It may be that human beings and skeptics do not fully understand all their own actions. But this point of Evans’s does not effectively undermine Pojman’s view that Kierkegaard is a direct volitionalist. It may still be that in some cases, cases when we fully understand what we are doing, we are aware that beliefs and doubts are acts of the will. If direct volitionalism presupposes self-awareness, then the willed belief can still occur, but only when the individual has understood him or herself. Therefore, Evans’s argument does not completely discredit the thesis that Kierkegaard is a direct volitionalist; it does, however, undermine the strength of Pojman’s argument, as based on the ‘Interlude.’
Evans is not opposed to the idea of Kierkegaard as an indirect volitionalist. He points out that the passages from the ‘Interlude’, though not an indication of direct volitionalism, do indicate indirect volitionalism. Indirect volitionalism, Evans points out, (and Pojman agrees,) is not an objectionable thesis.
Evans explains the passages quoted from the ‘Interlude’: “Kierkegaard may have in mind the well-known fact that beliefs can be modified indirectly, in the course of doing other things” (Evans, 178-179). Evans points out that Kierkegaard emphasizes that the skeptics are exercising their power of will. The skeptic wills to refrain from drawing conclusions. Evans quotes Kiekegaard.
Insofar as he (the skeptic) uses dialectics in continually making the opposite equally probable, he does not erect his skepticism on dialectical arguments, which are nothing more than outer fortifications, human accommodations…By the power of the will he decides to restrain himself and hold himself back from any conclusion. (Philosophical Fragments, 84-85).
As Evans claims, there is indirect volitionalism occurring within the skeptical reasoning described by Kierkegaard. The skeptics utilized indirect volitionalism to achieve a state of suspenced judgement, by considering the opposite equally probable. But any reading of an issue of volitionalism, of any type, into these passages, is missing Kierkegaard’s point. Kierkegaard is not discussing control of mental states. He is discussing the concept of necessity and our freedom to deny contingent facts.
It might be said that the skeptic wills to doubt the reality of a state-of- affairs, or that he wills not to doubt, i.e. he wills to believe that a state-of- affairs is the case. But these expressions are not precise formulations of what is actually occurring. The skeptic does not literally decide not to believe in something. Strictly speaking, he decides that a specific conclusion does not follow from evidence that is given. The skeptic doesn’t have the power to believe or disbelieve whatever suits him (whether he fully understands himself or not.) But he does have control over his inferential reasoning. He can regard as insufficient, evidence that is generally accepted. This does not amount to possession of control over belief states. Rather, this control shows possession of an ability to exercise discretion concerning the validity of certain types of inferencing and the strength of evidence.
The skeptics were concerned with the process of reasoning. They did not want to risk false conclusions. Kierkegaard explains their project: “I am deceived only when I conclude something about that stick [that looks broken in the water]…this is why the skeptic keeps himself in suspenso, and this state was what he willed…([the skeptics say that the end in view is a mind suspended, which brings with it a tranquility like its shadow.])” (Philosophical Fragments, 83).
If they are willing a state of mind at all, that state of mind is in suspenso. The skeptics are not willing doubt, any more than the gullible are willing belief.
The contention that passages in the ‘Interlude’ imply that Kierkegaard thought we can will beliefs probably results from a blurring of the willing of belief with the acceptance of a conclusion. The appearance of such an implication is a consequence of an ambiguity in Kierkegaard’s language. If I decide to withhold judgement until I’m better informed, I’m not consciously willing a state of doubt. If I accept evidence, I’m not willing a belief. The belief is a consequence of my act of accepting evidence. It can be said that I am free to accept or reject evidence, except in certain cases, for example, cases of logical entailment, or perhaps in cases of self-evidence. But in the case of matters-of- fact, doubt is by virtue of the will, i.e. no type of necessity coerces assent.
