sector. This was a gross mistake which resulted in the budget deficit in
1989 having increased to R100 billion or 11% of the Gross National Product
(GNP) and was predicted to rise to R120 billion. Therefore, under
Gorbachev, the budget deficit rose from 3% in 1985 to 14% in 1989. (29)
Inflation increased to over 5%. (30) Prices failed to reflect the high cost
of production and many companies were working at a loss. This economic
failure of communism meant that support for the system fell and that it was
becoming increasingly more difficult for the communist party to convince
the people that this indeed was the way forward, and a better solution than
capitalism.
Gorbachev therefore aimed to tie salaries into achieved results and to
remove subsidies on some goods and services. He did not act immediately,
however, with his price reform package as he hoped to first achieve a
balance between supply and demand. This merely worsened matters and wages
continued to rise faster than output and productivity. The main failure of
Perestroika is that it didn?t remove the old price system. Instead, it
allowed the old price system, which was based on scarcity, to continue, and
this merely exacerbated shortages. Ironically, it was the mass
organisations of people, who had emerged to defend living standards, who
actually hampered the struggle against inflation and the budget deficit.
This situation was partly created by the fact that the governing party had
no popular support and hadn?t been popularly elected. The economic
situation continued to decline. There was a zero growth rate. Shops were
calculated to be lacking 243 out 276 basic consumer items and there was a
chronic shortage of 1000 items out of 1200 which would be on a model
shopping list. There was a static farm output and high levels of inflation.
(31) Therefore it can be seen that communism was an economic disaster.
Khrushchev?s remark again can be used to illustrate the effect which this
had on the support for communism. (see ref 24).
As previously mentioned, communism never had majority support or a
legitimate political basis. Force and coercion were regularly used to
ensure that the communist party remained in power. Therefore one can
maintain that the fact that communism was a political failure was also a
contributing factor to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. If a
party has not got the support of a majority, then it has a weak political
basis. The fact that undemocratic means were used to ensure that the
communists came to, and then maintained, power shows that communism was a
political failure. Throughout the history of communism in Russia, never
once did the party gain a majority support or truly succeed in suppressing
public demonstrations of antipathy towards communism. It can therefore be
argued that a political leadership with no political basis or support could
ever hope to survive.
Another important factor to note is communism?s utter failure in relation
to society and culture. Soviet society under Communist rule was socially
and culturally underdeveloped. The state had a say in every aspect of
societal life. In response to low birth rates, large numbers of orphans and
the failure of 37/100 marriages in 1934 alone, the communist leadership
compelled the media to promote stable family life. (32)
Propaganda was used to coerce the people into believing in the positive
virtues of marriage and children. Divorce was made more difficult and
abortion was prohibited. Thus the people?s right to choose and exert
control over their own personal and familial decisions was removed. In
schools, the teaching of the social sciences was curtailed and Marxist and
Leninist theories were expounded. In the late thirties fees were
reintroduced for the three upper forms of secondary school. This
effectively meant that only those who could afford to pay these fees could
send their children on to further academic training as these were the forms
which prepared children for higher education. (33) Under Stalin
topographical, economic and political information and affairs were a state
secret. Maps were inaccurate and details about past disasters and history
were omitted or embellished.
Propaganda and brainwashing was used to ensure that the virtues of
communism were extolled and a cult following was created around Lenin and
Stalin. ?A Short Course on the History of the CPSU? became the staple
intellectual diet of all schoolchildren. (34) This was a propagandistic
book based on an idealistic view of communism and its leaders. The mass
arrests, the truth of the purges and the labour camps were not allowed to
be discussed in the media. State monopoly of information and mass
communications deployed in this way, and backed by the use of coercion and
force and the military, degraded the nation?s intellectual and cultural
life. People were simply not allowed to form an opinion contrary to that of
the communist state. People were also not allowed to choose their own
religion or follow their own personal religious beliefs. The state outlawed
and censored religious ?propaganda? and publications. The Soviet state
actively and brutally persecuted the churches. A large number of these were
desecrated or destroyed. More than half of all monasteries were forced to
close and in 1921 twenty-eight bishops were arrested or died in violent
clashes with the Soviet military. (35) Attempts were also made to split the
church from the inside. By 1939 only 12 bishops, out of the 163 who had
been active in 1930, remained. (36) These repressive measures, as a whole,
meant that the growth of Soviet culture and society was stunted and
stagnating. The secrecy and lies undermined efficiency, isolated
individuals and eroded the morale of society. This was compounded by the
fact that, due to Western influences, the public in the communist countries
were beginning to realise their predicament and their backwardness. These
measures continued until Gorbachev came to power.
