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Gorbachev Analysis Of Three Books About Gorbachev (стр. 2 из 2)

also mentions a gradual erosion of the ideological and moral values of Soviet

people as another argument for the need of restructuring. People did not

believe in the government because of the many promises that it made and never

accomplished; because the needs and opinions of ordinary working people, of the

public at large, were ignored. There was a process of decay in public morals;

“the great feeling of solidarity with each other that was forged during the

heroic times of the Revolution, the first five-year plans, the Great Patriotic

War and postwar rehabilitation was weakening” (p. 21-22). Gorbachev also talks

about alcoholism, drug addiction and culture alien to Soviet people, which “bred

vulgarity and low tastes and brought about ideological bareness”. This

statement about “alien to us” culture reminded me of how this fight against

“degeneration” which American movies and other media brings was carried out -

how people were hiding the fact that they have the VCR, how it would be almost

impossible to get a videotape with an American movie but people would still

manage to get it “through a friend of a friend” and then watch it, which as

Gorbachev puts it “bred vulgarity and low tastes”. Considering all the problems

the government made “the only logical conclusion” that the country was verging

on crisis. This conclusion was announced at the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of

the Central Committee, “which inaugurated the new strategy of perestroika and

formulated its basic principles” (p. 24). Gorbachev gives a plan of perestroika,

its component parts which include: overcoming the stagnation process, breaking

down the braking mechanism. It means mass initiative. “It is the comprehensive

development of democracy, socialist self-government, encouragement of initiative,

improved order and discipline, more glasnost, criticism in all spheres of the

society; respect for the individual”. Perestroika is also the intensification of

the Soviet economy, development of the principles of democratic centralism and

encouragement of socialist enterprise. It also means “the elimination from

society of the distortions of socialist ethics, implementation of the principles

of social justice. It means the unity of words and deeds, rights and duties”.

But Gorbachev does not forget to include Lenin and says that “the essence of

perestroika lies in the fact that it unites socialism with democracy and revives

the Leninist concept of socialist construction both in theory and in practice”

(p.34-35).

Gorbachev also gives his evaluation of perestroika. He is writing this book two

and a half years after the new line was launched and his assessment is as

follows: “perestroika is just getting of the ground. So far we have only been

shaping the mechanisms of acceleration” (p. 64). The real work for him is still

ahead and the main task is to get the whole society involved in the process of

restructuring.

In conclusion Gorbachev spends a lot of time talking about “new political

thinking”, new Soviet foreign policy which should benefit international

relations, especially Soviet-American relations and provide for “nuclear-free,

non-violent world”. The main task of the Soviet foreign policy is to move “from

suspicion and hostility to confidence, from a balance of fear to a balance of

reason and goodwill, from narrow nationalist egoism to cooperation” (p. 254).

Gorbachev feels that the not only the Soviet Union but the whole world needs

restructuring, a fundamental change – this, of course, does not come as a

surprise, if we remember that since 1917 first Bolsheviks and than communists

wanted to make this “fundamental change”.

The three books that were discussed above were all written by different authors

and in different times but still basically they all have the same approach.

Medvedev and Lewin both approve the new leader of the Soviet Union and give all

kinds of good adjectives to describe him such as “bright” and “intelligent”.

They both are optimistic about the future of the country although make it clear

that this is only a beginning of the story to follow and since the perestroika

just started at the time they were writing their works they can only speculate

about what would happen to the country. As for Gorbachev he is probably the

most optimistic about the new line which is not surprising since he is the

leader and leaders should radiate with confidence. He is also the best source

for finding out what perestroika is all about, its goals and its origins. Of

course now in 1996 many of his statements sound unfounded, even funny but when

we read his work we have to keep in mind that back in 1985 Gorbachev’s ideas

sounded new and revolutionary, destined to change the Soviet Union and even the

whole world – which did in fact happen.

The question whether Gorbachev’s perestroika was a failure or a success does not

have an easy immediate answer. Some scholars argue that the reforms that lasted

from 1985 to 1990 caused the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving the country

on the verge of crisis, with economy in chaos and no certain future. Joan E.

Spero, the author of the book “The Politics Of International Economic Relations”,

is the supporter of this point of view. In the chapter entitled “The Failure

of Perestroika” she shows by using different examples, such as economical

progress, stability of the country and so on, that Gorbachev failed to achive

the objectives of perestroika (Spero, 1996, p336). Although I agree that

Gorbachev did not achieve some of the goals stated in his book “Perestroika”, I

believe that perestroka was a success to a certain extent. First of all, he did

achieve some of the objectives. For instance, after the reforms the society did

become more open thanks to glasnost. People for the first time since 1917 could

say what they really thought and not what was “good for the party”. People also

gained access to all sorts of information which was previously denied to them.

Children in schools and students in colleges could finally learn the history as

it was and not as it was seen by the Communist party. Another major success of

perestroika was the increasing openness of the country to the West which led to

a considerable improvements in East-West relations. This also led to the

gradual reduction of arms and considerable decline in defense spending in the

Soviet Union as well as in the United States. Considering these and other

positive results of perestroika I would have to disagree with those people who

say that it was a complete failure. The restructuring that took place in the

Soviet Union has many dimensions – some are positive, some are negative. One-

sided view which Joan E. Spero and other scholars advocate is not correct, since

it concentrates only on the adverse effects of perestroika, completely ignoring

all the positive effects that it had.

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