpful in the process if it is not complicated by its frozen view of Taiwan status for the past century. In keeping with the legal framework of the three communiqu s and the TRA, which governs the US policy between china and Taiwan, it could present itself to be helpful in helping both sides to an acceptable agreement.
However the Taiwanese democracy requires the US to rethink it interpretation of its policy towards China and Taiwan. The main principle here is that the US supports reunification by mutual consent. The US has an obligation to Taiwan in the fact that it is a democracy. It cannot and should not turn its back on a fellow democracy; the affects could be very destructive to our foreign policy.
With all parties in agreement that a peaceful resolution is desired over a military exercise in what could lead to a major war it seems more important cease with our current policy format in this area and institute a new one using a different angle. We should push both parties through all diplomatic channels to work out a resolution now, before some happens that will not be easy to remedy. I look at the situation very simply; if the Chinese wanted Taiwan it could take it. It could have control over the island before we could throw a serious response at them. This however is not the case. China wants Taiwan that is established, but it knows it can wait as long as it has to for the island. In a military comparison Taiwan realizes it has little chance of fending off an invasion, and has come to accept the US pledge to help them only as secure as what is at stake.
In looking at all the negative aspect this issue has brought to light, there is one very positive. Taiwanese Democracy. This development has had a large impact on the situation. It is also one of the reasons China has not invaded. It is difficult to guess where this situation is going to go in the next few years. It seems to me that the two main players here have been fighting over this issue for the last seventy years, and it is unlikely to end anytime soon. In looking at possible out comes I would surmise that reunification is possible, although unlikely at this point. Another possibility is that little will be accomplished in the next few years; this is the most probable conclusion. Then there is always the worst-case scenario; War would break out between China and the US. That would be a terrible conclusion to this policy Triangle, but it cannot be ruled out.
The best conclusion in my opinion is that Taiwan is allowed to become a sovereign state and the Chinese recognize the country of Taiwan. This would allow the Un to grant Taiwan a seat and end this problem and allow a democracy to continue to thrive.
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