This point leads onto the most important factor which contributed to the
eventual collapse of communism in the East, that is, Gorbachev. Without
Gorbachev it is doubtful that the disintegration of the communist regime
would have occurred so soon. Gorbachev can be seen as a reform communist.
He introduced a number of revolutionary reforms like Perestroika and
Glasnost. The combined effect of these policies, and his general attitude
to reform, communism and the USSR, had the effect of causing the
culmination of all opposition to communism and collapsing the system.
Glasnost proved to be a great relief valve which allowed the people to
voice their long-standing discontent about communism and the communist
regime as a whole. The positive elements of Glasnost had the effect of
bringing national tensions to the surface of political and social life and,
in a sense, exacerbating the national problem. Liberalisation made people
less afraid of retribution when they spoke out against the injustices of
the system and the atrocities which had occurred. The ripple effect of
Gorbachev?s radical Perestroika and Glasnost weakened the authority of the
communist governments – economically, socially and ideologically. Above
all the failure of communism lay in the failure of Gorbachev?s Perestroika.
If the economy had improved then so too would the people?s well-being and
they may have considered maintaining the communist regime.
The fundamental problem with Perestroika was how to change a system which
had been built to withstand change. It was increasingly fractured. It had
originally been based on inaccurate figures about the well-being of the
economy and the national debt. Life under Perestroika became even harder
for the majority of Soviet people. There were no state-employed social
groups or skilled workers who stood to gain from Perestroika in the short
term. Economic reform involved hard work and higher prices and therefore
Perestroika was short on support. As the economic situation worsened, so
too did the people?s support for communism fall. This time there was a
difference however. Due to Glasnost the people and the media were now free
to criticise the policy.
Glasnost had the effect of ensuring that the previous reign of terror which
the communist leadership had held, was brought to an end. Gorbachev
employed a policy of ?Glasnost?, that is, openness and the right to
criticise and express an opinion. Up until then Soviet society was closed.
No criticism or freedom of speech was allowed. The major feature of
Glasnost is that of the lifting of most of the restrictions which had been
imposed on the circulation of information since communism began. The blank
pages in history were about to be filled in. Gorbachev realised that the
former policy of absolute secrecy was a major force holding back the
development of society. Censorship was relaxed. This had the adverse effect
of allowing the public criticism of a regime which previously could not be
criticised.
Gorbachev also allowed increasing independence to the Eastern bloc states.
He had come to the conclusion that compelling an unwilling population to
live under a system they detested was not ensuring the USSR?s security, but
on the contrary, jeopardising it. He indicated by omission, rather than by
direct statement, that he would not obstruct a change which would result in
these states achieving a measure of independence.
In Czechoslovakia on the 18th of January 1989 there was a decision taken to
legalise Solidarity. (37) On the 10th of February the Hungarian communists
agreed to a multi-party system and there was no opposition to this on the
part of the Soviets. On 29th March Moscow told the Hungarians that they
would not interfere in East European affairs. (38) In Poland on January
18th, Solidarity had been legalised after a string of protests and riots in
Hungary. (39) This led to an agreement between the communist government and
Solidarity, the main focus of which was the holding of the first relatively
free elections since the 1940?s in Poland. The elections were devastating
to the communists. They were swept out of the Senate and did not have any
representatives elected to the Sejm until the second round of counting.
(40)
This had a domino effect and hastened events elsewhere. Far from
Gorbachev?s original hope that allowing the Eastern states more freedom
would bring the union closer together, it was tearing the union apart.
Kadar was ousted from Hungary and the communists were swept aside by the
Hungarian Democratic Forum. On September 11th Hungary opened its borders
with Austria and allowed thousands of East Germans to cross to the west.
