However, because of the Japanese occupation, many conservative local leaders fled, removing the direct influence and consequently their usefulness to the GMD.
These Nationalists? difficulties bought the Communists a chance to prove themselves and take advantage of the situation. They were able to practice guerrilla warfare and Japanese atrocities played into their hands by driving millions of peasants into active resistance.
In the Japanese war the GMD had no chance, because their troops were badly organized and maintained and showed latter respect towards the peasants as well as their own soldiers. This made the people form China realise that in their situation, the Communist regime was the only one at that time, able to lead the nation towards improvement. Therefore it can be said, that the Japanese War was the perfect opportunity for the Communists to get the majority on their side and make them reject the GMD.
Another major contribution to Communist takeover of China was the Civil War, which lasted from 1946 to 89.
By autumn of 1946 the fighting between the Nationalists and the Communists was out of control. To the majority it appeared as if the GMD was in an appropriate position and therefore had a chance to win the Civil War. This was because they had a big stockpile of US weapons and their army outnumbered the CCP?s by 3 to 1.
The PLA (People?s Liberation Army) took control of the countryside, while Chiang occupied nearly all cities even Yanan.
During the Civil War the Nationalists managed to clear all communist units from central and south China, which did not contribute to the increase of power for their armies. There were three main reasons for this. Firstly, the Communists avoided large-scale battles; therefore the Nationalist advance did not imply the destruction of communist military forces. Secondly, the Nationalists were not able to consolidate their hold on lines of communication, e.g. railways and roads. This way their units had problems with receiving supplies or even being cut off completely. Finally the drastic increase of CCP forces, caused by peasants, which joined to fight on the side of the Communists.
When the Civil War began the GMD was advantaged by their military manpower, three times privileged in weaponry. But still, they were unable to convert these into a secure victory, due to their weak leadership qualities and the condition of the rank-and-file soldiers. GMD officers were known to be brutal an unfair, beating their men and swindle them of their pay and food. For families of those soldiers, who had fallen during the Civil War, there was no support scheme, even though they lost their labour and faced harsh economic circumstances.
As mentioned above, in contrast, communist armies had major strengths, which compensated for the early disadvantages regarding manpower and equipment. Even their officers were prepared to cooperate in regional strategies, without taking personal advantage. They fairly supplied the army with arms, medical services and food. Unlike the Nationalists, Communists also gave the rank and file regular political training, creating an understanding of the purpose of the war as well as the intentions of the party in promotion of reform for conquered areas and in support of their families. Due to their previously (during the Japanese war) learned experience, the Communists were qualified to fight with flexible tactics against their enemy, which lacked these abilities.
The decisive battle took place in Xuzhou, the main defense point for denying the Communists access to the lower Yangzi region from the north. With half a million deaths on each side the battle lasting two months, summited in a total Communist victory by 10 January 1949, with over 300 000 Nationalist troops taken prisoner.
Therefore it can be concluded that the Communist victory resulted from their military strengths and socio-political programs, as well as the opposite status and position of their enemy, the military weaknesses and other features of the GMD.
Overall, it can be disclosed that the Communists came to power in China mainly because of their useful methods, in which the mistakes of the Guomindang were taken advantage of. Besides, the CCP was able to fight more efficiently in the Civil and Japanese War, protecting the majority instead of ignoring it. The Communist leader, Mao Zedong, was finally able to take over the nation and proclaim it the Peoples Republic of China.
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