Assured Destruction). In the nuclear context, it only works whilst each side
believes that the threat is real – the countries involved believe each other
irrational enough to use it. The threat has to be a credible one but if it was
ever carried out it will be disastrous. Deterrence is based on actors being rational
in deterring potential aggression but find themselves in an irrational
situation, effectively signing themselves to suicide if war ever broke out.
Deterrence ultimately is a very dangerous game of bluff which only works whilst
everyone believes in it. Theoretically it is irrational and based on emotions
of revenge and so does not make much sense in the realist perspective to which
it is set. Bibliography. Calvocoressi, P. World Politics Since 1945.
6th edition. Longman. London. 1991 Finnis, Boyle and Grised. Nuclear
Deterrence, Morality and Realism. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1989 Hedley Bull. The Anarchical Society. 2nd
edition. Macmillan. London. 1995 Kegley and Wittkopf. World Politics. 5th
edition. St. Martins Press. New York. 1995