(41) The people of East Germany were demanding Glasnost and Perestroika. On
October 9th a mass demonstration of 70,000 people occurred in Leipzig. (42)
Thousands of Germans were escaping to the west through Hungary and the GDR
was powerless to stop them. Honecker, the East German leader, buckled under
the pressure and resigned. The net effect of which was that his successors
allowed the opening of the Berlin Wall on 8th November 1989 after the East
German government and communist leadership resigned. (43)
On the 24th of November the Czechoslovak Communist Party resigned after
mass demonstrations in Prague of up to 800,000 people. On the 7th of
December the communist government in Czechoslovakia collapsed entirely and
a new non-communist government was formed. (44)
Gorbachevs?s reforms were wreaking havoc on the communist system. Its base,
already weak and fragile, began to crumble away under the massive wave of
anti-communist feeling which had finally come to the fore after years of
suppression. On the 11th of December Bulgarian communists were forced to
agree to a multi-party system and on the 25th, the Rumanian leader
Ceausescu and his wife were tried and executed. (45) All of this was borne
out of Gorbachev?s reforms. The communist regime had been built on force
and coercion, terror and undemocratic methods. This regime could therefore
not be expected to survive under such an onslaught. In refusing the Eastern
bloc communist parties aid to suppress the revolts within, Gorbachev
effectively sealed their fate. The communist parties in those countries had
always relied on Soviet force for support in maintaining control of the
countries, now that his support had been removed the regimes crumbled.
Therefore the significance of the Gorbachev factor cannot be denied when
discussing the downfall of communism in Eastern Europe. If Gorbachev had
not introduced his reforms or had not refused aid to the other Eastern bloc
communist parties, the communist regime may have still stood today.
Gorbachev may not have been the cause of the downfall, but he was certainly
the trigger. The situation was like a fuse, Gorbachev merely provided the
matches and refused to stop the fire.
The final factor which this essay will examine, is that of the loss of
elite party confidence. With his reforms Gorbachev had undermined the
morale and confidence of the party elite. It had become clear that the
communist cause had exhausted itself and was a failure. Their utopian hopes
had been torn apart one by one throughout the years and Gorbachev had made
them face this fact. This had a paralysing effect on them and led to their
apathy about the ending of communism. If they had believed that there was
something left to fight for they may have used physical force to overthrow
Gorbachev and suppress the revolts, but they did not. Gorbachev had
launched a step-by-step dismantling of the party and the nomenklatura under
Perestroika. He separated and neutralised his most militant opponents among
the conservative members of the party elite. At the 28th Congress the party
elite was divided between those who would monitor the development of
Glasnost and perestroika, and the Presidency who would champion the fight
against the unreformable members of the nomenklatura. (46) Until the 28th
Congress membership of the nomenklatura had been a ticket to wealth and
power, after the conference it became a mere shell. Membership fell off and
loyalties faded. A form of local government control was implemented by
Gorbachev to further diminish the role of the Politburo. Piece by piece
Gorbachev was chipping away at the old elite?s confidence and beliefs. The
fact that Gorbachev was gaining support both from the public at home and
abroad, further eroded their confidence.
When the USSR began to collapse, however, certain voices in the party
refused to allow Gorbachev dismantle more of their dreams. Yelstin was
emerging at this time as an opponent to Gorbachev?s rule. In response
Gorbachev banned a pro-Yelstin rally in Moscow in 1991. (47) Alarmed at a
series of political strikes and a growing support for Yelstin, Gorbachev
negotiated a compromise which stipulated that in return for an end to
political strikes, Gorbachev would negotiate a new Union treaty which would
give power to the republics. The day before this treaty was to be signed,
however, its opponents moved to forestall it. Pugo announced that he was
assuming presidential control as Gorbachev was ill and declared a state of
emergency. (48) Gorbachev refused to concur with this announcement. Yelstin
called for a general strike and said that the emergency government was
?unconstitutional?. (49) Some workers went on strike, more did not. Battle
lines were being drawn and the complete collapse of communism was not far
behind. The leaders of the coup were arrested by Gorbachev?s men and
Gorbachev returned to Moscow.
The failed coup ironically however, had precipitated the process it had
been trying to prevent, that is, the break up of the USSR and the demise of
the communist party. In the Russian parliament Yelstin signed a decree
suspending the communist party pending an investigation of the coup.
Gorbachev had triumphed over the plotters but now had to capitulate to
Yelstin. After a vain attempt at protest, Gorbachev resigned as General
Secretary of the CPSU and recommended that the General Committee should
disband itself. In June 1991 Yelstin was elected president of Russia. (50)
After the failure of the coup most of the Soviet republics declared their
independence and sovereignty. Gorbachev tried unsuccessfully to revive the
Union treaty for several months afterwards, but to no avail. The chain of