4. Consider a broader reading of the Postscript
Direct volitionalism, the view that we can decide what to believe, is a doctrine that would to be most appropriately held by a metaphysical idealist, a solipsist, or perhaps a New Age convert–thinkers that deny, in some sense, the hard reality of the objective world. Pojman views willed belief and faith as problematic because he sees it as forcing ourselves to believe something, even though objective evidence would guide us in the opposite direction. If Christianity is without objective evidence, faith must just be created, in a way analogous to a solipsist’s concepts which are unconstrained by the realities of the external world. Pojman reasons, if we are to believe it, we must somehow just force ourselves to believe it.
Ironically, a very similar description of the leap, but intended as a caricature, can be found in Kierkegaard’s discussion of Lessing. Kierkegaard relates how Lessing sees an attempted leap: “One closes one’s eyes, grabs oneself by the neck, a la Munchhausen, and then–then one stands on the other side, on that other side of sound common sense in the promised land of the system” (Postscript, 99).
In this reference to a leap, the metaphor does not depict how we might come to accept the paradox. On the contrary, it is an exaggerated description of what systematicians mistakenly believe is possible, viz. that contingent historical truths could demonstrate eternal truths. Climacus maintains that a quantitative transition does not lead to a qualitative conclusion, i.e. decisions about matters pertaining to the eternal cannot be based on matters of fact, as if the inference were from one thing to another of the same kind.
In the words of Lessing, quoted by Climacus, “That [transition,] that is the ugly broad ditch that I cannot cross, however often and however earnestly I have tried to make the leap”(Postscript, 98). Climacus enjoys Lessing’s humour, when Lessing talks of earnestly wanting to make the leap. It is humourous, precisely because this leap can’t happen simply by wanting it (no matter how earnestly.) Climacus then, would similarly respond to Pojman; this leap doesn’t happen simply by wanting it (or willing it.) If a leap is possible, it is not like a decision made within the realm of historical matters-of-fact; it cannot happen by lifting oneself up by the neck. To become a Christian, and somehow cross this divide, an absolute decision is involved, a qualitative leap.
This point about historical truths being inadequate to ground Christianity is of major importance in the Postscript. Climacus regards the Hegelians as self- deceivers when they believe that they can ground Christianity in a system of existence. Climacus maintains that a system of existence cannot be given: “In order to think existence, systematic thought must think it as annulled and consequently not as existing” (Postscript, 118). This is because a system is by definition complete and all-inclusive. The systematic thinker, himself existing, cannot be part of his concluded system. Climacus says: “Who is supposed to write, or finish such a system?” (Postscript, 120). It is only a transcendent god that can have this bird’s eye view. But the Hegelians want to be able to include Christianity within the system.
In articulating the sense in which the truth of Christianity is unknowable, Climacus makes use of the concept ‘paradox.’ Christianity involves the absolute paradox of the godhead existing in time; it is the thesis that God has existed in human form. Climacus says “The only possible understanding of the absolute paradox is that it cannot be understood” (Postscript, 217-218).
Pojman might ask, if Climacus is not claiming that we can will faith, how then is he suggesting that we arrive at faith (given the lack of rational evidence to support faith?) I would respond, it is not clear that Climacus intends to guide us to faith at all. He discusses at length the importance of individuality and subjective thinking. He speaks of the transformation to inwardness and a reorientation away from objectivity. Rather than suggesting that we develop faith, Climacus describes a growing subjectivity through which the absolute paradox can be realized.
Though Climacus does not show an interest in volitionalism, he does put much effort into a discussion of willing the absolute telos (willing in the highest sense). Recall the discussions of the Pathos section (Postscript, 387-431). Climacus speaks of the individual whose existence is transformed because he has renounced everything but the highest good, which is willed for its own sake.
Absolute willing does not preclude relative willing, but the absolute relation can require renunciation of all relative end.Postscript, 405). The subjectively existing individual experiences continual temptation to relate absolutely to the world- historical, and must continually renew resolve. The subjective individual, relating to the absolute, acts, but not for fame, money, love, etc., not even for the good of humanity. These are relative ends, and are not willed absolutely. Only one thing is willed absolutely, viz. the absolute.
In these pages, Climacus is not only not supposing that we can or should will faith, but, on the contrary, is emphasizing that the transformed person absolutely wills only the absolute, to the exclusion of all else. Clearly this kind of absolute relationship precludes actions that control or transform one’s own belief state, for the purpose of becoming a Christian.
This sort of attempt to control one’s own belief state for the purpose of producing faith is analogous to the situation of the monks of the Middle Ages to which Climacus refers. In the monasteries much effort was put into creating a life and a frame of mind which, to all appearances, was close to God. Climacus declares: “True inwardness does not demand any sign at all in externals” (Postscript, 414). The absolute relation to the highest good does not follow from external actions. Cultivation of the outward appearance of Godliness can become the end in itself, resulting in the loss of the absoluteness of the relation to the absolute telos. Climacus remarks “renunciation of everything is nothing, if it is supposed to merit the highest good.”Postscript, 408).
A criterion of the absolute relationship to the absolute is the absence of any ulterior purpose, or any expectation of consequence or reward. “The specific sign that one relates oneself to the absolute is there is no reward expected.”Postscript, 402).
Willing to believe, directly or indirectly, is a relative willing, and hence a movement away from inwardness and the absolute relationship. To will a belief state, in order to achieve faith or eternal happiness, is willing something for consequences. Self-manipulation can only serve to separate the individual from the absolute. The absolute relationhship is not something gained by willing to achieve it. The act of willing anything other than the absolute undermines the absolute relationship.
The willing of the absolute good is the absolute decision, the qualitative leap. The will is involved in the process of becoming a Christian. But one doesn’t attempt to will the absolute in order to become a Christian, for then the absolute isn’t being willed for its own sake. However, Pojman’s position might be rephrased so as to allow a related objection to develop. Rather than arguing that there is no objective evidence to support belief, one might argue that there is nothing that would occasion willing the absolute. Since there can be no objective evidence to convince an individual to will the absolute, willing the absolute telos can only be something you must just force yourself to do. However, as in the case of the objectively unsubstantiated belief, there can be explanations for the absolute decision.
Evans suggests: “The believer might be convinced that the paradoxical nature of the god-man is a reality by a first-person encounter with the god-man. The belief is the result of the encounter with reality, not of some arbitrary act of the will” (Evans, 183). This encounter could not be considered rational objective evidence, but it could result in a transformation of an individual’s existence. Climacus hints at the occurrence of such encounters with phrases like ‘the moment the eternal touches,’ and ‘co-knowledge,’ and various other expressions which connote an experience of unity.
Investigation into possible explanations for the absolute decision–explanations that are alternatives to rational and objective evidence, and the notion that it is arbitrary–is a project that is suggested by the conclusion of this paper. In his book Transforming Vision9, M. Jamie Ferreira emphasizes the role that the imagination plays in the writings of Kiekegaard. The solution to the question of the explanation of the absolute decision may lie along these lines. A believer leaps, not as a rational being, but by virtue of the power of imagination.
Notes
This concern relates to the question of whether we ought to discover and/or acknowledge “objective truth.”
Pojman, Louis P., Religious Belief and the Will. (London and New York: Routledge & Kegen Paul, 1986) Subsequent references to this work will give the author’s name and the page number.
Evans, Stephen C. “Does Kierkegaard Think Beliefs can be Directly Willed?” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 26 (1989): 173-184. Subsequent references to this work will give the author’s name and the page number.
See David Wisdo, “Kierkegaard on Belief, Faith, and Explanation,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 21 (1987):95-114. See also M. Jaimie Ferreira, “Kierkegaardian Faith: ‘The Condition’ and the Response,” International Journal of Religion 28 (1990):63-79.
Louis P. Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity: Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Religion (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1984).
Louis P. Pojman, “Kierkegaard on Faith and Freedom,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 27 (1990):41-61.
References in this paper are to the following edition: Soren Kierkegaard [Johannes Climacus], Philosophical Fragments, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
References in this paper are to the following edition: Soren Kierkegaard [Johannes Climacus], Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragmemts, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).
M. Jamie Ferreira, Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).